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ARTICLES 
THE RIGHT TO CONTEST AI 
Margot E. Kaminski * & Jennifer M. Urban** 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used to make important 
decisions, from university admissions selections to loan determinations to 
the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. These uses of AI raise a host of 
concerns about discrimination, accuracy, fairness, and accountability. 
In the United States, recent proposals for regulating AI focus largely 
on ex ante and systemic governance. This Article argues instead—or re-
ally, in addition—for an individual right to contest AI decisions, mod-
eled on due process but adapted for the digital age. The European Union, 
in fact, recognizes such a right, and a growing number of institutions 
around the world now call for its establishment. This Article argues that 
despite considerable differences between the United States and other coun-
tries, establishing the right to contest AI decisions here would be in keep-
ing with a long tradition of due process theory. 
This Article then fills a gap in the literature, establishing a theoret-
ical scaffolding for discussing what a right to contest should look like in 
practice. This Article establishes four contestation archetypes that should 
serve as the bases of discussions of contestation both for the right to contest 
AI and in other policy contexts. The contestation archetypes vary along 
two axes: from contestation rules to standards and from emphasizing pro-
cedure to establishing substantive rights. This Article then discusses four 
processes that illustrate these archetypes in practice, including the first in-
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depth consideration of the GDPR’s right to contestation for a U.S. audi-
ence. Finally, this Article integrates findings from these investigations to 
develop normative and practical guidance for establishing a right to con-
test AI. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What appeals rights, if any, should people have when they are sub-
jected to decision-making by artificial intelligence (AI)?1 The right to chal-
lenge decisions with significant effects is a core principle of the rule of 
                                                                                                                                
 1. For purposes of discussion, this Article uses “AI” decision-making as a shorthand 
to refer to decision-making by algorithms more generally. Though computer scientists 
would not consider all of the algorithms used for decision-making today to qualify as artifi-
cial intelligence, decision-making algorithms are rapidly growing more sophisticated. See, 
e.g., Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1305, 
1307 (2019) (indicating the range of applications to which decision-making algorithms have 
been applied, including playing chess and driving vehicles). More practically, even relatively 
simple algorithms can be used to substitute, in whole or in part, for human decision-
making—an extension, or replacement, of human intelligence. Id. at 1335 (“[Legal self-
help systems] are simple expert systems—often in the form of chatbots—that provide ordi-
nary users with answers to basic legal questions.”). 
It is helpful, though, to consider the background behind the shorthand. An algorithm 
is a computer program. E.g., David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing With the Data: What Legal 
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 660–61 (2017). 
There are many different kinds of algorithms of varying levels of autonomy and sophistica-
tion, some of which are collectively referred to as AI: These range from programs that auto-
mate fields of human expertise by mapping out what human experts know, to algorithms 
that scan vast amounts of data, to algorithms that, effectively, create their own rules. See, 
e.g., Surden, supra, at 1310 (dividing AI into (1) machine learning and (2) logical rules and 
knowledge representation). Algorithmic decision-making entails using a computer program 
to make a decision. This can mean taking the decision a computer program gives you as the 
end result or relying on such a decision as a significant element in human decision-making. 
See, e.g., Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019) (defining an 
automated decision system as “a computational process . . . , that makes a decision or facili-
tates human decision making, that impacts consumers”). 
The EU’s recently proposed Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) similarly defines “AI” ex-
pansively. The draft AIA defines an “AI system” as “software that is developed with one or 
more of the techniques and approaches listed in Annex I,” which include (a) machine-
learning approaches, (b) logic- and knowledge-based approaches, and (c) statistical ap-
proaches, and that “can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, generate outputs such 
as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing the environments they 
1960 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
law.2 Yet it is unclear how this principle will fare for significant decisions 
made or facilitated by AI. 
As data collection and storage have become cheaper, processing has 
become faster, and algorithms have become more complex and more ef-
fective at certain tasks, the use of AI in decision-making has increased. The 
government and private sector now use algorithms to decide how to dis-
tribute welfare benefits,3 whether to hire or fire a person,4 whether expres-
sive material should be removed from online platforms,5 whether to keep 
people in prison,6 and more.7 
The increasing use of AI to aid or substitute for human decision-
making raises the question of what, if any, process should be afforded those 
affected by these decisions.8 Machine decision-making can be technically 
                                                                                                                                
interact with.” European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial 
Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, at tit. I art. 3(1), annex I, 
COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021). 
 2. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975) 
(“The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before 
a person is finally deprived of his property interests.” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 557–58 (1974))). 
 3. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
1249, 1252 (2008) [hereinafter Citron, Technological Due Process]; see also Ryan Calo & 
Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 70 
Emory L.J. 797, 800–01 (2021); David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. 
Sharkey & Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in 
Federal Administrative Agencies 17 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5G5-X24E] (showcasing that 
AI is used, among other things, in social welfare policy). 
 4. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems, 34 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 621, 631–33 (2021) [hereinafter Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative]; Ifeoma 
Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671, 
1694 (2020) [hereinafter Ajunwa, Paradox of Automation] (citing the example of Goldman 
Sachs building an algorithmic model to automate all management, including hiring and 
firing); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 857, 
860 (2017). 
 5. See Rory Van Loo, Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. 829, 
836–37 (2021) (discussing the processes used by technology platforms to resolve disputes); 
infra notes 312–313 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 Emory L.J. 59, 61 
(2017); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: Administrative 
Process for Machine Learning, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 773, 776 (2019); Rebecca Wexler, Life, 
Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1343, 1348 (2018). 
 7. See, e.g., Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 6, at 784 –85 (collecting examples of 
government use of algorithmic decision-making, including determining veterans’ disability 
compensation; evaluating teachers and determining their compensation; identifying chil-
dren at risk of abuse or neglect; and allocating public services). 
 8. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process 
for Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2014) [hereinafter Citron & Pasquale, 
Scored Society]; Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1281; Kate Crawford & 
Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy 
2021] THE RIGHT TO CONTEST AI 1961 
 
inscrutable and thus difficult to contest; it is likely to become even less 
scrutable as black-box machine-learning techniques expand.9 Humans 
may exhibit an “automation bias” that creates overconfidence in machine 
decisions,10 and an ensuing bias against challenges to those decisions.11 It 
is unclear how challenges, especially if they come with meaningful process 
rights, will affect the cost efficiencies that automated decision-making 
promises to deliver. And if related due process protections such as trans-
parency and notice are implemented badly or not at all, meaningful chal-
lenges will not be possible. 
In the United States, regulatory proposals directed at algorithmic 
decision-making have largely ignored calls for individual due process in 
favor of system-wide regulation aimed at risk mitigation. To the extent 
there has been convergence among recent U.S. policy proposals, it has 
been on the need for systemic policy solutions, such as algorithmic impact 
assessments or auditing, rather than an individual right to contest.12 
                                                                                                                                
Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 93, 109 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 Va. 
L. Rev. 611, 651 (2020) [hereinafter Huq, A Right to a Human Decision]; Aziz Z. Huq, 
Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 1875, 1905 (2020) 
[hereinafter Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State]. 
 9. See, e.g., Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of 
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 New Media & 
Soc’y 973, 981–82 (2016); Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity 
in Machine Learning Algorithms, Big Data & Soc’y Jan.–June 2016, at 3 (“At the heart of 
this challenge is an opacity that relates to the specific techniques used in machine learning.”); 
Tal Zarsky, The Trouble With Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine 
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 Sci. Tech. & Hum. 
Values 118, 123–27 (2016) [hereinafter Zarsky, The Trouble With Algorithmic Decisions]. 
See generally Emre Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions in the GDPR: An 
Attempt for Systemisation 17 (Jan. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions] 
(“Automated data-driven systems are distinguished by their complex, increasingly autono-
mous, and adaptive properties which render their technical dimension and inner workings 
obscure to human cognition.”); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1503 [hereinafter Zarsky, Transparent Predictions] (describing the importance of transpar-
ency and advancing a framework for understanding the role it must play in AI regulation). 
 10. Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection 
Directive and Automated Profiling, 17 Comput. L. & Sec. Rep. 17, 18 (2001) [hereinafter 
Bygrave, Minding the Machine] (describing humans’ “automatic acceptance of the validity 
of the decisions reached”); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72; 
Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based 
on Profiling, in EU Internet Law 77, 83 (Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux, 
Christiana Markou & Thalia Prastitou eds., 2017) (“The Commission . . . expressed a fear 
that such processes will cause humans to take for granted the validity of the decisions reached 
and thereby reduce their own responsibilities to investigate and determine the matters 
involved.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72. 
 12. See, e.g., Algorithm Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 
1655, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (explaining that the act, “[r]elating to estab-
lishing guidelines for government procurement and use of automated decision systems,” 
attempts to establish “algorithmic accountability report[s]”); Margot E. Kaminski, Binary 
Governance: Lessons From the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal. 
1962 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
In Europe, by contrast, regulators are taking a more holistic approach 
to algorithmic decision-making. The European Union’s (EU) General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which went into effect in May 2018, 
establishes a complex set of regulations of algorithmic decision-making 
that span multiple contexts and sectors.13 The GDPR incorporates both 
systemic governance measures and various individual rights for data sub-
jects: transparency, notice, access, a right to object to processing, and, for 
those subject to automated decision-making, the right to contest certain 
decisions.14 
Likewise, the Council of Europe has articulated a right to contest in 
its amended data protection convention, known as Convention 108.15 The 
Council of Europe is an international human rights organization that con-
sists of all the EU Member States plus additional non-EU members.16 As of 
now, forty countries have signed on to the amended Convention.17 Twelve 
have ratified it.18 The amended Convention states that “[e]very individual 
shall have a right[] . . . not to be subject to a decision significantly affecting 
him or her based solely on an automated processing of data without having 
his or her views taken into consideration.”19 In 2020, the Council of Europe 
adopted recommendations on AI, explaining that individuals should be 
                                                                                                                                
L. Rev. 1529, 1582–1607 (2019) [hereinafter Kaminski, Binary Governance] (contrasting 
and analyzing the GDPR’s interplay between individual rights and collaborative 
governance) [hereinafter Kaminski, Binary Governance]. But see California’s newly 
enacted amendment to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the California Privacy 
Rights Act (CPRA), which includes a provision on individual rights requiring the California 
Privacy Protection Agency to issue  
regulations governing access and opt‐out rights with respect to businesses’ 
use of automated decisionmaking technology, including profiling and re-
quiring businesses’ response to access requests to include meaningful in-
formation about the logic involved in those decisionmaking processes, as 
well as a description of the likely outcome of the process with respect to 
the consumer. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.185(16) (2020). 
 13. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) 1 (EU) [hereinafter 
GDPR]; Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1538–40 (comparing human and 
algorithmic decision-making). 
 14. See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3). 
 15. Council of Eur., Convention 108+: Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 15 (2018), https://rm.coe.int/ 
convention-108-convention-for-the-protection-of-individuals-with-regar/16808b36f1 [https: 
//perma.cc/N5DL-DUWQ] [hereinafter Convention 108]. 
 16. Id. at 34. 
 17. Modernisation of the Data Protection “Convention 108”, Council of Eur., 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/28-january-data-protection-day-factsheet [https://perma 
.cc/C5FR-HK7E] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 18. Italy, a 12th Ratification for Convention 108+, Council of Eur. (July 8, 2021), 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/-/italy-a-12th-ratification-for-convention-10-1 
[https://perma.cc/P8TN-7CCS]. 
 19. Convention 108, supra note 15, art. 9(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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provided “effective means to contest relevant determinations and 
decisions.”20 
The right to contest AI is developing traction outside of Europe, too. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
an intergovernmental economic organization focused on stimulating 
world trade, includes a right to contest in its recommendations on AI.21 
The OECD’s recommendations have historically formed the basis of data 
protection laws around the world, and its recommendations on AI are 
likely to be similarly influential. Brazil’s comprehensive data protection 
law, enacted in 2018, includes “the right to request a review of decisions 
taken” by AI.22 In November 2020, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada recommended that Canadian data privacy law be revised to in-
clude a right to contest AI decisions.23 The proposed amendments to 
Quebec’s privacy law, Bill 64, include a limited right to contest.24 
Despite this, few have given attention to the right to contest AI. Alt-
hough the GDPR’s notice and transparency requirements for AI, espe-
cially the so-called “right to explanation,” have attracted a flurry of schol-
arly analysis,25 contestation has not garnered as much attention.26 And alt-
hough the right to contest is clearly established in the GDPR, regulators 
                                                                                                                                
 20. Council of Eur., Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems 9, 13 (2020) 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docume
ntId=09000016809e1154 [https://perma.cc/YC8H-QUTX] [hereinafter Council of Eur., 
Recommendation on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems] (emphasis 
added). 
 21. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, § 1.3.iv, OECD 
Legal Instruments (May 5, 2019), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/ 
OECD-LEGAL-0449 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
 22. See General Personal Data Protection Act (LGPD), Law No. 13,709, art. 20, 2018, 
https://lgpd-brazil.info/chapter_03/article_20 [https://perma.cc/W2CL-SFTW] (Braz.). 
 23. A Regulatory Framework for AI: Recommendations for PIPEDA Reform, Off. of the 
Priv. Comm’r of Can., (Nov. 2020), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/ 
consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai/reg-fw_202011/ [https://perma.cc/ 
E6ZL-AP7H]; see also Ignacio Cofone, Policy Proposals for PIPEDA Reform to Address 
Artificial Intelligence Report, Off. of the Priv. Comm’r of Can. (Nov. 2020), https://www.priv. 
gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai 
/pol-ai_202011/#fn190-rf [https://perma.cc/Y4MH-YZ2X] (last updated Nov. 12, 2020). 
 24. An Act to Modernize Legislative Provisions as Regards the Protection of Personal 
Information, National Assembly of Québec, Bill 64, 102.12.1, 102.12.1(3) (2020) (Can.). In 
addition to the right to correct erroneous information used to arrive at the decision, “[t]he 
person concerned must be given the opportunity to submit observations to a member of the 
personnel of the enterprise who is in a position to review the decision.” Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 189, 192 n.8 (2019) [hereinafter Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained] (cit-
ing literature). 
 26. A minority of European scholars have discussed contestation. See Mireille 
Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to Agonistic 
Machine Learning, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 83, 119–20 (2019) [hereinafter Hildebrandt, 
1964 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
have yet to give meaningful guidance on what the right is or how it should 
be implemented. 
This Article takes on the right to contest, both descriptively and nor-
matively. It seeks to fill the gap in commentary and bridge the U.S. and EU 
conversations. This Article is the first to examine at length this right and 
its content, and the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the GDPR right 
to contestation for a U.S. audience.27 
This Article investigates a central question about regulating algorith-
mic decision-making: Should there be a right to contest AI decisions? In 
investigating this question, this Article uncovers and fills a substantial gap 
in the literature: the lack of a theoretical scaffolding for discussing contes-
tation models for privatized process at speed and at scale. This Article 
probes this question theoretically, considering reasons frequently given for 
establishing individual due process rights, and comparatively, through in-
depth case studies of existing contestation systems. Ultimately, we find 
merit in the possibility of establishing a right to contest AI, including 
                                                                                                                                
Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self] (“This should result in testable and contest-
able decision-systems whose human overlords can be called to account, squarely facing the 
legal interpretability problem and its relationship with the computer science interpretability 
problem.”); Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the 
Profiling Era, in Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2012, at 41, 49–54 (Jacques Bus Malcolm 
Crompton, Mireille Hildebrandt & George Metakides eds., 2012); Mendoza & Bygrave, su-
pra note 10, at 93–94 (“[A] right of contest is not simply a matter of being able to say ‘stop’, 
but is akin to a right of appeal . . . . [T]o be meaningful, it must set . . . an obligation to hear 
and consider the merits of the appeal . . . . [I]t must additionally . . . provide . . . reasons for 
the decision.”). 
 27. Related work that touches on the right to contest includes Emre Bayamlıoğlu, 
Contesting Automated Decisions: A View of Transparency Implications, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. 
Rev. 433, 433–35 (2018) [hereinafter Bayamlıoğlu, Contesting Automated Decisions] (dis-
cussing transparency requirements for effective contestation of automated decisions from a 
European perspective); Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9, 
at 3–4, 17 (proposing a transparency framework from a European perspective); Huq, A 
Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 621–22 (interpreting Article 22 as establishing 
a “right to a human decision,” and rejecting such a right). In an article arguing for counter-
factuals as a method of providing the “explanation” required by Recital 71 of the GDPR, 
Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell assert that these explanatory counter-
factuals could support contestation rights. Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris 
Russell, Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: Automated 
Decisions and the GDPR, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 841, 872–78 (2018) [hereinafter Wachter et 
al., Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box]. 
Deirdre K. Mulligan and coauthors have developed the related concept of “contestable 
design”: system design that encourages and allows iterative human engagement in a system’s 
evolution and deployment. Contestable design operates differently from ex post contesta-
tion, but systems designed for contestability could support contestation in practice. See, e.g., 
Daniel Kluttz, Nitin Kohli & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Shaping Our Tools: Contestability as a 
Means to Promote Responsible Algorithmic Decision Making in the Professions, in After the 
Digital Tornado: Networks, Algorithms, Humanity 137, 139 (Kevin Webach ed., 2020); 
Daniel N. Kluttz & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Automated Decision Support Technologies and the 
Legal Profession, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 861 (2019); Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 6, 
at 791, 850–57.  
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where decisions are made by private actors, to further due process values. 
We consider how to design an effective right. 
Part I introduces some of the challenges algorithmic decision-making 
presents and how they might relate to contestation. Part II turns to 
whether a right to contest AI decision-making can find theoretical pur-
chase. Part III looks to models for contestation, establishing four contesta-
tion archetypes and examining them in action through comparative case 
studies. It considers the GDPR’s right to contest and Member State imple-
mentations of it, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “notice-and-
takedown” scheme for online copyright infringement, the Fair Credit 
Billing Act’s contestation scheme for credit card charges, and the EU’s so-
called “right to be forgotten.” Part IV integrates the findings from these 
investigations and develops normative and practical guidance for design-
ing a right to contest AI. 
I. AI DECISION-MAKING: KNOWN PROBLEMS AND CONTESTATION 
 AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
On March 23, 2020, the International Baccalaureate Organization 
(IBO) canceled spring exams in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.28 
More than 170,000 students in nearly 150 countries29 faced this final hur-
dle in their two-year journey toward an International Baccalaureate (IB) 
Diploma—a credential used by universities around the world to determine 
admissions and scholarships and to award advanced course credits.30 In 
lieu of exams, the IBO chose to evaluate students using an algorithm.31 
On July 6, the IBO released final “grades,” to international uproar.32 
Many students discovered that their grades were lower than they and their 
                                                                                                                                
 28. May 2020 Examinations Will No Longer Be Held, Int’l Baccalaureate Org. (Mar. 
23, 2020), https://www.ibo.org/news/news-about-the-ib/may-2020-examinations-will-no-longer-
be-held/ [https://perma.cc/ZY2C-ALTU]. 
 29. Int’l Baccalaureate Org., The IB Diploma Programme Final Statistical Bulletin: 
May 2020 Assessment Session 2 (2020), https://www.ibo.org/contentassets/bc850970f4e54b 
87828f83c7976a4db6/dp-statistical-bulletin-may-2020-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2EJ-HVUP]. 
 30. University Admission, Int’l Baccalaureate Org., https://www.ibo.org/university-ad-
mission/ [https://perma.cc/84UW-GV6R] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 31. The IBO announced that it would employ a “method that uses data, both historical 
and from the present session, to arrive at the subject grades for each student,” and that it 
would be “undertaking significant data analysis” as part of “a rigorous process of due dili-
gence in what is a truly unprecedented situation.” The Assessment and Awarding Model for 
the Diploma Programme May 2020 Session, Int’l Baccalaureate Org. (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.ibo.org/news/news-about-ib-schools/the-assessment-and-awarding-model-for-
the-diploma-programme-may-2020-session/ [https://perma.cc/5TBD-36LP]. 
 32. See, e.g., Anam Rizvi, International Baccalaureate Organisation Defends Awarding 
Model After Backlash from Pupils, National (July 15, 2020), https://www.thenational.ae/ 
uae/education/international-baccalaureate-organisation-defends-awarding-model-after-back 
lash-from-pupils-1.1049550/ [https://perma.cc/9F3H-FQHA]; Tom Simonite, Meet the 
Secret Algorithm That’s Keeping Students Out of College, WIRED (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/algorithm-set-students-grades-altered-futures/ [https://perma 
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teachers had expected.33 Some students lost scholarships, leaving them un-
certain how to pay for college.34 Others feared losing provisional ac-
ceptances to universities.35 In Colorado, Isabel Castaneda’s “heart sank” 
when she saw that she had failed a number of IB courses, including high-
level Spanish, her native language. In an interview, Castaneda said, “I 
come from a low-income family—and my entire last two years were driven 
by the goal of getting as many college credits as I could to save money on 
school.”36 
By July, more than 15,000 students and parents had signed an online 
petition asserting that the magnitude of downgrading some students ex-
perienced “is . . . blatant evidence of a faulty algorithm.”37 The IBO up-
dated grades based on feedback it received but ultimately stood by its 
method.38 The IBO refused to answer questions about its system, which it 
characterized as an “IB awarding model, not a computer-based algo-
rithm.”39 The IBO stated, however, that the model combined completed 
coursework, predictive grades, and “school context” to determine 
grades.40 
All of this only raised more red flags for critics. It suggested that stu-
dents from historically poorer-performing schools could be disadvan-
taged, and that this would disproportionately harm students from 
                                                                                                                                
.cc/QYM4-53EG] [hereinafter Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm] (last updated July 13, 
2020). 
 33. Chan Ho-him, Number of Hong Kong Students With Perfect Scores in 
International Baccalaureate Drops by Nearly a Third After Grading System Change Amid 
Pandemic, S. China Morning Post (July 6, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ 
education/article/3092054/number-hong-kong-students-perfect-scores-international/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/NMX9-RV6T]; see also Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32 (ex-
plaining that several students received results much lower than expected by their teachers). 
 34. Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Avi Asher-Schapiro, Global Exam Grading Algorithm Under Fire for Suspected 
Bias, Reuters (July 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-tech-education-
analysis-trfn/global-exam-grading-algorithm-under-fire-for-suspected-bias-idUSKCN24M29L/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YLM-GNX2]. 
 37. Ali Zagmout, Justice for May 2020 IB Graduates—Build a Better Future! 
#IBSCANDAL, Change.org, https://www.change.org/p/international-baccalaureate-organ 
isation-ibo-justice-for-may-2020-ib-graduates-build-a-better-future/ [https://perma.cc/952Z 
-88VH] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 38. Int’l Baccalaureate Org., supra note 29, at 1. 
 39. Awarding May 2020 Results Further Information, Int’l Baccalaureate Org. (Mar. 
23, 2020), https://www.ibo.org/news/news-about-the-ib/awarding-may-2020-results-further 
-information [https://perma.cc/57NU-WRVN]; see also Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, 
supra note 32. Experts considered this characterization implausible. See Asher-Schapiro, 
supra note 36. 
 40. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 36. According to a statement by the IB, a “school’s own 
record was built into the model,” which used “historical data to model predicted grade ac-
curacy, as well as the record of the school to do better or worse on examinations compared 
with coursework.” Id. For schools with little historical data, IB would use data pooled from 
other schools. Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32. 
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historically marginalized groups.41 Others pointed out that a school’s rec-
ord might not be a reliable indicator for individual students, pointing to 
the surprisingly large drops from predictive to final grade that some stu-
dents experienced as evidence that the statistical model was inaccurate for 
individuals.42 
At first, the IBO offered only its usual appeals route or for students to 
retake exams in November, both of which require paying fees.43 On July 14, 
the IBO relented to an extent by making changes to its appeals process.44 It 
still did not release details about its decision-making system, leaving open 
the question of how students and universities could know whether the 
grading model was accurate or fair.45 A recent article in the Harvard Business 
Review notes that “what the IBO could have done instead was offer 
appellants the right to a human-led re-evaluation of anomalous grades, 
specify what input data the appeal committee would focus on in reanalyzing 
the case, and explain how the problem would be fixed.”46 In other words, 
the IBO could have afforded students a right to contest the algorithm. 
The IBO’s decision to use an algorithm to determine important out-
comes for a class of people is far from uncommon today. Indeed, the IB 
controversy is not the only algorithmic grading controversy. In England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland, officials also responded to the pandemic by 
using an algorithm to grade the exams taken by university-bound stu-
dents.47 Met with vehement opposition when nearly 40% of students were 
assigned lower grades than predicted,48 education officials reverted to the 
predicted grades.49 
                                                                                                                                
 41. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 36. The student and parent petition expressed that the 
average grades masked and exacerbated this inequality, arguing that “[t]he global average 
has increased obviously due to the fact that certain schools around the world achieved much 
higher grades than before.” Zagmout, supra note 37. 
 42. Scott Jaschik, What’s Wrong With This Year’s IB Scores?, Inside Higher Ed (July 
13, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2020/07/13/algorithm-
used-ib-scores-year-blamed-students-low-marks/ [https://perma.cc/6268-XH8E]. 
 43. Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32. 
 44. Catherine Lough, Exclusive: IB ‘Concession’ Over Grade Appeals, Tes (July 14, 
2020), https://www.tes.com/news/coronavirus-ib-concession-over-grades-welcomed-head 
teachers [https://perma.cc/D7CK-RR22] (reporting that the IB changed its appeals pro-
cess to “make[] it potentially easier for students to receive higher grades if they appeal 
against their results”). 
 45. Theodoros Evgeniou, David R. Hardoon & Anton Ovchinnikov, What Happens 
When AI Is Used to Set Grades?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/ 
what-happens-when-ai-is-used-to-set-grades/ [https://perma.cc/E2PG-495U] (noting that, 
“[s]ince the specifics of the program are not disclosed, all people can see are the results”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. A-Levels and GCSEs: How Did the Exam Algorithm Work?, BBC (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-53807730 [https://perma.cc/28WT-9YS5]. 
 48. Matt Burgess, The Lessons We All Must Learn From the A-Levels Algorithm 
Debacle, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gcse-results-alevels-
algorithm-explained [https://perma.cc/G8NE-4FMB]. 
 49. A-Levels and GCSEs: How Did the Exam Algorithm Work?, supra note 47. 
1968 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
As important as entrance-exam grades are for students, even more 
significant decisions are now entrusted to algorithms. Both the public and 
private sectors now regularly delegate decision-making to AI. Algorithms 
have been used for employment decisions,50 welfare benefits distribution 
and denials,51 policing,52 housing advertisements,53 risk assessments at 
criminal sentencing,54 COVID-19 vaccine allocation,55 and home-health-
care resources,56 among many other applications. 
The use of AI is growing in large part because of efficiency: AI can be 
cheaper and faster than human decision-makers. It may be the only viable 
                                                                                                                                
 50. Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative, supra note 4, at 631–40 (discussing “the business case 
for the trend toward automated hiring,” noting “the potential for automated hiring systems 
to be misused to produce unlawful employment discrimination,” and describing how such 
systems may serve to mask employment discrimination or impede its detection”); Ajunwa, 
Paradox of Automation, supra note 4, at 1692–704 (“The automation of the hiring process 
represents a particularly important technological trend and one that requires greater legal 
attention given its potential for employment discrimination.”); Kim, supra note 4, at 867–
92 (considering “the potential for data models to eliminate” bias in the workplace). 
 51. Calo & Citron, supra note 3, at 799–801 (explaining that Idaho and Michigan are 
among the states whose agencies have used flawed systems to automate public-benefits de-
terminations); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1256 (recounting how 
the Colorado Benefits Management System issues thousands of incorrect eligibility determi-
nations and benefit calculations, many as a result of coding errors); Engstrom et al., supra 
note 3, at 17 (explaining that a study of AI and machine learning in U.S. federal agencies 
found social welfare agencies to have the fourth-highest number of use cases). 
 52. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and 
the Future of Law Enforcement 18–19 (2017) (“Big data tools create the potential for big 
data policing.”). 
 53. See Charge of Discrimination, Facebook, FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8, slip op. ¶¶ 7–21 
(Mar. 28, 2019) (alleging that Facebook “uses machine learning and other prediction tech-
niques to classify and group users” to determine the audience for advertisements, including 
housing advertisements). 
 54. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 67–88 (observing that “the use of actuarial tools heralds 
a new, data-centric approach to prediction in sentencing”); Mulligan & Bamberger, supra 
note 6, at 776–77 (discussing a case involving the constitutionality of risk assessment software 
used in sentencing in Wisconsin); Wexler, supra note 6, at 1348 (observing that “[r]isk as-
sessment instruments are among the most controversial” automated criminal justice 
technologies). 
 55. Noah Weiland, At a National Kickoff Event, Officials Plead With the Public to Get 
Vaccinated, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/12/14/ 
world/covid-19-coronavirus/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 4, 
2021) (“The five people were selected by an algorithm the hospital used to assign the first 
doses, the result of a survey hospital employees filled out that asked about age and underly-
ing medical conditions.”); see also Lenny Bernstein, Lateshia Beachum & Hannah Knowles, 
Stanford Apologizes for Coronavirus Vaccine Plan That Left Out Many Front-Line Doctors, 
Wash. Post (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/18/stanford 
-hospital-protest-covid-vaccine/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 56. See Erin McCormick, What Happened When a ‘Wildly Irrational’ Algorithm Made 
Crucial Healthcare Decisions, Guardian (July 2, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2021/jul/02/algorithm-crucial-healthcare-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/67MD-
SDDP] (explaining the effects of an algorithm the state of Idaho created to apportion home 
care assistance). 
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option when decisions must be made at scale.57 Proponents also claim that 
algorithms can be fairer, less biased, and more accurate than human deci-
sion-makers.58 Indeed, despite substantial evidence of mistakes and dis-
criminatory effects,59 scholars see an unsettling tendency for humans to 
place excessive trust in algorithmic decisions,60 tempted by what Paul 
Schwartz in 1992 called the “seductive precision” of computational out-
puts.61 There is evidence that human decision-makers may rely more read-
ily on these machine decisions, trusting them as “objective” even when 
they are not.62 
But AI is not always accurate and does not eliminate human bias. In 
some cases, it instead obfuscates bias with layers of ostensibly objective 
mathematical authority. As the IBO example and others illustrate, the use 
of and reliance on AI for significant decision-making raises a host of con-
cerns about inaccuracy, bias, discrimination, and other errors. For exam-
ple, an algorithm used to allocate home-health-care resources in multiple 
U.S. states failed to take into account important aspects of patients’ situa-
tions—including whether they had diabetes or cerebral palsy—resulting 
in cuts in care, “incalculable human suffering,” and death.63 An algorithm 
used by the Mass General Brigham health system to estimate kidney func-
                                                                                                                                
 57. See, e.g., infra note 358 and accompanying text (describing how receiving millions 
or billions of copyright takedown notices impels online service providers to implement al-
gorithmic processing systems). 
 58. E.g., Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 
7–8 (2018); Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 654 –55. 
 59. See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, 
Police, and Punish the Poor 168 (2018) (describing machines’ lack of empathy); Andrew D. 
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 109, 120–21 (2017) [hereinafter 
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing] (noting examples of algorithm use with dis-
criminatory outcomes). 
 60. See Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 18 (observing that the 
European Commission expressed a fear that “the increasing automatisation of decision-
making processes engenders automatic acceptance of the validity of the decisions reached 
and a concomitant reduction in the investigatory and decisional responsibilities of hu-
mans”); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72 (observing that “[t]he 
cognitive system’s engineering literature has found that human beings view automated sys-
tems as error-resistant” and that “[o]perators of automated systems tend to trust a com-
puter’s answers”); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 83 (“The Commission also 
expressed anxieties over the quality of fully automated decision-making processes, more 
specifically a fear that such processes will cause humans to take for granted the validity of 
the decisions reached . . . .”). 
 61. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of 
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 Hastings L.J. 1321, 1341–42 (1992) (at-
tributing the computer’s “seductive precision” to “the difference between the power that 
we attribute to it and its actual capacities and limitations”). 
 62. See Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72 (“Studies show 
that human beings rely on automated decisions even when they suspect system 
malfunction.”). 
 63. McCormick, supra note 56. 
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tion assigned Black people healthier scores than it assigned to white peo-
ple with similar kidney function, leaving Black patients less likely to be 
referred to a specialist or referred for a kidney transplant.64 Amazon’s AI 
recruiting tool consistently assigned women a lower score than men.65 The 
Apple Card’s creditworthiness algorithm has been accused of giving 
women lower credit limits.66 
Biased outcomes like these do not necessarily occur because the pro-
grammers of algorithms intend to discriminate. A study of facial recogni-
tion software led by an MIT researcher revealed that baked-in bias from 
training data (that primarily included white men) predictably resulted in 
biased decisions (that failed, for example, to accurately recognize Black 
women).67 Algorithms also reflect programmer decisions that implicate 
substantive values, from what model programmers choose to deploy to 
how they choose to weigh false positives versus false negatives.68 
These issues apply across a range of technologies. Concerns about in-
accuracy, bias, and discrimination are raised even by relatively simple ac-
tuarial algorithms—that is, statistically derived algorithms—used in 
criminal sentencing.69 More complex machine-learning algorithms pre-
sent additional challenging and important questions about transparency 
and accountability.70 Some black-box algorithms cannot be assessed ex 
                                                                                                                                
 64. See Tom Simonite, How an Algorithm Blocked Kidney Transplants to Black 
Patients, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/how-algorithm-blocked-
kidney-transplants-black-patients/ [https://perma.cc/QYW5-Y8SS] [hereinafter Simonite, 
Kidney Transplants]. If the same formula used for white patients had been used for Black 
patients, a full third of Black patients—more than 700 people—would have had their kidney 
disease classified into a more severe category. Id. 
 65. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias 
Against Women, Reuters (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-
com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-
against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G/ [https://perma.cc/V2S7-K4FP] (“[Amazon’s system] 
penalized resumes that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess club captain.’ ”). 
 66. See Evelina Nedlund, Apple Card Is Accused of Gender Bias. Here’s How That Can 
Happen, CNN Bus. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/12/business/apple-
card-gender-bias/index.html/ [https://perma.cc/4U6T-RH3X]. 
 67. See Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial 
Artificial-Intelligence Systems, MIT (Feb. 11, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-finds-
gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212/ [https://perma.cc/E36B-S5VP]. 
 68. See generally U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Records, Computers and the 
Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal 
Data Systems 23 (1973) [hereinafter HEW Report] (“[A] serious[] consequence of putting 
record keeping in the hands of a new class of data-processing specialists is that questions . . . 
which involve issues of social policy are sometimes treated as if they were nothing more than 
questions of efficient technique.”); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1267 
(describing programmers’ substantive policy decisions); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 1 (ex-
plaining how the benefit and harm “of choosing certain machine-learning algorithms is the 
ability to place weight on particular types of errors over others”). 
 69. Eaglin, supra note 6, at 68–69 n.41. 
 70. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. 
L. Rev. 671, 674 (2016) [hereinafter Barocas & Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact] 
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post to determine how decisions were made, and programming decisions 
can distort policy in application.71 
At the limit, AI decision-making can raise concerns about “what it 
means to be human.”72 In both the private sector and public sector con-
texts, human decision-makers who might employ discretion, exercise com-
passion, tailor statistics to a specific application, or otherwise apply human 
expertise are being removed from the decisional loop.73 Eliminating hu-
man decision-makers and replacing them with a machine arguably affects 
the dignity of the human subject of the decision.74 As an attorney for 
home-health-care patients whose care was cut by a new algorithmic 
decision-making system put it, “we move into unsettling territory when we 
rely solely upon algorithms and data to make determinations about health 
care needs . . . . We reduce a person’s humanity to a number.”75 
This is not to say that human decision-makers are necessarily better 
than algorithms. The same human who introduces compassion can also 
introduce error or bias. Human judges can be racist, both explicitly and 
implicitly.76 Discrimination by a human decision-maker can also harm the 
dignity of a human subject. 
                                                                                                                                
(“[B]ecause the mechanism through which data mining may disadvantage protected classes 
is less obvious in cases of unintentional discrimination, the injustice may be harder to iden-
tify and address.”); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 108 (describing the privacy risk that 
may arise due to the complex nature of Big Data); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 1, at 705–10 
(laying out the importance of increasing the explainability of AI to reduce potential bias); 
Surden, supra note 1, at 1311–12 (“[A]lgorithms improve their performance by examining 
more data and detecting additional patterns in that data that assist in making better auto-
mated decisions.”). 
 71. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1261 (“Policy is often distorted 
when programmers translate it into code.”). 
 72. Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of 
Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 Soc. Stud. Sci. 216, 219 (2017) [hereinafter 
Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop]. 
 73. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal 
Lock-In, 119 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 233, 236 (2019) (comparing human judges to AI 
judges); A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform Doctors: 
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 33, 37 (2019) (“The reduction in new data from physicians . . . creates scenarios in 
which we cannot rule out the risk that sub-optimal conclusions are reached.”); Mulligan & 
Bamberger, supra note 6, at 791 (describing how the algorithmic system used in the food 
stamp program resulted in a discriminatory effect). 
 74. See Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 219 (“[T]echno-
logical developments . . . significantly challenge our notions of human agency and auton-
omy—what it means to be human in light of computational technical advances like artificial 
intelligence and robotics.”); Zarsky, The Trouble With Algorithmic Decisions, supra note 9, 
at 129 (“Algorithmic decision-making processes raise . . . autonomy-related concerns that 
also involve harms to individual dignity.”). 
 75. McCormick, supra note 56. 
 76. E.g., Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, 
and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 350 (2007); Gregory Scott Parks, Judging Racism, 
2012 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 238, 246–47, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004078 [https:// 
perma.cc/8SYU-VDE3]. 
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The shift from human decision-making to AI or hybrid human–AI 
decision-making systems, however, decisively alters the policy landscape 
and thus affects social values.77 For example, instead of having a human 
decision-maker evaluate a particular individual’s particular circumstances 
ex post, AI decision-making shifts some policy decisions early on to the 
designers of an algorithm.78 In some cases, other policy decisions are 
shifted into the “black box” of the algorithm itself, unobservable, perhaps, 
even to the designers. Who makes decisions and when decisions are made 
change. This can affect both the outcome of decisions and accountability, 
as parts of the decision-making process become less visible. If a doctor tells 
you that you have not been recommended for a kidney transplant, you can 
ask why. If AI makes the decision, you can’t (currently) ask the program-
mer to explain it.79 As one patient whose home health care was drastically 
cut by an algorithm described, neither she nor the assessor who entered 
her data into the program could “quite understand what was happen-
ing.”80 In addition, at least one third-party software vendor implementing 
the algorithm simply didn’t know that the program improperly accounted 
for diabetes, saying, “As far as we knew, we were doing it the right way.”81 
A shift to AI decision-making can entail, too, a shift to categorically 
based decisions instead of individual tailoring.82 This leads to what has been 
referred to as the long-tail problem, where an AI inappropriately applies 
familiar categories to “[w]eird stuff that’s hard to deal with.”83 For exam-
ple, a self-driving car trained to avoid cats, dogs, and deer can be incapable 
of “seeing” kangaroos in the road.84 The USDA’s fraud alert algorithm for 
food stamps (SNAP) that was trained to alert for fraud on whole-number 
                                                                                                                                
 77. See Meg Leta Jones, Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots With Fair 
Automation Practices Principles, 18 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 77, 88–92 (2015) (explaining 
the inherent flaws and risks of automation); see also Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra 
note 12, at 1538–40 (comparing human and algorithmic decision-making). 
 78. See Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1261 (“Code writers also 
interpret policy when they translate it from human language to computer code.”); Eaglin, 
supra note 6, at 88 (“Tools constructed to estimate recidivism risk reflect numerous norma-
tive choices.”). 
 79. See generally Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 Yale L.J. 1972 (2017) (offering 
a framework for conceptualizing and regulating machine evidence). 
 80. Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, Verge 
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-
algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1538–40 (“Algorithmic decision-
making can be biased, reflecting biased decisions made by programmers or historic discrim-
ination baked into the data sets on which algorithms are trained.”); see also Crootof, supra 
note 73, at 236. 
 83. Evan Ackerman, Autonomous Vehicles vs. Kangaroos: The Long Furry Tail of 
Unlikely Events, IEEE Spectrum (July 5, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/ 
transportation/self-driving/autonomous-cars-vs-kangaroos-the-long-furry-tail-of-unlikely-
events [https://perma.cc/S27X-7RBT]. 
 84. Id. 
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purchases mistakenly identified fraud at Somali-American grocers, where 
customers would purchase meat in whole-dollar amounts.85 In practice, 
the “long tail” can include things that aren’t “weird” in any objective 
sense: For example, the error-prone home-health-care allocation 
algorithms failed to appropriately consider diabetes or cerebral palsy, 
hardly outlier conditions.86 
All this is to say: Human decision-making may not always be better 
than AI decision-making. But AI decision-making raises distinct challenges 
to our assumptions about how decision-making works, which in turn struc-
ture how we have regulated—or not regulated—decision-making. 
A. A Right to Contest AI Decisions 
As the use of AI decision-making grows, so does the importance of 
addressing the challenges it presents. As discussed below, some U.S. schol-
ars have responded to these concerns with calls for updated procedural 
and substantive protections designed to address the risks created by algo-
rithmic decision-making.87 One tool for addressing bad AI decisions, gain-
ing traction in some parts of the world but largely ignored in the United 
States, is contestation: giving individuals affected by AI decisions the right 
to challenge those decisions. 
Contestation is a core mechanism for establishing and preserving jus-
tice in the Western adversarial tradition. The right takes many forms. 
Sometimes it appears within a broader adversarial process. For example, 
criminal defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them,88 
and civil defendants have the right to reply to plaintiffs’ complaints and 
make counter-claims. Sometimes it requires the provision of “some kind 
                                                                                                                                
 85. H. Claire Brown, How an Algorithm Kicks Small Businesses Out of the Food Stamps 
Program on Dubious Fraud Charges, Counter (Oct. 8, 2018), https://thecounter.org/usda-
algorithm-food-stamp-snap-fraud-small-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/UEZ7-GYFH]; Chris 
McGann, Somali Grocers Lose Right to Use Food Stamps, Seattle PI (Apr. 8, 2002), https:// 
www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Somali-grocers-lose-right-to-use-food-stamps-1084746.php/ 
[https://perma.cc/GPZ3-LPLN]. 
 86. See Lecher, supra note 80; McCormick, supra note 56. 
 87. See infra section I.D. 
 88. The right to confront witnesses was established in the United States by the Sixth 
Amendment. As Frank R. Herrmann and Brownlow M. Speer establish, the confrontation 
right extends back at least 1,500 years and probably much further. Frank R. Herrmann & 
Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the 
Confrontation Clause, 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 481, 483 (1994). It can be found in recognizable 
form in legislation of Emperor Justinian from 539 CE. As the Supreme Court noted in Coy 
v. Iowa, Acts 25:16, which was composed between the years 80 CE and 90 CE, quotes a Roman 
general explaining that the prisoner Paul will be afforded customary Roman confrontation 
rights. The same rights were described by Cicero in 70 BCE. Id. at 482–83. As noted infra 
section II.A.1, it is also found in the even more ancient Book of Proverbs, which teaches, 
“The one who first states a case seems right, until the other comes and cross-examines.” 
Proverbs 18:17 (NSRV). 
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of” process for challenging a decision—i.e., the contestation itself, ef-
fected.89 Accordingly, in the United States, administrative decisions with 
significant effects may be subject to appeal and are generally subject to the 
recipient’s “opportunity to be heard.”90 Similarly, in the EU, the “right to 
be heard” is considered a fundamental principle that both Member States 
and individual citizens are guaranteed.91 Nor are contestation rights con-
fined to government decisions. Both legislatures92 and courts93 have im-
posed some forms of contestation (and other due process) responsibilities 
on private companies. 
The right to contest decisions is central to due process. Indeed, other 
familiar due process protections—for example, transparency, notice, and 
the right to an impartial arbiter—serve to strengthen contestation rights. 
The U.S. Constitution guarantees additional procedural protections for 
individuals, such as the right to trial by jury, and the right to counsel, which 
allow individuals to contest certain decisions with serious ramifications.94 
As Part II discusses below, contestation, in turn, serves to perfect more sub-
stantive rights of fairness and justice and to preserve rule of law values, by 
                                                                                                                                
 89. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1274. 
 90. See id. at 1273, 1300 n.168 (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (ruling that a hearing including an “effective opportunity to de-
fend” is required before terminating welfare benefits). A sufficient “opportunity to be 
heard,” however, does not necessarily mean an evidentiary hearing. Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976). 
 91. See, e.g., Marco Borraccetti, Fair Trial, Due Process and Rights of Defence in the 
EU Legal Order, in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding 
Instrument 95, 105–06 (Giacomo Di Federico ed., Springer 2011). Article 41 of the Charter 
reads: 
Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, 
fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices, and 
agencies of the Union. This right includes: the right of every person to be 
heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her ad-
versely is taken; . . . [and] the obligation of the administration to give rea-
sons for its decisions. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 403–04. 
 92. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018) (imposing 
dispute resolution requirements for consumer credit bureaus); Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018) (imposing copyright dispute resolution responsibili-
ties on Internet intermediaries in return for a safe harbor from secondary copyright 
liability). 
 93. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollings Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1998) 
(noting that “good cause” in the context of an implied employment contract requires an 
“appropriate investigation” that includes “notice of the claimed misconduct and a chance 
for the employee to respond”); Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 387 (Ct. App. 
1998) (“[I]nvestigative fairness contemplates listening to both sides and providing employ-
ees a fair opportunity to present their position and to correct or contradict relevant state-
ments prejudicial to their case, without the procedural formalities of a trial.” (citing Cotran, 
948 P.2d at 422)); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
543, 589 nn.184 –88, 590 nn.189–90 (2000) (collecting cases). 
 94. See Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 625–26. 
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correcting errors, preventing or changing unjust outcomes, and enhanc-
ing the predictability and consistency of decisions. A fair contestation pro-
cess can enhance the perceived legitimacy of both the law itself and 
specific outcomes.95 
Despite this robust tradition, U.S. policymakers have largely eschewed 
individual rights in recently proposed laws governing AI, both at the state 
and federal levels.96 By contrast, in the EU, the GDPR’s Article 22 estab-
lished an individual “right to contest” an AI decision, and this model has 
recently gained traction in Europe and beyond. 
B. The GDPR’s Right to Contestation 
The GDPR’s right to contestation, though largely ignored in the 
United States, has become increasingly influential in AI policy discussions 
around the world. In Article 22, the GDPR dictates that for certain auto-
mated decisions, affected individuals must be provided “at least the right 
to obtain human intervention . . . to express his or her point of view and 
to contest the decision.”97 
The GDPR applies to all processing of personal data (with some ex-
ceptions). Thus Article 22 applies to automated decisions that entail pro-
cessing personal data, which includes many if not most AI decisions 
affecting individuals on an individual level.98 The GDPR applies to both 
the government and the private sector.99 The GDPR’s right to contestation, 
                                                                                                                                
 95. On legitimacy, see generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology 
of Procedural Justice (1988) (exploring the view that people may be more interested in 
issues of process than issues of outcome); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural 
Justice: A Psychological Analysis (1975) (offering objective data indicating that individuals 
feel more fairly treated in adversarial than in inquisitorial proceedings). 
 96. See supra note 12. 
 97. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3) (emphasis added). 
 98. For AI that is not subject to the GDPR, the European Commission has recently 
proposed draft regulations on AI. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial 
Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, § 1.2, COM (2021) 206 
final (Apr. 4, 2021), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/proposal-regulation-
laying-down-harmonised-rules-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/AG8H-FLD2]; see 
also Proposal for a Regulation on a European Approach for Artificial Intelligence, Legislative 
Train, Eur. Parl. (June 24, 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-
a-europe-fit-for-the-digital-age/file-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc 
/5X7L-2FH6] (noting that regulations on AI have been proposed and will be discussed in 
the European Parliament). The proposed regulations are built on risk mitigation, and do 
not include a right to contest AI that does not involve processing personal data. They would 
act, however, as an overlay on the GDPR, leaving its right to contest in place. 
 99. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 3(1), 4(7)–(8) (stating that “[t]his Regulation 
applies to the processing of personal data” by a “controller or processor in the Union” and 
defining both “controller” and “processor” to include a “legal person, public authority, 
agency or other body”). The GDPR has law enforcement exceptions for things like journal-
ism or public health research, for example. Id. art. 23(1) (providing exceptions where nec-
essary to safeguard, among other things, national security, public security, public health 
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therefore, at least in theory, establishes due process rights for individuals 
significantly affected by many uses of AI in the EU. There are, however, 
several limits to its scope, discussed further below: It applies only to deci-
sions that are “based solely on automated processing” and that have “sig-
nificant[]” effects on the concerned individual.100  
The GDPR’s right to contestation has its origins in earlier European 
laws on automated decision-making. Prior to Europe-wide efforts to har-
monize data protection laws, a subset of European countries enacted these 
laws as part of their data protection regimes. A French data protection law, 
enacted in 1978, proscribed both governmental and private decisions 
“based solely on any automatic processing of data which describes the pro-
file or personality of the citizen concerned.”101 French law established an 
early version of algorithmic due process, stating that a “person shall be 
entitled to . . . dispute the data and logic used in automatic processing, the 
results of which are asserted against him.”102 Both the first Spanish data 
protection law and the first Portuguese data protection law contained sim-
ilar provisions.103 
The 1995 EU-wide Data Protection Directive (Directive), which pre-
ceded the GDPR, contained the direct precursor to the GDPR’s right to 
contestation: a little-known, little-used provision on “Automated individ-
ual decisions,” Article 15(2).104 It required, in most cases where automated 
decision-making was permitted, that a company or a state adopt “suitable 
measures to safeguard [a person’s] legitimate interests.”105 These “suitable 
measures” included “arrangements allowing [a person] . . . to put his point 
                                                                                                                                
objectives). In general, the GDPR starts from broad coverage, limited by EU “competencies” 
(meaning, it doesn’t cover things the EU itself cannot reach, such as national security), and 
then carves out exceptions. This differs from U.S. sectoral privacy laws, which start by cover-
ing a particular type of information or a particular sector or particular entities. 
 100. Id. art. 22(1). 
 101. Loi 78-17 du 6. Janvier 1978 Relative à l’Informatique, aux Fichiers et aux Libertés, 
Section 2 of the Act, translated in Data Protection in the European Community: the 
Statutory Provisions (Spiros Simitis, Ulrich Dammann, Marita Körner-Dammann & Anne-
Arendt eds., 1992); see also Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 17 n.2. 
 102. Loi 78-17 du 6. Janvier 1978, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 103. Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 17 n.3; see also Art. 12 of first 
Spanish law (Ley organica 5/1992 de 29. De octubre 1992, de Regulacion del Tratamiento 
Automatizado de los Datos de Caracter Personal; replaced and repealed by Law 15/1999 of 
13.12.1999); Art. 16 of Portuguese data protection law (Lei. No. 10/91 de 12. De Abril 1991, 
da Proteccao de Dados Pessoais face a Informatica), replaced and repealed by Law no. 
67/98 of 26.10.1998. 
 104. Council Directive 95/46, art. 15, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 43 (EC) [hereinafter DPD]. 
 105. Id. arts. 15(2)(a), 15(2)(b). The one case in which an automated decision was per-
mitted but no suitable safeguards were required was when a data subject’s request for enter-
ing into a contract had been satisfied (meaning, there was a positive outcome for the data 
subject). See DPD, supra note 104, art. 15(2)(a); Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 
10, at 21. 
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of view” to the entity using automated decision-making.106 Article 15, how-
ever, lacked the GDPR’s explicit mention of a “right . . . to contest the 
decision.”107 
Lee Bygrave has noted that the Directive’s Article 15 had very little 
effect on the ground.108 Article 15 applied only when “a large number of 
conditions [were] satisfied.”109 Moreover, the Directive did not have direct 
effect as law, and Member State implementation of Article 15 arguably 
weakened it.110 Some Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and oth-
ers) implemented Article 15 as a prohibition on algorithmic decision-
making; others, like the United Kingdom, implemented it as a right to opt 
out of algorithmic decision-making.111 The opt-out approach put the onus 
on individuals, few of whom invoked the right.112 Thus Article 15, in prac-
tice, became according to Bygrave a “second-class data protection right . . . 
rarely enforced, poorly understood and easily circumvented.”113 
Article 22 of the GDPR supersedes the Directive’s Article 15. Though 
the two provisions exhibit strong similarities, the GDPR’s Article 22 ap-
pears to provide “broader, stronger, and deeper” protections than the 
Directive’s Article 15.114 One of the ways in which Article 22 is deeper—
that is, provides more protections—than Article 15 is that it includes not 
just a right to express one’s view, but a right to contest an automated 
decision. 
Like its predecessor, the GDPR makes the right to contestation avail-
able only in limited circumstances. The right arises only in cases in which 
“solely” algorithmic decisions have legal or “similarly significant[]” effects 
on data subjects.115 Elsewhere, one of us has discussed these restrictions in 
                                                                                                                                
 106. DPD, supra note 104, art. 15(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
 107. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3). 
 108. Bygrave describes it as “[a]ll dressed up but nowhere to go,” and a “house of 
cards.” Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 21. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 17–18 (“[Article 15] directs each EU Member State to confer on persons 
a right to prevent them being subjected to such decision making. Hence, a legally adequate 
implementation of Art.15(1) may occur when national legislators simply provide persons 
with the opportunity to exercise such a right.”). 
 111. Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation 
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 
7 Int’l Data Priv. L. 76, 94 –95 (2017) [hereinafter Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation 
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist].  
 112. Id. at 95 (“If Article 22 is interpreted as a right to object, automated decision-
making is restricted only to cases in which the data subject actively objects.”). 
 113. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 3. 
 114. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 201. 
 115. We accept the Article 29 Working Party’s view that “Article 22(1) establishes a gen-
eral prohibition for decision-making based solely on automated processing,” some excep-
tions to the general prohibition, and safeguards for the exceptions. Article 29 Data Prot. 
Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the 
Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN. WP 251rev.01, at 19 (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter 
Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making]; see also Kaminski, Right to 
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greater detail and has argued that Article 22’s scope is nonetheless broader 
than the Directive’s; it covers not only algorithmic decision-making but 
also such decision-making with some degree of human involvement. Also, 
Article 22 covers decision-making having a comparatively broad range of 
significant effects, including not just legal effects but also things like par-
ticularly manipulative targeted advertising.116 
Article 22 begins with a general prohibition of automated decision-
making with significant effects. There are, however, three exceptions: if a 
decision is necessary for a contract; if it is authorized by EU or Member 
State law; or if it is based on the data subject’s explicit consent—a stronger 
form of consent than envisioned elsewhere in the GDPR.117 
Companies that use automated decision-making under one of these 
exceptions are not unfettered. They must implement “suitable measures 
to safeguard [an individual’s] rights and freedoms and legitimate inter-
ests.”118 Such safeguards must include “at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of 
view and to contest the decision.”119 
                                                                                                                                
Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197. Beyond the Guidelines’ persuasive power, we 
think this is the most sensible interpretation. Others, however, interpret Article 22(1) as 
only a “right” that the data subject must actively invoke. For a detailed account of the argu-
ments for each interpretation, see Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the GDPR Article 22, at 
17–22 (Stan.-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. L. F., Working Paper No. 31, 2018), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/pehrsson_eulawwp31.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/T566-EZDK]. 
In any event, these “limited cases” may be more common than they first appear. Article 
22(2) allows automated decision-making when “necessary” to execute a contract, when it is 
authorized by Member State law, or when there is explicit consent, a set of exceptions that 
Giancarlo Malgieri characterizes as “wide and general.” GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(2); 
Gianclaudio Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States: The Right to 
Explanation and Other “Suitable Safeguards” in the National Legislations, Comput. L. & 
Sec. Rev., Oct. 2019, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU 
Member States]. Article 23 allows Member States to create legislative exemptions to many 
of the GDPR’s algorithmic process protections for a laundry list of purposes, such as 
national security, criminal and civil enforcement, ethics investigations, and “other 
important objectives of general public interest of the Union or a Member State.” GDPR, 
supra note 13, art. 23(1). Further, it is still unclear at what point human involvement would 
exempt a decision-making process from Article 22’s protections. The Guidelines on 
Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling say that a human with “authority and 
competence” must have an “actual influence on the result” to take a decision out of Article 
22, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra, at 21, but some think that 
“even nominal involvement of a human” would accomplish this, Wachter et al., Why a Right 
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 111, at 88. 
 116. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 201–03. 
 117. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(2). For further discussion, see Kaminski, Right to 
Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197–98 (explaining that both the contractual ex-
ception and the explicit consent exception could be interpreted to be broader or narrower, 
depending on the interpretation of when a decision is “necessary” for a contract). 
 118. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3). 
 119. Id. art. 22(3) (emphasis added). 
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What this right to contest means is unclear from the text. It is clear, 
however, that the right to contest is more than a right to correct inaccurate 
data on which a decision is based.120 Elsewhere, the GDPR provides general 
access and correction rights for data processing.121 The right to contest must 
be something more than just the generally applicable right to correction. 
The relationship between the three safeguards/rights named in 
Article 22 is also unclear. These rights—to human intervention, expression 
of a point of view, and contestation—could be understood independently. 
Or they could be understood to be redundant, naming aspects of the same 
envisioned process.122 
Arguably, however, the “right to contest is the backbone” of Article 22’s 
protections.123 As Emre Bayamlıoğlu observes, the GDPR’s new wording 
compared to the Directive’s “points at . . . at least, an obligation to hear the 
merits of the appeal and to provide a justification for the decision.”124 This 
right “obliges the data controller either to render automated decisions con-
testable or to cease [automated decision-making] at all.”125 Thus other indi-
vidual rights in the GDPR, including both transparency and process rights, 
are understood to be necessary for, or precursors to, this central right to 
contestation.126 
Contestability relies on transparency—just as due process requires no-
tice, in addition to an opportunity to be heard. The GDPR compels multi-
ple forms of transparency, including a general right to notice of personal 
data processing, and a more specific right to “meaningful information 
about the logic involved” in automated decision-making.127 It also contains 
                                                                                                                                
 120. For a related query, see Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable 
Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 494, 568–71 (“Although there is no consensus about the legal rights over inferences, 
there is an argument to be made that even the GDPR goes beyond procedural data control 
and management (informational self-determination), and provides safeguards against infer-
ences and decisions based on inferences with the right to contest in Article 22(3).”). 
 121. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 15 (access) & art. 16 (correction). 
 122. Emre Bayamlıoğlu, The Right to Contest Automated Decisions Under the General 
Data Protection Regulation: Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, Regul. & 
Governance, Mar. 2021, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to 
Explanation”] (explaining that the rights are usually treated as though they are on equal 
footing as alternatives, without clarity regarding whether they are “complementary, gradual, 
or distinct rights, or they should be treated as a unity”). 
 123. Id. at 5; Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1592 (characterizing 
Article 22 as establishing a version of algorithmic due process). 
 124. Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, supra note 122, at 6. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 27 
(providing that an individual “will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view 
if they fully understand how it has been made and on what basis”). 
 127. See Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to 
Explanation, 7 Int’l Data Priv. L. 233, 235 (2017) (“When an individual is subject to ‘a deci-
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a right to an explanation of automated decisions.128 While Article 22 is by 
its nature procedural and not substantive,129 the existence of an underlying 
right to contest gives substance to its transparency requirements.130 That is, 
according to regulators’ guidance, the “right to explanation” of an auto-
mated decision requires processors to disclose at least enough information 
to affected individuals to make contestation actionable.131 The GDPR’s indi-
vidualized algorithmic transparency requirements are “not about informing 
or disclosing but rendering the decision contestable at least against a human 
arbiter.”132 
The right to contestation, like other aspects of the GDPR, in effect ob-
ligates companies to both comprehend and to disclose, in the words of 
Mireille Hildebrandt, “the justification of such decision-making rather than 
its explanation in the sense of its heuristics.”133 For complex machine-learn-
ing systems, this may be challenging if not impossible. It will require creative 
thinking about how to build such systems so they are not just “explainable” 
in terms of counterfactuals, but “justifiable” in terms of understanding, re-
vealing, and making challengeable the normative grounds of a decision. 
The right to contestation is thus strangely both central to the GDPR’s 
system of algorithmic accountability and barely articulated. Despite its cen-
trality to the GDPR’s Article 22, it is not spelled out in the text. Nor does 
it receive much coverage in the Guidelines issued by the central EU data 
privacy regulator (the European Data Protection Board) or in the Recitals 
(the nonbinding preambulatory text accompanying the GDPR).134 Recital 
71 simply and redundantly characterizes the right to contest as a right to 
“challenge” a decision.135 The Guidelines largely parrot the text of the 
                                                                                                                                
sion based solely on automated processing’ that ‘produces legal effects . . . or similarly sig-
nificantly affects him or her,’ the GDPR creates rights to ‘meaningful information about the 
logic involved.’ ” (quoting GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(1))). 
 128. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 204 (“[A]n individual 
has a right to explanation of an individual decision because that explanation is necessary 
for her to invoke the other rights—e.g., to contest a decision, to express her view—that are 
explicitly enumerated in the text of the GDPR.”). 
 129. Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, supra note 122, at 5–6 
(“Due to its procedural character, Article 22/3 is inevitably silent on the substantial grounds 
which could be relied upon to challenge the reasoning or the criteria underlying the auto-
mated decisions . . . whether or when certain [machine-learning] outcome[s] could be re-
garded as unfair or unlawful is a conclusion . . . [requiring] . . . normative propositions . . . .”). 
 130. Id. at 6 (“In principle, the data controller has to ‘explain’ the decision in such a 
way that enables the data subject to assess whether the reasons that led to a particular out-
come were legitimate and lawful.”). 
 131. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 204 – 05. 
 132. Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, supra note 122, at 6. 
 133. Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self, supra note 26, at 113. 
 134. For an explanation of the difference between GDPR text, Recitals, and Guidelines, 
see Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 193–95. 
 135. See GDPR, supra note 13, Recital 71 (advocating for individuals’ right to “obtain 
human intervention,” receive “an explanation of the decision,” and “to challenge the 
decision”). 
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GDPR, and appear in places to conflate contestation with the parallel rights 
to human intervention and to express one’s view.136 
There has previously been little academic attention to the GDPR’s 
right to contest, and effectively none by U.S. scholars.137 At one level, this 
is surprising. The GDPR is one of the first regulatory regimes in the world 
to regulate AI decision-making, and the right to contestation appears cen-
tral to its approach, arguably at the core of the individual rights envisioned 
by the GDPR.138 
At another level, the lack of attention is understandable. The GDPR 
is complex and challenging for a U.S. audience to understand.139 The right 
to contest may yet be a “paper tiger”—existing on paper but limited in 
practice.140 There is little information, even now several years after the 
GDPR went into effect, about what the right to contestation looks like.141 
The GDPR’s contestation rights arise only for “solely automated” decisions 
with significant effects.142 And, as is generally the case with individual due 
process measures, the right to contestation is deeply, and sometimes con-
fusingly, intertwined with other due process measures, especially the more-
discussed transparency and notice rights that give it effect. 
As section III.B discusses below, the GDPR’s right to contestation ex-
ists largely for now as a standard, rather than a set of specific procedural 
rules.143 Companies must allow individuals to challenge certain automated 
decisions, but there are as of yet few details about what that process must 
                                                                                                                                
 136. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 27, 32. 
 137. But see Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 620–24 (discussing 
Article 22 as an example of a “right to a human decision,” but forgoing deep analysis of its 
requirements). 
 138. The regulators that interpret the GDPR have explained that the GDPR’s much-
debated algorithmic transparency provisions (the “right to explanation”) are in service of a 
more central right to contestation. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, 
supra note 115, at 27. These regulators explain that individuals need a right to explanation 
in order to be able to contest automated decisions. See Bayamlıoğlu, Contesting Automated 
Decisions, supra note 27, at 2 (“[T]he right to contest is regarded as the backbone provision 
with a key role in determining the scope of algorithmic transparency under the GDPR.”). 
But see Antoni Roig, Safeguards for the Right Not to Be Subject to a Decision Based Solely 
on Automated Processing (Article 22 GDPR), 8 Euro. J.L. & Tech. 1, 6 (2017) (claiming that 
these rights all could be meaningless). 
 139. See Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR, 98 
Denv. L. Rev. 93, 106–11 (2020) (discussing common errors U.S. readers make when trying 
to understand the GDPR). 
 140. Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 21. 
 141. Raphaël Gellert, Marvin van Bekkum & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The Ola & 
Uber Judgments: For the First Time a Court Recognises a GDPR Right to an Explanation 
for Algorithmic Decision-Making, EU L. Analysis (Apr. 28, 2021), http://eulawanalysis. 
blogspot.com/2021/04/the-ola-uber-judgments-for-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/7KP 
3-2JFV] (“This is the first time that a court in the Netherlands recognises such a right . . . . 
[I]t is also the first time that a Court anywhere in Europe recognises such a right.”). 
 142. See Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197, 207. 
 143. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
Duke L.J. 557 (1992). 
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be. This leaves companies, regulators, EU Member States, and eventually 
courts with a fairly blank (but not entirely blank) slate for implementing 
the right. 
C. The Right to Contestation Beyond the GDPR 
Despite the nascent state of the GDPR’s right to contest, other institu-
tions beyond the EU have already picked up on its importance to algorith-
mic accountability. The Council of Europe is an international 
organization, distinct from the EU, that was founded in 1949.144 At its core 
is a human rights system, comprising the 1953 European Convention on 
Human Rights, which is interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights. In April 2020, the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation 
setting out guidelines to address the human rights impacts of algorithmic 
systems. It included the guideline to provide “effective means to contest rel-
evant determinations and decisions.”145 
The right to contest has also begun to appear in contexts beyond 
Europe. The 2020 Recommendation of the OECD Council on AI includes 
a recommendation that users of AI should “enable those adversely affected 
by an AI system to challenge its outcome based on plain and easy-to-
understand information on the factors, and the logic that served as the 
basis for the prediction, recommendation or decision.”146 The OECD rec-
ommendations may influence lawmaking and practices in countries 
around the world. 
Individual countries have already adopted or are considering 
adopting the right to contest. As noted above, Brazil adopted the right in 
2018.147 In November 2020, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada recommended that Canada revise its data privacy law to afford a 
right to contest automated decisions.148 Reasoning that AI decision-
making “introduces unique risks that warrant distinct treatment in the 
                                                                                                                                
 144. Jones & Kaminski, supra note 139, at 101. Note that all EU Member States are par-
ties to the Council of Europe. See Our Member States, Council of Eur., https://www.coe.int 
/en/web/about-us/our-member-states [https://perma.cc/72W5-ZSGT] (last visited Sept. 
7, 2021). 
 145. Council of Eur., Recommendation CM/Rec (2020) of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems 9, 13 (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://rm.coe.int/09000016809e1154 [https://perma.cc/2MMJ-WVVC]. 
 146. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, § 1.3.iv, at 8, 
OECD Legal Instruments (May 22, 2019), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instrume 
nts/OECD-LEGAL-0449 [https://perma.cc/6KCV-BL2R]. 
 147. LGPD, Art. 20, Law No. 13,709 (Aug. 18, 2018), https://lgpd-brazil.info/chapter_ 
03/article_20 [https://perma.cc/W2CL-SFTW] (Braz.). 
 148. A Regulatory Framework for AI: Recommendations for PIPEDA Reform, Off. of 
the Priv. Comm’r of Can. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-
we-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai/reg-fw_202011/ [https:// 
perma.cc/E6ZL-AP7H]. 
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law,” the Commissioner recommended establishing two specific individual 
rights: a right to explanation and a right to contest.149 
The Commissioner called for the right to contest to be similar to the 
GDPR, but explicitly rejected including qualifiers like “solely” in order to 
ensure that the right applies when automated decisions include more hu-
man involvement.150 The right to contest would, per the Commissioner’s 
Recommendations, entail the ability to “express [one’s] point of view to a 
human intervener, and contest the decision.” The Commissioner distin-
guished between the right to contest and the already existing right to ob-
ject to data processing, since “contestation provides individuals with 
recourse even when they choose to continue to participate in the activity 
for which automated decision-making was employed.”151 
Yet in the United States, proposed and enacted laws fail to include a right 
to contest AI decisions. The proposed federal Algorithmic Accountability Act 
of 2019 aimed to create risk assessments for AI systems but did not establish 
individual rights.152 A proposed law in Washington State, too, focused on 
risk assessments and did not establish a right to contest.153 The newly 
enacted California Privacy Rights Act, the first in the country to address AI 
decision-making writ large, tasks the new California Privacy Protection 
Agency with establishing through regulations a right to opt out of certain 
kinds of automated decision-making, accompanied by a right to access 
“meaningful information” about the decision-making process.154 It does 
not, however, explicitly describe a right to contest. 
One can argue that a number of technology-neutral laws effectively 
establish a right to contest AI decisions in the United States in certain 
policy contexts. Litigants have already successfully used due process and 
administrative procedure claims to challenge government use of AI.155 
                                                                                                                                
 149. Id.; see also Cofone, supra note 23. 
 150. A Regulatory Framework for AI: Recommendations for PIPEDA Reform, supra 
note 148 (“Unlike the GDPR or Quebec’s Bill 64, the term should drop any qualifier such 
as ‘solely’ or ‘exclusively’, which scopes the applicability of specific protections very narrowly. 
These also make the term susceptible to subversion where a human role is added in the 
process to merely evade additional obligations.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2019). 
 153. H.B. 1655, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (attempting to establish “algo-
rithmic accountability reports”). Additionally, the latest proposed Washington Privacy Act 
mimics the GDPR in calling for data impact assessments but fails to establish an individual 
right to contest automated decisions. See S.B. 5062, 67th Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021). 
 154. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.185(16) (2021). 
 155. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1895–
98 (citing successful due process claims against the government’s use of machine-learning 
algorithms for significant decisions); see also Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & 
Vincent M. Southerland, AI Now Inst., Litigating Algorithms 2019 US Report: New 
Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems 28–32 (2019), https:// 
ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.html [https://perma.cc/MJF4-3T3E]. 
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Antidiscrimination law, too, might in some circumstances be used to chal-
lenge decisions made using AI.156 Existing doctrines, however, present hur-
dles in the AI context, not the least of which is evidentiary.157 There are 
benefits to a clearly established and cross-contextual right to contest AI. 
D. Academic Views on Regulating AI 
Academic views on regulating AI can both illustrate and influence pol-
icymakers’ thinking on whether to establish a right to contest AI. There is 
a fast-growing literature considering how to regulate complex computer 
algorithms. Yet while earlier scholars called for some kind of due process, 
the recent trend has been to favor systemic governance over the compa-
nies or government entities that build and use AI over establishing indi-
vidual rights such as a right to contest.158 
A first wave of scholars on algorithmic accountability called for “tech-
nological due process” or “big data . . . due process.”159 In Technological 
                                                                                                                                
 156. Plaintiffs do face an “uphill battle,” both for disparate impact claims generally and 
with regards to big data inferences in particular. See Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative, supra 
note 4, at 647 (“[P]laintiffs aiming to bring an employment discrimination claim on a the-
ory of disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, face an uphill battle.”); Barocas & 
Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, supra note 70, at 674 (“[A]ttempts to certify the absence 
of prejudice on the part of those involved in the data mining process may wrongly confer 
the imprimatur of impartiality on the resulting decisions.”). Ajunwa has instead proposed a 
third cause of action under Title VII of “discrimination per se” whereby: 
[A] plaintiff [could] assert that a hiring practice (for example, the use of 
proxy variables [in automated hiring] resulting or with the potential to result 
in adverse impact to protected categories) is so egregious as to amount to 
discrimination per se, and this would shift the burden of proof from the 
plaintiff to the defendant (employer) to show that its practice is non-
discriminatory. 
Ajunwa, Paradox of Automation, supra note 4, at 1728. 
 157. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1897 
(“I have not been able to find examples of challenges to algorithmic allocation systems 
based on equality or privacy concerns. This may be because due process claims are easier to 
allege.”); see also Barocas & Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, supra note 70, at 694 –714 
(describing challenges for Title VII claims about machine-learning algorithms). 
 158. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1540 n.34; see also Huq, 
Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1550 (“Those scholars 
who reject individualized algorithmic due process and individualized transparency largely 
implicitly reject both the dignitary and justificatory rationales for them. They understand 
regulating private-sector algorithms as being largely about correcting error or discrimina-
tion and bias.”); id. at 1557 (“A growing body of literature calls for moving away from ex 
post, individualized transparency and due process or, at least, supplementing them with reg-
ulations that target algorithmic design at earlier stages and target the human systems around 
algorithms.”). 
 159. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1301; Citron & Pasquale, 
Scored Society, supra note 8, at 27; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 124; see also Maayan 
Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 Stan. 
Tech. L. Rev. 473, 496 (2016) (“Affected individuals should have the rights to inspect, cor-
rect, and dispute what they believe to be inaccurate adjudication decisions made with re-
spect to their online conduct.”); Schwartz, supra note 61, at 1343–74; Daniel J. Steinbock, 
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Due Process, Danielle Citron observed the increasing governmental use of 
computer algorithms for decision-making.160 Citron called for systemic 
regulation, drawing on the Administrative Procedure Act as both a model 
and a legal constraint, and for individualized due process. She noted, 
however, that Mathews v. Eldridge could present hurdles to individual 
challenges in practice because of the potential expense involved in chal-
lenging algorithmic systems.161 
Several years later, two sets of scholars called for extending “due pro-
cess”-like protections to private sector decisions.162 Kate Crawford and 
Jason Schultz drew heavily on due process theory—drawing on the work 
of Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall,163 and Judge Henry Friendly164—
to build an argument for individualized process in the face of predictive 
data analytics.165 In The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 
Citron and Frank Pasquale similarly explained that “[p]rocedural protec-
tions should apply not only to the scoring algorithms themselves (a kind 
of technology-driven rulemaking), but also to individual decisions based 
on algorithmic predictions (technology-driven adjudication).”166 These 
scholars called for systemic regulatory oversight, but not to the exclusion 
of process protections (or rights) for individuals. 
These pathbreaking works, however, do not provide much guidance 
for implementing an individual right to contest automated decisions. 
Citron suggested that government decision-makers could be required to 
explain their use of an automated system’s decision and should be edu-
cated about such systems’ biases, while the systems should be tested for 
error and bias.167 Crawford and Schultz called for a “neutral data arbiter” 
such as the FTC to investigate complaints against private parties “based on 
predictive privacy harms and, in the process of those complaints, investi-
gate the basis of the predictions.”168 It is not clear whether every individual 
complaint would result in an individualized hearing; this seems unlikely 
                                                                                                                                
Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 64 –81 (2005) (addressing 
government use of data mining in the context of air passenger screening and the creation 
of watch lists); Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, supra note 9, at 1553–68 (offering an ex-
haustive analysis of transparency in algorithmic decision-making and calling for procedural 
protections). 
 160. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1259, 1263–67. 
 161. Id. at 1284 –85. 
 162. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8. 
 163. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and 
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 474 (1986) (describing the need for 
“a model of procedural due process that simultaneously allows the flexibility central to the 
due process concept as it has evolved, while providing a principled and workable 
structure”). 
 164. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1268–1304. 
 165. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 114 –20. 
 166. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 19. 
 167. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1304 –11. 
 168. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 127. 
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given the limited capacities of the FTC.169 Citron and Pasquale called, too, 
for regulatory oversight by the FTC.170 They also called for individualized 
notice guaranteed by audit trails,171 and interactive modeling to let indi-
viduals better understand the scoring algorithms used against them.172 
While they referred to “challenge[s]” against algorithmic scoring, they did 
not go into detail about what such an “opportunity to be heard” might 
constitute in practice.173 
In any event, despite this initial enthusiasm for individual due process, 
more recent proposals have largely shied away from it. Some scholars have 
simply ignored individual due process and related transparency rights; 
others have explicitly rejected them. In Accountable Algorithms, a bevy of 
interdisciplinary authors listed potential harms of transparency—obviat-
ing the “notice” portion of individual due process rights.174 Other scholars 
have critiqued individual rights as ineffective fallacies, citing a lack of in-
dividual capacity and access to justice issues.175 Several scholars have noted 
that due process applies only in the context of state action.176 
Aziz Huq has gone further, arguing that due process rights should not 
apply even to state action—or rather, that instead of individualized chal-
lenges to algorithmic decision-making, individuals should be able to chal-
lenge whether the algorithm is systemically “well-calibrated.”177 
There are limited exceptions to the trend. Rory Van Loo, for example, 
calls for a complex appeals system to apply to platform decision-making, 
involving transparent precedent established by neutral human arbiters.178 
In the criminal trial context, Andrea Roth calls for a confrontation right 
with respect to machine-created evidence, including tools ranging from 
                                                                                                                                
 169. Crawford and Schultz seem more concerned about obtaining transparency and 
checking bias at the level of the general public. Id. at 127 (“The presence of a neutral data 
arbiter would provide the public with an opportunity to be heard, to examine the evidence 
used in adjudicative predictions, and to challenge it.”). 
 170. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 20–27. 
 171. Id. at 28. 
 172. Id. at 28–29. 
 173. Id. at 27–28, 33. 
 174. See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
633, 657–60 (2017). 
 175. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to 
an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 
18, 74 –75 (2017). 
 176. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms 
and the Law, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 43, 46 (2017) (“Although due process concerns explain 
why we would require the creation of robust trails of evidence for software-driven decision 
processes in government, whether the same is true for private sector uses turns on the nature 
of the private activity at issue.”). 
 177. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 686; Huq, Constitutional 
Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1909–10. 
 178. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 867–78. 
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courtroom testing to cross-examination of responsible programmers.179 
These arguments, however, are site specific, and do not call for a general 
right to contest AI. 
We turn, then, to the limited academic literature on the legal right most 
analogous to what we propose: the GDPR’s right to contest an automated 
decision. The GDPR’s right to contestation has received surprisingly little 
scholarly attention. Instead, much ink has been spilled over the related 
“right to explanation” of an algorithmic decision.180 There, again, we see 
considerable backlash against an individualized transparency right.181 
Even in Europe, where there is a relatively robust conception of data pri-
vacy as a human right that contributes to protecting individual dignity, 
much of the literature has focused on the efficacy of systemic oversight, 
rather than the individual rights the GDPR has to offer.182 One of the only 
European scholars to examine the GDPR’s right to contestation, Emre 
Bayamlıoğlu, does argue that contestation is a necessity and “requires a 
mechanism which will enable data subjects to have their objection heard 
in a process intelligible to them—with the possibility of an outcome for 
the annulment or the amendment of the decision.”183 By contrast, Huq, 
who is one of the only U.S. scholars to directly address the GDPR’s right 
to contestation, explicitly rejects it in favor of a “right to a well-calibrated 
machine decision”—that is, a right not to an individual challenge, but to 
a systemically well-functioning machine.184 
Instead of an individualized right to contest, scholars recently have pro-
posed systemic measures that regulate the companies or government agen-
cies that build or use the AI. These measures include: ex ante testing, design 
requirements, impact assessments, recording requirements that document 
how an algorithm was trained and what data was chosen to train it, whistle-
blower protections, and creation of a public interest cause of action.185 
                                                                                                                                
 179. Roth, supra note 79, at 2050 (suggesting the use of programmer testimony before 
an expert panel, written interrogatories to programmers, access to source code, and the 
disclosure of prior statements of machines). 
 180. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 192 n.8. 
 181. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 74 –75; Wachter et al., Why a Right 
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 111. 
 182. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 74. On the EU and dignity, see Jones, 
The Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 231; Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The 
GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 Seton Hall L. Rev. 995, 1016–17 (2017) [hereinafter Zarsky, 
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 183. Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9, at 39. 
 184. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 686. 
 185. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 176, at 43 (“We begin this Part by looking at public 
sector decision-making and explain why technical accountability is necessary as a matter of 
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and protect whistleblowers who know of prohibited practices.”); Huq, Constitutional Rights 
in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1940 (“Aggregate challenges (such as class 
actions, facial challenges, and the like) usefully direct attention to system-wide causes of 
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These systemic governance proposals have value. Systemic 
governance is likely necessary for governing AI, given the very real chal-
lenges individuals face in contesting such systems.186 An individual right to 
contest by itself would likely fail to fully address or mitigate harms. Because 
of the nature of the technology and the locus of expertise in the private 
sector, AI, too, may be particularly well suited to innovative “new govern-
ance” or “collaborative governance” models that harness the strengths of 
both government and industry.187 
But current scholarship leaves largely unsettled the question of 
whether there also is value in subjecting algorithmic decision-making to 
contestation. Consequently, it also fails to address how to design and im-
plement an effective contestation right.  
II. WHY HAVE A RIGHT TO CONTEST AI? 
This Part takes a deeper look at the theory underpinning the Western 
tradition of individual due process and considers whether it provides pur-
chase for an individual right to contest AI decisions. 
                                                                                                                                
constitutional harm.”); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intel-
ligence, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 54, 115–17, 126–29 (2019) (encouraging a thorough examination 
ex ante and ex post of the algorithm and the training data employed to refine the algo-
rithm); Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, supra note 59, at 169–72 (discussing 
the possibility of an Algorithmic Impact Statement requirement in the model of 
Environmental Impact Statements); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive 
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planation required by existing law); Andrew D. Selbst, An Institutional View Of Algorithmic 
Impact Assessments, 35 Harvard J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2021) (UCLA Sch. of Law, Public 
Law Research Paper No. 21–25) (manuscript at 4 –5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3867634 
[https://perma.cc/667V-3XAG] (discussing the goals and potential efficacy of [algorithmic 
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 186. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1557 (“While individual rights can 
address important dignitary and justificatory concerns, there are better ways to identify and 
fix systemic problems in algorithmic decision-making.”). 
 187. Id. at 1559–77 (discussing the promises and pitfalls of collaborative governance of 
algorithms, including a lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms); Michael 
Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to 
Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 385, 427, 441, 445 (2017) (calling 
for a mix of self-regulation and risk regulation in the form of soft-law, regulatory 
“nudge[s]”); Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 159, at 529–31 (“We advocate a collaborative-
dynamic regulation . . . .”); Alicia Solow-Niederman, Administering Artificial Intelligence, 
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633, 640, 645 (2020). On collaborative governance generally, see Orly 
Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance 
65, 66–67 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the 
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 21–33 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The 
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. 
L. Rev. 342, 371–76 (2004). 
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As discussed above, contestation is an ancient concept that remains 
core to the Western tradition of justice.188 In the U.S. legal system, contes-
tation rights most prominently extend from the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.189 Contrary to what some may believe, however, in the 
United States, contestation is not limited to government decisions. Layers 
of positive law developed in specific policy contexts afford individuals pro-
cedural protections, including rights to access and correct personal infor-
mation190 and rights to contest credit card charges.191 Understanding that 
U.S. law already imposes rights to contest the decisions of private compa-
nies is important context for any discussion of a right to contest AI, as pri-
vate companies’ algorithms can make decisions as significant as any 
government body’s.192  
Contestation rights do not always provide justice. Contestation may 
occur ex post, when some harms cannot be undone or ameliorated. 
Contestation may be too slow. It may be too costly.193 Information, power, 
and influence asymmetries between the disputants may tilt the process to-
ward unfairness. A right to contest may be neither sufficient to protect 
fundamental rights nor self-executing. 
But while a right to contestation may not be sufficient to protect funda-
mental rights, it may yet be necessary. The next section discusses the reasons 
frequently given for establishing individual process rights and notes their 
resonance with recent discussions of rights to contest AI decisions. 
A. Why Have Due Process? 
As discussed above, a few scholars have called for establishing individ-
ual due process for algorithmic decision-making, drawing on several core 
                                                                                                                                
 188. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 189. Rules of evidence, too, can be understood as an important aspect of contestation, 
mandating disclosure or limiting the use of particular pieces of information in legal chal-
lenges. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 79, at 2039–51; Wexler, supra note 6, at 1395–429. 
 190. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–
1798.199.100; California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 (2020) (to be codified 
at Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100); Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, 2021 
Va. Special Sess. Law I, ch. 52 (2021) (to be codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-571–59.1-581 
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 191. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 851. 
 192. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 8–13 (discussing credit 
scoring and other algorithmic ranking systems); Van Loo, supra note 5, at 836–50 (discuss-
ing decisions made by technology platforms about speech, lodging, commerce, elections, 
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 193. Procedural safeguards that are too costly may not be required. See, e.g., Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976) (providing for a cost-benefit analysis to decide 
which specific safeguards will be required as part of an “opportunity to be heard”). In 
Technological Due Process, Citron observes that Mathews likely poses a challenge to requiring 
expert analysis of automated decisions, though she argues that the cost of an expert to cor-
rect the computer logic in one case of erroneous automated decision-making should be 
weighed against the benefits the correction provides for all future cases. Citron, Technological 
Due Process, supra note 3, at 1284 –86. 
1990 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
texts of due process theory.194 Further exploration of the due process liter-
ature sheds additional light on the role of a right to contest. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.”195 In practice this requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard “appropriate to the nature of the case.”196 But why? The rationales 
for due process include obtaining accuracy, supporting rule of law values, 
and liberal theory—that is, theory that emphasizes the importance of the 
individual who is affected by a given decision. 
1. Accuracy. — A common answer to the question of why we have due 
process is an instrumentalist one: to ensure accuracy.197 The Supreme Court 
has stated more than once that “[t]he function of legal process . . . is to 
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”198 Accuracy is commonly named as 
a reason for robust contestation mechanisms.199 This is ancient reasoning: 
The Bible cautions that “[t]he one who first states a case seems right, until the 
other comes and cross-examines.”200 This reasoning also retains force today. 
For example, only individual administrative appeals and lawsuits revealed the 
problems with the home-health-care allocation algorithm discussed above.201 
But our legal system does not even in the highest-stakes contexts guar-
antee individuals an accurate decision.202 Rather, accuracy is often treated 
as a goal or value to be balanced against other goals or values, such as cost 
and efficiency.203 Some scholars have thus taken accuracy to be a systematic 
                                                                                                                                
 194. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1258; Cary Coglianese 
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management goal, meaning that to the extent individual due process can 
in the aggregate make a decisional system more accurate, it is worth pro-
tecting.204 If this were the only reason for protecting individual process, 
however, individual process would not be worth protecting to the extent it 
failed to make a decisional system more accurate. Accuracy thus may be a 
central goal of individual process, but it alone cannot account for strong 
intuitions people have about what is just or fair. 
2. Rule of Law Values. — A second reason to establish individual rights 
to contest is to respect rule of law values. These values suggest that a deci-
sional system should be fair, consistent, predictable, and rational across 
different individuals.205 Allowing individuals to contest decisions reveals 
whether a decisional system is unfair, inconsistent, arbitrary, unpredicta-
ble, or irrational. Contestation and its accompanying procedural protec-
tions, such as reason giving, require that a decision-maker demonstrate 
examinable commitment to an outcome and describe the reasons for it.206 
This aims to prevent arbitrariness and allow for quality control of deci-
sions, including sniffing out bias or discrimination.207 That is, contestation 
might help eliminate the pitfalls of decisional discretion, while leaving de-
cision-makers the ability to tailor rules to individual circumstances. 
But again, the rule of law rationale could be characterized as arguing 
for individual protections from an underlying focus on the decisional sys-
tem as a whole. The central concern with the rule of law rationale is over 
the legitimacy of the system of decision-making, not necessarily the indi-
viduals within it. Thus, rule of law reasoning might leave space, like the 
accuracy rationale, for arguments that individual rights to contest are nec-
essary only to the extent that they reveal unfairness, arbitrariness, unpre-
dictability, and irrationality. Indeed, we see echoes of this reasoning in the 
literature on algorithmic accountability, with scholars rejecting individual 
rights in favor of other measures that in their view are adequate for ensur-
ing that a decisional system as a whole is not arbitrary or irrational.208 
3. Liberal Theory. — To fully consider the potential value of an individ-
ual right to contest, we need theory that is grounded in individuals. This 
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section turns to what Jerry Mashaw terms “the liberal tradition” in U.S. 
constitutional theory, which “has at its core the notion that individuals are 
the basic unit of moral and political value.”209 Mashaw has argued, con-
vincingly, that there is a long tradition of at least three categories of liberal 
theory that could be behind calls for individual due process: Benthamite 
(utilitarian), Lockean (natural rights), and Kantian (personhood) theo-
ries.210 This section examines each in turn. 
At first glance, utilitarianism might seem an ill fit for an argument that 
individual rights matter. Utilitarianism, after all, is primarily concerned 
with maximizing outcomes for society as a whole.211 There are, however, 
three ways in which utilitarianism can support an individual right to con-
test.212 First, utilitarians might argue through classic cost-benefit analysis 
that individual process produces acceptance or even happiness on the part 
of affected individuals, which makes it more likely that the decisional sys-
tem as a whole will achieve social welfare goals. Second, utilitarians some-
times (albeit rarely) argue for individual rights based on the idea that 
certain protections are so likely to be correct in terms of social welfare 
maximization that it makes sense to establish those protections as default 
rules (“rule utilitarianism”).213 Under rule utilitarianism, society should 
establish individual process as a rule when it is more likely to maximize 
social welfare—if it prevents pain or other seriously negative conse-
quences.214 Finally, utilitarians do recognize the existence of a private 
sphere for individuals in which social welfare calculations have no place.215 
If a decisional system threatens to impinge on that private sphere, individ-
ual process rights arguably should apply. 
From a Lockean or natural rights perspective, individual due process 
is understood as a means of protecting underlying natural entitlements. 
Lockean analysis centers around the idea of the “natural rights” inherent 
in individuals, such as the rights to life, liberty, and property.216 If the gov-
ernment reallocates or significantly impinges upon these rights, it must do 
so through adequate process. The goal of process under a Lockean analy-
sis is to (1) avoid errors, or if that is not possible, (2) indicate “consent” to 
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such reallocations or impingements by the affected individuals.217 Thus in 
circumstances where natural rights are affected, process is intended to 
help mitigate error, and evidences individual buy-in (if not consent). The 
limit to the Lockean argument for due process is that process is tied to 
protection of these certain core substantive rights; it is not justified in and 
of itself. 
Finally, we turn to Kantian or dignitary theory. Current scholarship 
on algorithmic accountability largely ignores or rejects the dignitary tradi-
tion in U.S. thought.218 More broadly, privacy scholarship for the most part 
concedes that while Europe is concerned about dignity, the United States 
is not.219 This overstates the case. Examining due process theory shows that 
there is a long dignitary tradition in the United States, and we overlook it 
to our detriment. 
The Kantian categorical imperative is that individuals must be treated 
as an end in themselves, not as the means to an end.220 A right to contest 
significant decisions is an expression of this value. The strongest form of a 
Kantian/dignitary argument for process is that using proxy categories to 
make decisions about individuals treats them as objects and thus violates 
their dignity—unless they are afforded opportunities for individualized 
judgment.221 One need not subscribe to this strongest form, however, to 
acknowledge the dignitary argument for due process. 
A Kantian approach argues that due process rights are necessary to 
respect individual selfhood. Opaque or arbitrary decisions fundamentally 
interfere in such self-respect. Offering a reason for a decision, by contrast, 
                                                                                                                                
 217. Id. at 909. 
 218. See Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 652 (describing dignity as 
an “ambiguous and contested” concept); Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 185, 
at 1119 (“To the extent that the personhood rationale can be converted to a more actiona-
ble legal issue, it is reflected in the concept of ‘procedural justice[]’ . . . .”).  
 219. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy 
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1341–54 (2000) (contrasting the United States’ 
liberal approach to information privacy with Europe’s social-protection approach); James 
Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 
1180–89 (2004) (describing the philosophical origins of privacy law); see also Jones, The 
Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 182, at 217. 
 220. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: And What is 
Enlightenment? 47 (Lewis White Beck trans., 1959) (1785) (“Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means 
only.”); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in Due 
Process: NOMOS XVIII 172, 179 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) 
(“[P]articipation is an instrument by which the valuation of persons as ends in themselves 
is expressed.”); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 209, at 915 (“The direct 
application of the Kantian categorical imperative, in which dignity may be said to consist in 
being treated as an end in oneself rather than as instrumental to the ends of others, may 
thus yield a robust set of procedural rights.”).  
 221. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 209, at 897, 901. According to 
Mashaw, this “principle has no obvious limits.” Id. at 897; see also Kaminski, Binary 
Governance, supra note 12, at 1541–42. 
1994 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
shows a sign of respect for the decisional subject.222 So does enabling par-
ticipation in the legitimacy of the system by establishing a right to contest 
its outputs. When a decision affects certain fundamental rights, process is 
necessary as both a means for promoting accuracy with respect to rights 
deprivation and an end for enabling self-respect.223 
B. AI Decisions and Due Process Values 
Centering the individual in the due process inquiry is thus not a for-
eign concept. The question remains whether AI decision-making, includ-
ing by private entities, should be subject to a right to contest. This section 
begins with some history, addressing the influential 1973 HEW Report and 
its emphasis on due process. It then applies the reasoning above—instru-
mentalism, rule of law values, and liberal theory—to the question of 
whether individuals should be afforded due process in the face of signifi-
cant decision-making by AI. 
1. The HEW Report: Due Process for Data Processing. — The idea that 
automated data processing—including by private entities—implicates due 
process values has deep roots in the United States. In the early 1970s, then-
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot L. Richardson estab-
lished an Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data systems.224 In 
establishing the Committee, Richardson declared that “there is a growing 
concern that automated personal data systems present a serious potential 
for harmful consequences, including infringement of basic liberties. This 
has led to the belief that special safeguards should be developed to protect 
against potentially harmful consequences for privacy and due process.”225 
In 1973, the Committee published an influential report (the HEW 
Report),226 often characterized as a foundational document for data privacy 
lawmaking. Data privacy laws both in the United States and around the 
world have since been based on the Report’s core principles, though the 
United States diverged in significant ways from its counterparts abroad. 
The HEW Report takes a highly procedural approach to information 
privacy, with due process principles running throughout. The Report notes 
that conventionally, privacy is often equated with secrecy or seclusion.227 
That is, shared information is presumed to be no longer private.228 This con-
ception of privacy is a poor fit, however, for the privacy interests in personal 
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data held and processed as part of a system of record keeping. Individuals 
often deliberately hand over personal data for limited use, yet still retain 
some expectation of privacy in them.229 
The HEW Report thus formulates a conception of data privacy in-
tended to both allow “some disclosure of data” and afford affected individ-
uals at least some agency in deciding “the nature and extent of such 
disclosure.”230 That is, the Report’s founding principle is that both the or-
ganizations that process records and the individuals affected by such rec-
ords should be able to participate in constructing what data privacy means 
in practice.231 As organizations typically control such decisions with little 
input by affected individuals, the HEW Report’s safeguards (later known 
as the fair information practice principles or “FIPPs”) are largely geared 
toward providing procedural protections for affected individuals. 
The result is a set of procedures and standards rather than substantive 
determinations. The Report notes that its safeguards do not 
provide the basis for determining a priori which data should or 
may be recorded and used, or why, and when. [They do], how-
ever, provide a basis for establishing procedures that assure the 
individual a right to participate in a meaningful way in decisions 
about what goes into records about him and how that infor-
mation shall be used.232  
Like due process, such procedural safeguards include notice233 and various 
rights to be heard.234 As scholars later note, these are the foundations of a 
kind of due process for data processing.235 
The HEW Report stands as a counterargument to the idea that only 
Europeans care about dignity and due process in the context of automa-
tion.236 The Report’s reasoning reflects the range of concerns about 
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computerized decision-making articulated in this Article: concerns about 
accuracy, fairness, individualized flexibility, dignity, and dehumanization. 
The Report observes that data processing can “sacrifice flexibility and accu-
racy” in the name of efficiency, contributing to the “the so-called ‘dehuman-
izing’ image of computerization.”237 It evinces concern about both inaccuracy 
and unfairness.238 It identifies the problem of “statistical stereotyping,” in 
which data processing is used to predict an individual’s future behavior 
based on his placement into a “statistically defined group.”239 The way to 
mitigate problems, the Report notes, is to “permit[] an individual to know 
that he has been labelled a risk and to contest the label as applied to him.”240 
The HEW Report, whose principles now form the backbone of federal 
U.S. sectoral data privacy laws such as HIPAA and COPPA, is thus as much 
about due process as it is about what most people would term privacy. It pro-
poses process safeguards to mitigate the power asymmetries between individ-
uals and the organizations, public and private, that hold records on them.241 
To be clear, there have been many valid critiques of how the United States 
has since operationalized privacy regulation, outside of the above-named stat-
utory regimes, around a watered-down version of individual control.242 The 
dominant U.S. approach to privacy protection has been “notice and choice,” 
in which individuals are expected to “read [privacy] notices and make deci-
sions according to their overall preferences.”243 This approach has been criti-
cized for, among other things, creating a legal fiction of consent when nobody 
in fact reads privacy policies; overly relying on individuals’ time, attention, and 
expertise; and overlooking the extent to which technology platforms manip-
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ulate individuals into making choices that benefit companies and not individ-
uals.244 Emphasizing individual rights to the exclusion of collective 
governance, too, ignores that many privacy problems—surveillance of neigh-
borhoods or communities, discrimination against particular groups, and 
chilling minority viewpoints or speech—are collective in nature.245 
Yet as both sectoral statutory schemes within the United States and con-
trasting data protection regulation around the world illustrate, operational-
izing the HEW Report’s principles need not mean idealizing ineffective 
individual control—especially if individual rights are coupled with more ro-
bust systemic regulation.246  
At the time of the Report, the kind of AI decision-making discussed here 
was still a hypothetical future.247 The Report reads as a prescient call for an 
American version of the right to contest: “Sometimes the individual does not 
even know that an organization maintains a record about him. Often he may 
not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control its dissemination, or 
challenge its use by others.”248 
2. Due Process Theory and AI Decision-Making. — One of the only U.S. schol-
ars to directly address the GDPR’s right to contestation explicitly rejects it.249 
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Huq queries whether such a right can be justified. He rejects calls for trans-
parency and accuracy, reasoning that human decision-makers can be just as 
opaque250 and just as inaccurate251 as machines. He rejects dignity as too neb-
ulous a ground for a contestation right.252 He concludes that none of a host 
of concerns can justify a right to a human-made decision, even in the criminal 
law context.253 
Instead, Huq reasons that the purpose of individualized due process 
is largely utilitarian: to ensure systemic accuracy and lack of bias.254 Instead 
of individual due process challenges, he calls for a “right to a well-cali-
brated machine decision”—that is, a right to an unbiased and accurate 
system, rather than a right to engage with its individualized outputs.255 
Such a right could, per Huq, be vindicated through ex ante and systemic 
measures, or through ex post class action litigation. 
We disagree. Challenges aimed at systemic issues are advisable, but 
cannot replace the ability of individual contestation rights to ameliorate real 
harms. This section applies the rationales we have identified for individual 
process in human decision-making—accuracy, rule of law considerations, 
utilitarianism, natural rights, and, yes, dignity—to decision-making by AI. 
Decisions made by AI can be inaccurate. Due process mechanisms can 
improve the accuracy of the system as a whole.256 For example, an individ-
ual person can best identify when the long-tail problem has occurred.257 
The Somali-American grocers who were not permitted to accept food 
stamps because the USDA’s algorithm mistakenly found fraud could have, 
through contestation, established that their customers were in fact making 
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whole-number purchases.258 Similarly, individual actions contesting an al-
gorithm’s decisions about allocating home care visits for severely disabled 
individuals revealed both individual and broader inaccuracies.259 Court 
proceedings revealed that the algorithm accounted for only about sixty 
factors from a much longer list collected from patients, didn’t account for 
diabetes issues, and was improperly coded for cerebral palsy.260 The cere-
bral palsy mistake alone had “caused incorrect calculations for hundreds 
of people, mostly lowering their hours [of home care].”261 Only an indi-
vidual contestation in which “the other c[ame] and cross-examine[d]”262 
allowed these systemic accuracy problems to be identified. 
Individual contestation rights can also support rule of law values. Rule 
of law values suggest that decisions should be fair, consistent, predictable, 
and rational across different individuals.263 But AI decisions can be arbi-
trary or subject to a logic we cannot understand or normatively reject. For 
example, an algorithm may find that credit risk correlates to the color of 
a person’s socks.264 People with pink socks might get better credit than 
people with blue socks, or vice versa. Even if this correlation is backed by 
unimpeachable studies, it may still feel unreasonable, arbitrary, or even—
if sock color correlates with other features such as gender or sexual orien-
tation—discriminatory. 
An individual right to contest AI-made credit decisions could uncover 
the sock color irrationality. It could uncover, too, whether such rules are 
being applied consistently across individuals or whether the system instead 
has created sock color loopholes that make it normatively unfair. 
A utilitarian argument for a right to contest AI could take three forms. 
First, giving individuals a right to contest AI decisions could produce 
greater acceptance of such decisional systems.265 Second, where such deci-
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sions have very significant effects, such as the deprivation of welfare bene-
fits or the denial of child custody,266 “rule utilitarianism” might suggest 
that process protections are more likely to maximize social welfare by 
preventing serious pain. Third, if AI decisions threaten the private sphere, 
even utilitarians may find that individual process rights should apply. The 
denial of child custody could be characterized as impinging upon the 
private sphere;267 so could, for example, an employer’s use of AI to 
intrusively track employee behavior or attributes.268 
From a Lockean perspective, individuals should have a right to con-
test AI decisions where such decisions impinge on natural entitlements 
such as the rights to life, liberty, and property. A right to contest could help 
mitigate error. Equally important is that a contestation process could evi-
dence individual buy-in or even consent. 
Finally, we come to dignity. The dignitary argument for a right to con-
test is perhaps the strongest, despite Huq’s and others’ objections to it. 
Decisions that affect people’s lives implicate dignity. Specific examples are 
clear on this point. It is offensive to the dignity of Black kidney patients to 
deny them the same chance at life-saving treatment as white patients with 
kidney disease of the same severity.269 It is offensive to the dignity of home-
health-care patients to severely limit their existing independence, to leave 
“people lying in their own waste . . . getting bed sores . . . being shut in . . . 
skipping meals,” and fearing institutionalization, and to “reduce [their] 
humanity to a number.”270 AI, by its nature, categorizes people in order to 
make decisions. Categorizing individuals arguably objectifies them; 
affording a right to contest that categorization restores at least some form 
of dignity.271 Affording a right to contest affords a form of respect to 
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individual people in the system. It permits participation. It establishes 
agency. 
Rather than acting as mere “abstract and vague” concepts, dignity and 
autonomy interests animate calls for accuracy (to root out harmful mis-
takes) and rule of law constraints (to root out unequal, inconsistent ef-
fects), as well as values of rationality, respect, and individual participation 
in decision-making. Though dignity and autonomy may not, by them-
selves, provide sufficient justifications for contestation, they provide essen-
tial justifications. And because respecting dignity and autonomy enhances 
acceptance, including them in design rubrics may ultimately contribute to 
a decision-making system’s legitimacy. 
As noted above, dignitary theory is not new to U.S. law. It is not even 
new in the data privacy context. In fact, early calls for data governance 
echoed concerns about individual powerlessness and lack of autonomy 
that sound in similar dignitary notes.272 These calls resulted in existing U.S. 
privacy laws that, while not as comprehensive or consolidated as European 
data privacy law, are founded on the notion that affording transparency 
and participation mitigates power disparities. 
Thus, theories from the due process literature support a call for a 
right to contest AI. And when we look to the legal systems that have estab-
lished or suggested establishing a right to contest, we see echoes of each 
of these theories. 
For example, Europe’s 1995 Directive protections grew, in part, from 
a concern about automation bias that sounded in accuracy—that human 
decision-makers “may attach too much weight” to an automated decision 
and fail to question its reasoning or catch its errors.273 The Council of 
Europe, in its 2020 Recommendation, notes that “algorithmic systems are 
based on statistical models in which errors form an inevitable part,” and 
that, owing to algorithmic systems’ large-scale effects, the “number of peo-
ple . . . who are affected by these errors and inbuilt bias, will also 
expand.”274 
Rule of law values, too, animate concerns about algorithmic decision-
making. Both the scholarly literature and European policy-makers voice 
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concerns about fairness, predictability, accountability, and the need to dis-
cipline algorithmic decisions. The Council of Europe, in its 
Recommendation, directly invokes the rule of law, admonishing that “the 
rule of law standards that govern public and private relations, such as le-
gality, transparency, predictability, accountability, and oversight, must also 
be maintained in the context of algorithmic systems.”275 
Both the GDPR and Council are motivated by autonomy and dignity 
rationales as well as accuracy.276 Article 15 of the Directive was, first, in-
tended to protect an autonomy interest that an individual has in actively 
“participating in the making of decisions which are of importance to [an 
individual].”277 The second, closely related, rationale was to protect indi-
vidual dignity, by preventing machine decisions from being made based 
on objectified and uncontestable “data shadows.”278 
3. Open Questions. — Once we establish that a right to contest should 
exist, challenging questions remain, such as (1) when are process rights 
triggered? and (2) what sort of process might each theory require? 
The first question—the threshold question—is beyond the scope of 
this Article and worthy of significant additional work.279 However, due pro-
cess theory provides some clues. Each of the theories discussed above sug-
gests that due process is triggered when a significant right of some kind is 
meaningfully affected. Due process doctrine in practice does the same, 
asking whether an individual has been deprived of a liberty or property 
right.280 The GDPR’s right to contestation, similarly, is triggered only when 
a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, pro-
duces “legal effects” or “similarly significant effects,” or “similarly signifi-
cantly affects” an individual.281 
As to the kind of process required, much of the remainder of this 
Article is dedicated to answering that question. We briefly note here, how-
ever, that the arguments for reason giving are particularly salient to our 
task.282 AI decisions do not naturally provide reasons for outcomes. In fact, 
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some technologies cannot provide explanations unless they are pro-
grammed to do so. Reason giving is central to contestation, not just be-
cause it might increase accuracy, but because it commits to treating 
decisional subjects equally, contributes to consistency, allows for quality 
control, and demonstrates respect for the subject of a decision.283 Contes-
tation without an explanation, in other words, is largely meaningless.284 
Taken all together, the rationales behind individual process rights ap-
ply with force to AI decision-making. Effective contestation rights can ame-
liorate individual harms and give life to broader rule of law values. 
Contestation can play a valuable role in policing AI decision-making and 
directing it toward accuracy, consistency, reliability, and fairness. 
However, a right to contest by itself is not a panacea. There has been 
an understandable backlash against mere process, or “procedural fetish-
ism.”285 And as Parts III and IV discuss, effective contestation is heavily de-
pendent on both design and context. Systemic solutions—for example, 
testing, audits, algorithmic impact assessments, and documentation re-
quirements286—are all important, too.287 Substantive law matters. Access to 
legal representation or expertise matters. Correcting historic and embed-
ded systemic injustice matters. 
The point is not that process alone matters. The point is that it matters, 
too. 
III. CONTESTATION MODELS 
Under this normative analysis, the EU, Council of Europe, OECD, 
Brazil, Quebec, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada are 
all correct in calling for or establishing a right to contest AI. What that 
right to contest should look like in practice, however, is an open question. 
The GDPR’s right to contest AI, as noted, is more cipher than road map. 
The second half of this Article thus turns to how the right to contest 
might be operationalized. The constitutional due process model, which 
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affords notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral arbiter, 
encounters significant obstacles when applied to AI decision-making.288 AI 
decisions are made at speed and at scale—features that in fact can be core 
justifications for using AI in the first place.289 To impose full judicial pro-
cess on each AI decision would be to impose costs, both monetary and 
temporal, that might make the use of AI unwieldy. 
Sometimes, as in the criminal context, this may be a good thing: The 
benefits of using AI may be so outweighed by the consequences of potential 
injustice that nothing short of full judicial process might suffice. Others have, 
for similar reasons, called for a moratorium on law enforcement use of facial 
recognition (a form of AI), reasoning that the costs in the law enforcement 
context are not worth any benefits the technology might afford.290 
Often, however, AI decision-making may be either so useful or so es-
tablished that an outright ban is not possible.291 Affording judicial process 
in every contestation would outpace the resources of our judicial system.292 
What, then, should be done to afford process that is not perfect, but in-
stead is good enough? 
This problem is not new. The question of how to afford adequate in-
dividual process at speed and at scale has been at the core of several policy 
debates.293 There are “offline” models for abbreviated process, too.294 This 
Part identifies and examines four archetypes for process at speed and at 
scale: the GDPR’s right to contestation, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s “notice-and-takedown” process, the EU’s so-called “Right to be 
Forgotten,” and the Fair Credit Billing Act’s process for challenging credit 
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card transactions. We show how the GDPR’s right to contestation has been 
implemented by different EU Member States in ways that map onto the 
archetypes. After establishing these archetypes and observing them in ac-
tion, this Article turns, in the next and final Part, to crafting a meaningful 
right to contest AI. 
A. The Design of Privatized Process: Four Contestation Archetypes 
This Part establishes four contestation archetypes, drawn from models 
used in practice. These archetypes can frame discussions of contestation 
and provide theoretical clarity to often myopic conversations about pro-
cess at speed and scale. 
In this examination of extrajudicial contestation models, the devil is 
usually in the details. Contestation varies along a number of axes, with sig-
nificant consequences for the efficacy and legitimacy of the system. How 
any one of these axes is calibrated can affect the success of the entire sys-
tem. For purposes of the archetypes, contestation varies along two key 
axes; other considerations are addressed in section III.F below. 
The first key axis is whether the contestation mechanism itself is es-
tablished by what we call a “contestation rule” or by a “contestation stand-
ard.”295 This distinction is related, but not identical, to the more general 
distinction between rules and standards in the law. The literature on legal 
rules and standards is robust.296 One way to understand the difference be-
tween a legal rule and a legal standard is that a legal rule provides clear 
and precise content ex ante (“do not drive above 75 mph”), while a stand-
ard’s content is determined by an interpreter ex post (“drive reasona-
bly”—what is reasonable?).297 Another way to understand the distinction 
is that a rule ties the hands of future decision-makers, requiring them “to 
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering 
facts,”298 while a legal standard provides more discretion, asking decision-
makers to apply a “background principle or policy . . . to a fact situa-
tion.”299 Rules may have the benefit of being clear and providing notice;300 
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standards may have the benefit of avoiding under- or over-inclusivity.301 
Standards also arguably have the benefit of inducing moral deliberation 
in citizens, including in the corporate context (what is “hostile”? or “of-
fensive”?)302—but the corresponding disadvantage of leaving discretion to 
actors whose interpretations of such broader principles may be self-
serving. 
A contestation rule, as this Article defines it, is similar to a legal rule in 
that its precise details are spelled out ex ante, by legislators or regulators, 
including: a notice requirement, a timeline for complaining, a timeline 
for responses to complaints, or formal requirements for how to complain. 
A contestation standard, by contrast, merely states that there is a right to 
contest, leaving the procedural details to future decision-makers, private 
or public. 
For example, a law could dictate that “individuals should be afforded a 
right to contest,” without saying more about the parameters of the right, 
when and how it should be “afforded,” and so forth. This would establish 
what this Article describes as a contestation standard, in the sense that without 
more information, someone other than the legislature will be left to fill in 
the gaps. At another level, however, a contestation standard still provides a 
legal rule: It establishes that there is a right to contest, rather than leaving 
that question vague. As another way of distinguishing the concepts, a 
contestation rule may itself contain legal standards—for example, requiring a 
business to respond to contestation within a “reasonable” time frame. As 
with legal rules and standards more generally, in practice these are not 
“pure types,” as “legal commands mix the two in varying degrees.”303 
A contestation rule, or really, a set of contestation rules, could dictate not 
just the existence of a right to contest, but its granular details: whether, when, 
and how notice should be afforded; how decisions should be made; by whom; 
and on what timeline. For example, a law could state: “Individuals should 
be notified as to an adverse decision within 5 business days, using the follow-
ing format, and challenges must be heard before a neutral arbiter within 10 
business days, with individuals afforded the following procedural rights.” 
As with rules and standards more generally, there are costs and benefits 
to designing a right to contest as more rules based or standards based. A 
contestation standard has the benefit of flexibility. It allows decision-makers to 
tailor the right in response to particular circumstances, including to partic-
ular technologies or sectors. It allows other actors, such as regulators or 
judges or even regulated entities, to fill in the gaps in the afforded process 
over time, or to modify approaches as technology, practices, and norms 
evolve. Thus a contestation standard, like standards more generally, argua-
bly “future-proofs” the law against changing circumstances, requiring less 
future intervention through legislation or regulation. 
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A contestation rule, by contrast, has the benefit of clarity. With clarity 
often comes lower costs. If the law is clear about what it requires, an entity 
attempting to comply with a contestation rule can spend less money on 
lawyers and risks fewer penalties for erroneous noncompliance. This has 
implications for competition: For smaller and less resourced companies, 
lower-cost rules could establish a more level playing field—although some 
rules may be costly in their execution and so disadvantage less resourced 
companies regardless. A contestation rule, too, has the potential benefit 
of affording less wiggle room. By establishing clear and inflexible pro-
cesses, a contestation rule can better guarantee that the same process will 
be afforded equally across all actors. 
The second axis along which contestation varies is how much substan-
tive law it incorporates or relies on. A right to contest can be more purely 
procedural, focused on the mechanics of contestation—on affording a 
right to contest, but not the underlying substantive rights. Or contestation 
can be substantive, establishing not just how contestation should occur, but 
on what basis a decision may be contested. Simply put, a right to contest 
that has a substantive focus incorporates not just the procedural rules of a 
challenge, but the substantive basis of that challenge. For example, a law 
could state: “Individuals have a right to contest decisions, which cannot be 
made on the basis of an erroneous piece of data.” An individual invoking 
this right to contest could then challenge a decision for being based on an 
erroneous piece of data.304 
The other pole of this axis—contestation based on procedure—might 
seem strange. How can one have a right to contest a decision that lacks 
grounding in a substantive right? But when we look to existing models of 
contestation rights, it becomes apparent that sometimes process is di-
vorced from the substance of the challenge. This can occur in two ways. 
First, some versions of contestation establish how, procedurally, one might 
contest a decision, without establishing a substantive basis for the chal-
lenge. This is the case for some early implementations of the GDPR’s right 
to contestation. Second, even where there is an underlying substantive ba-
sis, other features of a contestation scheme—including strict procedural 
rules and decision-making at speed and scale—can render the scheme pro-
cedural in practice. As described below, this is the case for the notice-and-
takedown process of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In 
fact, some schemes allow challenges to be made and completed without 
really getting to any substantive basis for them at all. 
For example, a law might state: “Individuals have a right to challenge 
an AI’s decision to assign them a particular grade.” This statement estab-
lishes only that there is a right to challenge the AI’s decision. It does not 
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establish, normatively or practically, what reasons or reasoning might give 
rise to successful challenges. 
A law that fails to identify the substantive basis for a right to contest 
leaves substantive decisions in the hands of nonlegislative actors. The sub-
stance of a challenge might then be decided not by legislators but by reg-
ulators, judges, the contesting parties themselves, or the nonjudicial 
entities mediating or adjudicating contestation. Or it may afford a right to 
contest that is all procedure, with no clear substance at all. 
Once again, this design choice—whether to make the right to contest 
more substantive or more procedural—has consequences, both good and 
bad. The benefit of a right to contest that is more focused on procedure is 
that substantive law can be subtle, heavily fact dependent, and complicated. 
Expertise in substantive law can thus be very expensive, which can impede 
individual access to justice. Additionally, as the due process theory discussed 
above argues, process can matter for its own sake. Process by itself can afford 
transparency, reveal problems in decision-making, give individuals agency 
in a decision, and make decision-making accountable, even if underlying 
substantive norms go unstated. 
There are downsides, though, to a heavily procedural and minimally 
substantive right to contest. The first is arbitrariness. Affording the ability to 
contest a decision without substantive grounding gives no notice to the en-
tity whose decisions are subject to contestation, except that it may be subject 
to challenges against any and all decisions. Unconstrained challenges bring 
with them costs, including the cost of a large volume of challenges.305 Arbi-
trariness can be bad for challengers, too; creating no substantive backstop 
to a contestation right means that an adjudicator (who is sometimes the same 
as the entity whose decision is being contested) has untethered discretion. 
The following tables illustrate the archetypes. Table I describes the 
archetypes. Table II offers hypothetical statutory language illustrating 
them. 
TABLE I: THE CONTESTATION ARCHETYPES 
 Contestation Standard Contestation Rule 
Procedural 
Focus 
1) Contestation Standard 
with a Procedural Focus 
2) Contestation Rule with 
a Procedural Focus 
Substantive 
Focus 
3) Contestation Standard 
with a Substantive Focus 
4) Contestation Rule with 
a Substantive Focus 
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TABLE II: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF THE CONTESTATION ARCHETYPES 
 Contestation Standard Contestation Rule 
Procedural 
Focus 
1) “An individual shall 
have a right to contest 
decisions, and shall be 
afforded adequate 
process.” 
2) “An individual shall have 
a right to contest decisions. 
She shall be provided notice 
of an adverse decision 
within 5 business days . . . “ 
Substantive 
Focus 
3) “An individual shall 
have a right to contest 
decisions, which shall not 
be biased.” 
4) “An individual shall have 
a right to contest decisions, 
which cannot be made on 
the basis of erroneous data 
points.” 
As with all archetypes and models, in reality, most laws map onto a 
continuum, rather than reside at the poles.306 For example, the GDPR’s 
right to contestation is on its face purely procedural, but read in context, 
arguably has substantive components.307 On the spectrum between sub-
stantive and procedural, the GDPR’s right to contest, at least on its face, 
sits closer to the procedural pole: 
         
 
Laws, too, will often contain more than one archetype at a time. For 
example, the chargeback process of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA) 
contains both precise language on substance (making it a contestation 
rule with a substantive focus), and precise rules on the elements of re-
quired notice and contestation timelines (making it also a contestation 
rule with a procedural focus). 
Further, laws may operate very differently in practice from how they 
appear on paper. This can be deliberate—when, for example, a law dele-
gates interpretive power to a regulator that adds in details that make a stand-
ard more rule-like in practice. For example, the EU’s Right to Be Forgotten 
has arguably become more rule-like over time, as regulators have issued 
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sponsible for explaining the articles have clarified that the apparently procedural require-
ment of a “solely” automated decision in fact involves a determination of whether there was 
meaningful human involvement, see Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, 
supra note 115, at 20–21 (discussing meaningful human involvement). 
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more detailed guidelines.308 Similarly, the GDPR’s right to contestation has 
been altered by Member States whose implementations of the right have 
moved it from one quadrant to another.309 
Or, the law’s implementation might change over time to depart from 
its original design. For example, some online platforms have developed 
approaches to online copyright infringement that one of us has termed 
“DMCA Auto” and “DMCA Plus.”310 In these approaches, online service 
providers (OSPs) employ automated systems to remove content—or pre-
vent it from ever making it onto the provider’s platform. Some versions of 
these approaches forgo substantive review in favor of rapid removal at 
scale; others go beyond what is required by the DMCA in the first place.311 
In turn, these decisions are sometimes subject to a privatized version of 
contestation that also departs from the law.312 On paper, then, the DMCA 
establishes a contestation rule with a procedural focus, grounded in sub-
stantive copyright law. But what happens in practice may depart from the 
substantive law; in the case of “DMCA Plus,” practice may depart from the 
DMCA’s procedural requirements, too. 
This brings us to an important aspect of our chosen archetypes: Each 
is an example of privatized contestation—contestation effected by private 
parties. In each chosen archetype, the private parties that actually apply a 
contestation scheme develop that scheme and operate under some type of 
                                                                                                                                
 308. See Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 5/2019 on the Criteria of the Right to Be 
Forgotten in the Search Engine Cases Under the GDPR (Part 1), paras. 13–83 (July 7, 2020), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_201905_rtbfsearc
hengines_afterpublicconsultation_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SVM-V474] (detailing 
grounds for a data subject’s personal data to be delisted from search engine results and 
grounds for a search engine’s proper refusal to delist such data); see also Article 29 Data 
Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzáles” C-131/12, at 2–3 (2014), http:// 
ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/ 
wp225_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/98GH-6SPR] [hereinafter Article 29 Working Party, 
Guidelines on Google Spain] (listing circumstances under which data subjects can demand 
that “search engines . . . de-list certain links to information affecting their privacy from the 
results for searches made against their name”). 
 309. See Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 
115, at 18–23 (comparing member state implementations). 
 310. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 29; 
see also Maria Strong, U.S. Copyright Off., Section 512 of Title 17: A Report of the 
Register of Copyrights 67 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-
512-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C68-HWFA] (noting the existence of “DMCA+ 
systems”); Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus Enforcement by 
Internet Intermediaries, in Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law 185, 187 
(John A. Rothchild ed., 2016) (surveying “the current landscape of DMCA-plus 
enforcement”). 
 311. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 29. 
 312. See Bridy, supra note 310, at 197 (explaining how YouTube’s Content ID program 
and Vimeo’s Copyright Match program “allow users to dispute a copyright owner’s claim on 
content”). 
2021] THE RIGHT TO CONTEST AI 2011 
 
statutory or regulatory framework. Some readers might characterize these 
choices as leaving a missing box: privatized contestation unconstrained by 
law or regulation. For example, much ink has been spilled on the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) Section 230 and the broad immun-
ity it affords to platforms from liability for online content moderation.313 
In the absence of a statutory contestation mechanism for most online con-
tent, many platforms have developed contestation schemes that are con-
strained only by the platforms’ preferences and interests.314 Those purely 
privatized mechanisms can certainly inform the conversation about how 
to design contestation rights—especially whether or not companies can be 
trusted to come up with adequate process and substance. However, this 
Article aims to structure a conversation about statutory and regulatory de-
sign rather than entirely privatized approaches.315 
The rest of this Part turns to examples that illustrate these archetypes 
of contestation in action. Table III identifies how our examples map onto 
our contestation archetypes. 







1) The GDPR’s “Right 
to Contestation” 
2) The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s (DMCA’s) 
“Notice-and-takedown” regime; 
The UK Right to Contestation 
Substantive 
Focus 
3) The EU’s “Right to 
Be Forgotten” (RTBF); 
The Slovenian Right to 
Contestation 
4) The Fair Credit Billing Act 
(FCBA); The French & 
Hungarian Rights to 
Contestation 
                                                                                                                                
 313. E.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace 170–81 (2016); Eric 
Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability 155, 155 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020); Jeff 
Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet (2019); David S. Ardia, Free 
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 373 (2010); 
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017); Eric Goldman, The Ten Most 
Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2017); Felix T. Wu, 
Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 293 
(2011). 
 314. See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent 
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 Yale L.J. 2418, 2427–48 (2020) (dis-
cussing Facebook’s content moderation process prior to the establishment of the firm’s 
Independent Governance and Oversight Board); Van Loo, supra note 5, at 832 (providing 
“case studies of the dispute processes designed by Airbnb, Amazon, Facebook, and 
Google”). 
 315. Inasmuch as reforms to CDA 230 suggest implementing statutory changes, these 
archetypes may prove useful. 
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In the wild, none of these examples is perfect. Here, each is simplified 
for purposes of illustration. At their core, however, these examples effec-
tively illustrate the variations in how a right to contest might be 
designed.316 
B. Archetype 1 Illustrated: The GDPR’s Right to Contestation 
The first quadrant of the contestation archetypes is a contestation stand-
ard with a procedural focus.317 The GDPR’s right to contestation embodies this 
archetype. 
As discussed above, the GDPR’s right to contestation is a set of stand-
ards rather than specific rules. It does not, on its face, provide substantive 
grounds for challenging algorithmic decisions—those grounds, some sug-
gest, will be found in other areas of substantive law.318 The Guidelines is-
sued by the EU’s data regulator, the European Data Protection Board, 
highlight the centrality of the right to contest without giving it much fur-
ther substance.319 
While the right to contestation itself is as of yet a cipher, other GDPR 
rights can be understood to give it substance. For example, a number of the 
GDPR transparency rights are meant to enable contestation.320 The GDPR 
requires notice to individuals who have been subjected to an automated de-
cision; disclosure of “meaningful information about the logic involved” in 
an automated decision-making system; and explanation of individual deci-
sions.321 These various forms of transparency are intended to enable indi-
viduals to meaningfully contest algorithmic decision-making.322 
                                                                                                                                
 316. The newly enacted Virginia Consumer Data Privacy Act, Va. Code § 59.1-577(C) 
(2021), and Colorado Privacy Act, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3459 (to be codified at Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1306(3) (2021)), each contain privatized contestation models for “personal 
data rights” that could be slotted into the archetypes. 
 317. To be clear, this is what the GDPR right to contest looks like on the face of the law. 
Certain EU Member States have further detailed this right, sometimes in ways that move it 
from this first archetype to one of the other quadrants. For further discussion of this hybrid-
ization, see infra section III.F. 
 318. Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9, at 41–49 (ob-
serving that “[n]either Article 22 nor the GDPR in general[] contains any guidance as to 
the substance of the right to contest automated decisions” and arguing that the contents of 
the right of contestation can be “a legal procedure or an adjudicatory system”). 
 319. Id. at 41. 
 320. The right to explanation and the right to know “meaningful information about the 
logic involved,” GDPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1)(h), in automated decision-making are, ac-
cording to the Guidelines, meant to empower individuals to contest such decisions, 
Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 27; see also Mendoza 
& Bygrave, supra note 10, at 91; Selbst & Powles, supra note 127, at 236 (“[T]he test for 
whether information is meaningful should be functional, pegged to some action the expla-
nation enables in the data subject, such as the right to contest a decision as provided by 
Article 22(3).”). 
 321. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 196–200. 
 322. Id. at 211. 
2021] THE RIGHT TO CONTEST AI 2013 
 
Generally applicable GDPR rights also give meaning to, or comple-
ment, the right to contestation.323 For example, the right to access, which 
includes a right to see both the data a company holds about an individual 
and inferences a company has made, enables individuals to challenge a 
decision as being based on incorrect data or incorrect inferences.324 The 
GDPR contains a correction right (the “right to rectification”) as well, 
which enables individuals to require companies to correct inaccurate per-
sonal data.325 Several other generally applicable GDPR rights, such as the 
right to erasure, right to object, and right to restrict processing,326 can each 
be understood as alternatively (1) complements to the right to contesta-
tion, (2) minimum requirements regardless of the strength of the contes-
tation right, or perhaps (3) as models for the contestation right. 
The right to contestation is intertwined, too, with the GDPR’s treat-
ment of the “human in the loop” of automated decision-making.327 For 
reasons ranging from a concern about respecting human dignity328 to a 
concern about excessive deference to automated decisions,329 the GDPR 
pushes both private and public entities toward involving humans in 
significant decisions, rather than allowing such decisions to be made by 
machines alone. If companies wish to escape Article 22’s safeguard 
requirements, they have to meaningfully involve a human in the loop.330 
Where Article 22 applies, companies must adopt a means for “human 
intervention.”331 The Guidelines suggest this might mean “for example 
providing a link to an appeals process at the point the automated decision 
is delivered to the data subject, with agreed timescales for the review and a 
named contact point for any queries.”332 This suggestion in some ways resem-
                                                                                                                                
 323. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 49. 
 324. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1); see also Guidelines on Automated Individual 
Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 17. 
 325. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 16; see also Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 38. 
 326. GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 17, 18, 21. 
 327. Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 231. 
 328. Id.; see also Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 84 (noting “a concern to uphold 
human dignity by ensuring that humans (and not their ‘data shadows’) maintain the pri-
mary role in ‘constituting’ themselves”); Zarsky, Incompatible, supra note 182, at 1016–17 
(“[W]hen faced with crucial decisions, a human should be treated with the dignity of having 
a human decision-maker address his or her personal matter.”). 
 329. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 84; Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra 
note 10, at 18; Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72. 
 330. First, Article 22’s scope and stringency incentivize companies to meaningfully in-
volve humans in algorithmic decision-making. Recall that Article 22 applies only when de-
cisions are “based solely on automated processing”; this has been interpreted in the 
Guidelines to mean decisions that do not involve meaningful human involvement and over-
sight. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 20–21 (dis-
cussing what constitutes “meaningful human involvement”). 
 331. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3). 
 332. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 32. 
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bles the DMCA notice-and-takedown process, in that it establishes a com-
pany contact point and suggests that there be timescales for procedures, 
although it does not establish specific timelines. 
Also notable is that the Guidelines’ example does not involve an ex-
ternal neutral decision-maker but houses the appeals process within the 
same company that implements automated decision-making.333 While this 
guidance arguably moves the right to contest from a pure contestation 
standard to something more rule like, it still leaves most details up to the 
entity processing the AI decision. Moreover, it is an example, not a 
requirement. 
The central concern about the right to contestation is that, like its 
predecessor, it may become dead-letter law.334 The Guidelines, however, 
show335 that the regulators that enforce the GDPR believe contestation is 
a core component of the GDPR’s basket of rights. 
A second concern about the right to contestation as a contestation 
standard is that it leaves substantial wiggle room for companies and gov-
ernments to render the right ineffective in practice. Furthermore, the 
GDPR allows Member States to implement their own versions of the 
right.336 As a standard, Article 22 leaves ample room for Member States to 
craft their own versions of the contestation right, potentially resulting in 
both higher compliance costs for companies operating across the EU and 
in varying degrees of efficacy that depend on where a person lives.  
Finally, the GDPR right at first appears to be largely procedural rather 
than substantive. It is not clear from the text on what basis someone may 
contest an AI decision. This leaves open the possibility that implementing 
entities or Member States can construct a right that is almost entirely pro-
cedural. And in fact, both the Guideline example discussed above and the 
implementation by some Member States discussed below have construed 
the right to contestation as being largely procedural in nature. This risks 
defanging the right and allowing companies to comply through rubber-
stamped processes rather than requiring effective mechanisms with mean-
ingful effects.337 
But there are strong arguments that when it is read in context, there 
is a substantive backstop to the GDPR’s contestation right—illustrating 
                                                                                                                                
 333. Cf. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 20 (proposing that the FTC 
plays an analogous supervisory role in the context of credit-scoring algorithms); Crawford 
& Schultz, supra note 8, at 126–27 (proposing that a regulatory entity like the FTC play this 
role).  
 334. Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 65–67; Wachter et al., Why a Right to 
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 115, at 96–97. 
 335. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, 
at 4. 
 336. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(2)(b). 
 337. Wachter & Mittelstadt, Right to Reasonable Inferences, supra note 120, at 569 (call-
ing “into question that the right to contest can be meaningfully implemented without un-
derlying decision-making standards”). 
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that laws often fall on a spectrum between the poles rather than existing 
as pure versions of the archetypes. At least, individuals can contest the in-
accuracy of the personal data on which decisions are based, using the gen-
eral GDPR right to rectification.338 It is clear, too, that the right to contest 
is intended to go beyond mere rectification. Like other restrictions on AI 
decision-making, the right is intended to protect “the data subject’s rights 
and freedoms and legitimate interests.”339 One can thus argue that the 
GDPR affords a right to contest not just erroneous decisions, but biased 
and discriminatory decisions, and most decisions based on highly sensitive 
personal data.340 There is the worrisome prospect that both complying en-
tities and Member States will eschew this substantive grounding and take 
the GDPR’s right to contest in the more proceduralized direction offered 
in the Guidelines. 
C. Archetype 2 Illustrated: The DMCA’s “Notice-and-Takedown” Process and 
the UK Right to Contestation 
We now move to the second archetype: a contestation rule with a proce-
dural focus. This is illustrated by some implementations of the influential 
“notice-and-takedown” process created by section 512 of the U.S. 
DMCA.341 We also offer the UK implementation of the GDPR’s right to 
contestation as an example. 
1. DMCA Section 512. — The DMCA’s section 512 contains one of the 
most widely adopted versions of a contestation right in the digital age. The 
DMCA’s approach has been exported in various forms throughout the 
world,342 including in the implementation of the EU’s E-Commerce 
                                                                                                                                
 338. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 16 (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from 
the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning 
him or her.”). 
 339. Id. art. 22(3). 
 340. GDPR, supra note 13, Recital 71. Recital 71 explains that entities should aim to 
minimize errors and to “prevent . . . discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis 
of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, 
genetic or health status or sexual orientation,” and to not utilize processing “that results in 
measures having such an effect.” While not specifically directed at the contestation right, 
these substantive goals can be understood as the goals of contestation as well. Additionally, 
Recital 71 states that AI decisions based on particularly sensitive personal information (“spe-
cial categor[y]” data, such as biometric data, racial data, and sexual orientation data) 
“should be allowed only under specific conditions.” 
 341. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018). 
 342. For a detailed account of the DMCA’s influence on other implementations, see 
Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 21–23 (“The E-
Commerce Directive was largely inspired by the DMCA safe harbors, though it differs from 
the DMCA in several notable ways.”). For comprehensive discussions of the background and 
relationship between the U.S. and European approaches, see generally Aleksandra 
Kuczerawy, Intermediary Liability and Freedom of Expression in the EU: From Concepts to 
Safeguards (2018); Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European 
Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 
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Directive.343 For better or worse, section 512 has become a worldwide model 
for a privatized version of individual due process as applied to online 
expression.344 
Section 512 structures online copyright disputes. Its drafters sought 
to reduce legal uncertainty for OSPs and to reduce costs for copyright 
holders facing online copyright infringement.345 Under section 512, copy-
right holders can address online copyright infringement by sending rela-
tively inexpensive “takedown” notices directly to OSPs.346 If OSPs respond 
to the takedown notices by removing the allegedly infringing material, 
they receive “safe harbor” from certain types of secondary liability for their 
users’ copyright infringements.347 In turn, targets of takedown notices can 
contest removal by sending a “counter notification” asking that material 
be reinstated.348 
Section 512’s notice-and-takedown scheme, taken as a whole, exem-
plifies a contestation rule. If material infringes copyright, then it comes 
down. Moreover, the statute dictates many (though notoriously not all) 
precise elements of a tightly orchestrated process.349 Copyright holders 
                                                                                                                                
481, 511 (2009) (arguing that, while the EU and U.S. statutes include problematic ambigu-
ities and other similarities, their differences render them functionally distinct). 
 343. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 (EC) [hereinafter E-
Commerce Directive]. Note that, in the majority of implementations, “takedown” is re-
served for copyright complaints, though it is sometimes applied to other serious complaints 
(such as complaints of so-called “manifestly unlawful” speech), and rarely, to any unlawful 
content. See Aleksandra Kuczerawy, From ‘Notice and Take Down’ to ‘Notice and Stay 
Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Intermediary Liability Online 525, 526 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020) (comparing and con-
trasting some specific national implementation strategies and how they “can impact the 
right to freedom of expression”). 
 344. Beyond the E-Commerce Directive, the DMCA has influenced approaches in 
online service providers’ mechanisms for removing content that implicates issues other than 
copyright. See, e.g., Report a Trademark Issue, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/forms/ 
trademark [https://perma.cc/A8HF-W8BF] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); Trademark Report 
Form, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/284186058405647 [https:// 
perma.cc/42ES-JWFA] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). 
 345. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998). 
For a comprehensive account of the reasoning behind, and debates surrounding, the pas-
sage of the DMCA, see generally Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual 
Property on the Internet (2001). 
 346. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 45 (explaining how the “notice and 
takedown” procedure of subsection (c)(3) is a “formalization and refinement” of the coop-
erative process meant to efficiently handle network-based copyright infringement). 
 347. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19 (explaining that under section 
512, there are a series of “safe harbors” for certain common activities of OSPs, in which the 
OSP receives the benefit of limited liability). 
 348. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B). 
 349. A number of aspects of section 512 have been the subject of expensive and time-
consuming litigation, once again illustrating that most real-life examples sit on a spectrum 
rather than being a pole of the archetypes. Even the timeline for takedown itself contains, 
in addition to precise rules, standards such as “act[] expeditiously to remove” material. Id. 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
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must send a takedown request that contains specific information.350 If a 
copyright holder properly requests a takedown, OSPs must “respond[] ex-
peditiously to remove” material.351 Those whose material is targeted by a 
takedown notice can contest removal by sending a “counter notifica-
tion”—that, again, contains specified information352—back to the OSP.353 
If a counternotice arrives, the OSP must forward it on to the notice sender, 
who can choose to file a copyright lawsuit against the target or let the dis-
pute go.354 If, after a statutorily prescribed time period (ten to fourteen 
days), no lawsuit is filed, the OSP must replace the targeted material.355 
Viewed as it is applied in practice, section 512 also exemplifies a pro-
cedural focus. Section 512’s contestation mechanism, in theory, is 
grounded in substantive copyright law. Takedown and “putback” should 
turn on copyright infringement or noninfringement, respectively. And in 
some circumstances, this is how it operates: OSPs review takedown re-
quests and consider whether there is infringement, then decide whether 
to remove the complained-of material.356 
In other cases, however, the notice-and-takedown project is, in prac-
tice, almost entirely procedural. In these circumstances, notices arrive and 
material is removed with little or no substantive review by OSPs.357 This 
occurs for a number of reasons. First, some OSPs must manage notices at 
scale—millions, or at the limit, even a billion or more notices in a year. For 
these OSPs, automated review and takedown is the only practicable 
option.358 
Second, the notice-and-takedown system creates an interlocking set of 
requirements, incentives, and risks that push OSPs away from substantive 
review and toward takedown. To begin, a copyright holder sending a 
takedown notice does not have to prove a copyright violation. They just 
have to identify allegedly infringing materials and state that they believe 
in good faith that the targeted use is not authorized.359 OSPs reviewing the 
notice then have strong incentives to err on the side of removal, because 
strong remedies—injunctions, stiff statutory damages, and attorneys’ 
                                                                                                                                
 350. Id. § 512(c)(3) (specifying the required “[e]lements of notification”). 
 351. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). This, of course, is a standard embedded within a largely rule-
bound process. As noted, none of the archetypes is a perfect example. 
 352. Id. § 512(g)(3) (specifying the “[c]ontents of counter notification”). 
 353. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B). 
 354. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B)–(C). 
 355. Id. 
 356. See Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 40–
41 (noting that these relatively substantively-based processes are still designed and followed 
by the OSPs, which are not neutral arbiters). 
 357. Id. at 54 –55. 
 358. See id. at 52–54 (explaining that “notice-and-takedown” policies range from using 
human review to evaluate manageable numbers of requests to processing mass amounts of 
notices using automated systems). 
 359. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
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fees—are available for copyright infringement.360 Some OSPs thus simply 
comply with all notices that appear to conform with section 512’s proce-
dural requirements.361 As an OSP representative put it in empirical work 
by one of us, “[T]he process forces you to try to stay out of making judg-
ment calls [and] to take [takedown requests] at face value.”362 
In these situations, the online platform either engages in a substantive 
analysis biased by the incentives in the system or does not engage in sub-
stantive copyright analysis at all. Instead, the law establishes a statutorily 
dictated process that is implemented by nonneutral parties, acting against 
a legal and practical backdrop that militates toward takedown. 
Section 512(f), which provides a judicial backstop to the process, al-
lows participants to sue one another for knowing material misrepresenta-
tions that result in content being improperly removed or restored.363 That 
is, section 512(f) does tether the notice-and-takedown process to the sub-
stance of copyright law—and provides recourse to a neutral arbiter—but 
only inasmuch as it prevents users of the process from knowingly misrep-
resenting the law, and only inasmuch as it is actually invoked in practice 
(which isn’t much). In the end, the ability to recover damages under sec-
tion 512(f) pales in comparison to the downside risk OSPs incur by refus-
ing removal or replacing contested material.364 
On its face, the section 512 process is carefully structured to balance 
responsibilities and protect the rights of both copyright holders and notice 
targets. By some measures, section 512 has been extraordinarily successful. 
Its takedown process has been followed an estimated billions of times over 
the last twenty years,365 relatively inexpensively resolving disputes and 
clearing infringing material from the internet. Measured by the myriad of 
online dispute resolution processes that mimic its structure,366 it is also 
wildly successful as a model. 
                                                                                                                                
 360. Statutory damages range from $200 to $150,000, per work infringed. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
Because statutory damages are calculated per work infringed, OSPs, which may host or link 
to very large numbers of user-posted works, can face extremely high potential awards. For a 
detailed discussion of the effect of statutory damages in the U.S. copyright system, see 
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in 
Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 452 (2009) (observing that the “new higher 
range for statutory damages that could be awarded against willful infringers . . . unfortu-
nately opened up opportunities for excessive awards far beyond congressional intent”). 
 361. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 41. 
 362. Id. 
 363. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
 364. Statutory damage awards are potentially so high that some OSP decisions not to 
remove disputed material may fairly be characterized as “betting the company.” Urban et 
al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 43. OSPs also consider the 
slowness and expense of court cases, and the high burden of proof required by section 
512(f), to be stymieing. Id. 
 365. Id. at 8. 
 366. See supra notes 342–344 and accompanying text. 
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Yet section 512 attracted due process concerns from its inception.367 
Copyright holders have complained that the takedown process is insuffi-
ciently effective, too costly, and burdensome.368 OSPs have argued that sec-
tion 512’s process risks capturing legal uses along with infringing 
materials.369 The “counternotice” mechanism was added late in the legis-
lative process in response to process concerns.370 Some have pointed out 
that the required ten-to-fourteen-day takedown period could quell time-
sensitive speech; others have observed that it gave the notice sender little 
time to file a lawsuit if a counternotice arrived.371 Civil society groups have 
worried that section 512’s contestation mechanisms and other design fea-
tures are insufficient to deter abusive or mistaken removals.372 
The DMCA’s due process protections thus appear to be shaky. Alt-
hough the lack of public visibility into the system makes it impossible to 
fully observe, there is now a small body of empirical research into the no-
tice-and-takedown process373 and stakeholder experiences.374 The U.S. 
Copyright Office, too, recently completed a multiyear study of the section 
512 system.375 Investigators consistently have found mistaken or improper 
uses of the takedown system. In 2006, one of us found that 29% of a sample 
of notices to Google Search were flawed.376 In 2017, one of us found that 
31% of a large sample of notices sent to Google Search were questionable. 
In that same sample, 70% of the notices sent to Google Image Search were 
fundamentally flawed, largely because of one prolific sender.377 Without 
                                                                                                                                
 367. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa 
Clara Comput. & High Tech. L.J. 621, 633–36 (2006). 
 368. Strong, supra note 310, at 77–82. 
 369. Id. at 139–41; Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 
287, at 39–43. 
 370. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 367, at 633–36. 
 371. Id. at 636–37. 
 372. Id.; Strong, supra note 310, at 11. 
 373. E.g., Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind the Scenes of Online Copyright 
Enforcement: Empirical Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50 Conn. L. Rev. 339 (2018); 
Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 159, at 473; Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant 
Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 Va. J.L. & Tech. 369 (2014); 
Urban & Quilter, supra note 367; Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, 
supra note 287; Jennifer M. Urban, Brianna L. Schofield & Joe Karaganis, Takedown in Two 
Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 483 (2017) [hereinafter Urban 
et al., Takedown in Two Worlds]; Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling 
Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, Ctr. For Internet & Soc’y (2011), http://cis-india. 
org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL9G-LWDC]. 
 374. E.g., Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and 
Takedown: Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. 
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 371 (2017) [hereinafter Urban et al., Accounts of Everyday Practice]; 
Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287. 
 375. Strong, supra note 310. 
 376. Urban & Quilter, supra note 367, at 667. 
 377. Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds, supra note 373, at 499, 510. 
2020 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
her notices, 36% were questionable. Also in 2017, Sharon Bar-Ziv and Niva 
Elkin-Koren investigated the Israeli (.il) notices from the same sample, dis-
covering that only 34% contained allegations of copyright infringement; 
the other 66% were improper subject matter.378 
The DMCA’s contestation mechanisms thus apparently have failed to 
fulfill their purpose. Despite evidence that improper or questionable re-
movals are not uncommon, counternotices appear to be rare; section 
512(f) suits for any party’s knowing material misrepresentation of a copy-
right violation are even rarer.379 The counternotice mechanism is used ex-
tremely infrequently;380 OSPs largely consider it a dead letter.381 The 
Copyright Office’s study, too, uncovered problems with the counternotice 
process.382 The DMCA thus has lessons to teach about what to avoid, or to 
include, when designing contestation. 
2. The UK Implementation of the Right to Contestation. — The UK imple-
mentation of the GDPR’s right to contestation offers a second example of 
a contestation rule with a procedural focus. In implementing the GDPR 
before Brexit, the UK adopted a highly proceduralized approach to chal-
lenging algorithmic decision-making. This approach builds on domestic 
law in place before the GDPR.383 
Prior to the GDPR, section 12 of the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 
required a company to notify individuals of an automated decision “as 
soon as reasonably practicable” and provided individuals twenty-one days 
to request reconsideration or request a new decision with human involve-
ment.384 A company then had to respond within twenty-one days with “a 
                                                                                                                                
 378. Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 373, at 359–60. 
 379. Because no public record of counternotices exists, it is impossible to know exactly 
how often they are sent; however, all available evidence indicates they are rare. Most quan-
titative work focuses on notices to search engines, which are less likely to receive counterno-
tices because they are not required to forward notices to the targets. See, e.g., Seng, supra 
note 373; Urban & Quilter, supra note 367, at 626; Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds, 
supra note 373, at 393. Relying on studies of search alone would likely result in an underes-
timate of counternotices. However, a qualitative study of OSPs and large notice senders, 
covering a wide range of OSP types, also found counternotices to be rare. Urban et al., 
Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 44 – 46. 
 380. Urban et al., Accounts of Everyday Practice, supra note 374, at 394. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Strong, supra note 310, at 162 (“Another aspect of section 512 that received signif-
icant attention . . . was the ten–fourteen day period between when the OSP receives a 
counter-notice and when the copyright holder must file a federal lawsuit or see the material 
get replaced set forth in section 512(g)(2)(C).”). 
 383. See Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 
115, at 9–10 (noting that the UK’s 2018 Data Protection Act’s proceduralized process for 
contesting algorithmic decision-making is probably due to previous provisions of the UK 
Data Protection Act of 1998). 
 384. UK Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, § 12(2)(b) (UK) (“[T]he individual is entitled, 
within twenty-one days of receiving that notification from the data controller, by notice in 
writing to require the data controller to reconsider the decision or to take a new decision 
otherwise than on that basis.”). 
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written notice specifying the steps that [it] intends to take to comply with 
the [individual’s] notice.”385 Nothing in the law specified what measures a 
company needed to take to adequately reconsider a decision. Thus, the 
UK approach to algorithmic decision-making, prior to the GDPR, was to 
focus on procedural timelines and not on substantive prohibitions or on 
standards for reversing decisions. 
New UK law implementing the GDPR extended the twenty-one days 
to one month. As before, a company must notify an individual of an auto-
mated decision in writing “as soon as reasonably practicable”; the individ-
ual has one month (instead of twenty-one days) to request that a company 
“(i) reconsider the decision, or (ii) take a new decision that is not based 
solely on automated processing.”386 The company then ordinarily has a 
month to “consider the request, including any information provided by 
the data subject . . . comply with the request, and . . . by notice in writing 
inform the data subject of: (i) the steps taken to comply with the request, 
and (ii) the outcome of complying with the request.”387 This process may 
be amended through regulation.388 This establishes what Gianclaudio 
Malgieri has referred to as a “proceduralized explanation”—individuals 
are given insight into the process of contestation, which may itself check 
company behavior, or even incentivize pro-consumer outcomes through 
transparency. 
Other implementing EU Member States also specify some procedural 
requirements for contestation, though not to the same level of detail as 
the UK. Ireland and France invoke appellate procedure.389 Ireland re-
quires companies to enable an individual to “(I) make representations to 
the controller in relation to the decision, (II) request human intervention 
in the decision-making process, [and] (III) request to appeal the deci-
sion.”390 As in the UK, companies must “notify the [individual] in writing 
                                                                                                                                
 385. Id. § 12(3). 
 386. UK Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, § 14(4)(a)–(b) (UK). 
 387. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, 
at 9 n.80 (quoting UK Data Protection Act 2018, § 14(5)) (“Section 14(5) states that the 
data controller must react within the period described in Article 12(3), GDPR[,] . . . which 
commences] within one month of receipt of the request . . . [and] may be extended by two 
further months where necessary.”). 
 388. According to Malgieri, these safeguards in the UK law “basically absorb[]” the 
GDPR safeguards of contestation, expressing their point of view, and getting human inter-
vention. Id. at 10. Under this interpretation, the UK has implemented the right to contesta-
tion as a right to “reconsider the decision”; the right to obtain human intervention as the 
right to “[t]ake a new decision that is not based solely on automated processing”; and the 
right to express one’s voice as the right to have a company consider “any information pro-
vided by the [individual].” Id. at 10. 
 389. See id. at 10–11, 13, 15. 
 390. Data Protection Act 2018, § 57(1)(b)(ii) (SI 7/2018) (Ir.). 
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of (i) the steps taken to comply with the request, and (ii) in the case of an 
appeal . . . the outcome of the appeal.”391 
It is too early to know how these proceduralized implementations of 
Article 22 will fare, but the DMCA suggests some lessons. Section 512’s 
detailed timelines and requirements for notices and counternotices have 
not, for the most part, created a usable contestation process. Instead, both 
the process as actually practiced and substantive decisions turn on OSPs, 
which are influenced by their analysis of liability risk. Without substantive 
standards for reconsideration or guidance on how to treat additional in-
formation provided by the data subject, it is unclear whether procedures 
alone will enhance accuracy and prevent discrimination or respect dignity. 
Similarly, the UK law’s transparency requirements require a description of 
the procedural steps themselves, not the underlying reasons for a deci-
sion.392 This is process giving, not reason giving. By itself, the UK rubric is 
unlikely to foster the consistency and reliability, or serve the decision-
disciplining functions, that we expect from adequate process. 
D. Archetype 3 Illustrated: The “Right to Be Forgotten” and the Hungarian 
and Slovenian Rights to Contestation 
To illustrate our third archetype, a contestation standard with a substan-
tive focus, we turn to the EU’s so-called “Right to Be Forgotten.” We addi-
tionally point to the Hungarian and Slovenian implementations of the 
GDPR’s right to contestation. 
1. The Right to Be Forgotten. — The “Right to Be Forgotten” (RTBF), 
more accurately characterized as a right to erasure of certain personal 
data, grew from European data protection law in existence before the 
GDPR.393 In the 2014 Google Spain case, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) interpreted data protection law to hold that a 
search engine must, as a “data controller,” respond to certain requests 
from individuals to erase personal data—that is, to challenges by individu-
als to the inclusion of their personal data in search engine results.394 
                                                                                                                                
 391. Id. § 57(2)(b). France bans automated decision-making, including semi-automated 
decision-making, in the judicial context. Fully automated administrative decisions are also 
prohibited. However, semi-automated decisions are permissible in particular contexts, un-
der conditions that include implementing administrative procedures for appeals. Malgieri, 
Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, at 13. 
 392. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 393. The right emerged in current form from the Court of Justice of the EU’s (CJEU’s) 
2014 case, Google Spain, and exists in current form in Article 17 of the GDPR. For a compel-
ling history of its origins and characterization of its nature, see Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef 
Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. Info. Pol’y. 1, 6–11 (2013). 
 394. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 100(3) (May 13, 2014). 
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The RTBF thus functions, in effect, as a right to contest inclusion in 
search engine results.395 The RTBF is not an absolute right to erasure but 
rather a right to request erasure, with the search engine, as with the DMCA, 
acting both as an interested party and as arbiter. Unlike the DMCA, how-
ever, the RTBF contains no putback mechanism—and in fact, establishes 
virtually no procedural rules at all.396 
The Google Spain decision was quickly characterized as a blow to free 
speech, with European authors noting that the CJEU failed to explicitly 
consider the fundamental right to freedom of expression.397 Others iden-
tified the decision as a prime example of core differences between the U.S. 
and EU approaches to managing the tension between privacy and 
speech.398 This focus on free speech, however, risks obfuscating the utility 
of the RTBF as a contestation model. 
Among our contestation archetypes, the RTBF is most accurately char-
acterized as a contestation standard with a substantive focus. The CJEU in 
Google Spain established substantive requirements for search engines to use 
in determining whether to delist search results. The court found that “as 
a rule” individual rights to data protection and privacy “override . . . not 
only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also 
the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon 
a search relating to the data subject’s name.”399 But the court also estab-
lished a substantive balancing test for search engines to use in establishing 
exceptions. Companies may balance between individual interests in pri-
vacy and data protection and a public interest in access to information.400 
                                                                                                                                
 395. See Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU 
Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1017, 1037 (2016) (describing the process as 
an “administrative procedure for filing and deciding RTBF claims”). 
 396. See id. at 1023 (noting that the CJEU left erasure requests to the discretion of the 
search engine or other entity receiving the request). 
 397. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 293, at 52–56 (noting how “Google Spain and the 
Article 29 Working Party guidelines . . . chafe[] against free expression norms and values 
recognized in Europe and beyond”); Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s 
Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 287, 354 (2018) (discussing how the RTBF is both similar to and different 
from intermediary liability); Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Google Spain v. 
González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of Expression?, 5 Eur. J. Risk Regul. 389, 397 
(2014) (discussing the court’s reliance on private ordering and observing that “search en-
gine operator[s] may not be the most appropriate party” to balance the fundamental rights 
involved).  
 398. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US 
Perspectives, 30 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 161, 167–68 (2012); Orla Lynskey, Control Over Personal 
Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, 78 Mod. L. Rev. 522, 
531 (2015); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to be 
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 Duke L.J. 981, 1061–62 (2018). 
 399. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 99 (May 13, 2014). 
 400. Id. ¶ 81.  
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Under certain circumstances, companies may maintain information in 
search results, for example when the individual is a public figure and the 
interest of the general public in such information outweighs privacy 
concerns.401 
The CJEU’s opinion in Google Spain establishes a contestation stand-
ard rather than a rule. It requires companies to respond to individual 
takedown requests, but leaves a great deal of leeway for determining what 
constitutes an individual interest in privacy and what constitutes a public 
interest in access to information.402 What the CJEU did not do is give any 
indication of the procedure a search engine must follow: The CJEU deci-
sion emphasized substance, without establishing a contestation process. 
Over time, both companies and regulators have filled in some of the 
gaps left by the CJEU. First, Google established an Advisory Council that 
issued a report indicating the substantive criteria the search engine would 
use in evaluating takedown requests.403 Regulators then established their 
own list of criteria.404 This dialogue has largely clarified the substantive 
standard set by the CJEU into something more rule-like in nature. 
                                                                                                                                
Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by those articles 
also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that balance 
may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information 
in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the 
interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may 
vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in pub-
lic life. 
Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 397, at 398. 
 401. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 97 (May 13, 2014) (“[T]he interference with his fundamental rights 
is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having . . . access to the 
information in question.”). 
 402. See id. ¶ 81. 
 403. In the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision, Google established an Advisory 
Council and went on tour, holding public meetings in seven European cities to discuss the 
substance of the right. Lee, supra note 395, at 1044. Google’s Advisory Council issued a 
forty-one-page report in 2015, pointing to four substantive criteria: an individual’s role in 
public life, the nature of the information, the source of the information, and the passage of 
time. The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten (Feb. 6, 2015), https:/ 
/static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/en//advisorycouncil/advisem
ent/advisory-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5DJ-G7TG]; see also Paulan Korenhof, Jef 
Ausloos, Ivan Szekely, Meg Ambrose, Giovanni Sartor & Ronald Leenes, Timing the Right 
to be Forgotten: A Study Into “Time” as a Factor in Deciding About Retention or Erasure 
of Data, in Reforming European Data Protection Law 171, 172–73, 180–84 (Serge Gutwirth, 
Ronald Leenes & Paul de Hert eds., 2015) (exploring the role of time in the RTBF and 
identifying “specific points in data processing, which also denote specific points or periods 
in time, where enforcing of RTBF is reasonable or even necessary”). 
 404. The Article 29 Working Party, the leading data protection regulator, issued guide-
lines in November 2014, with thirteen substantive criteria for balancing when to delist con-
tent. Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Google Spain, supra note 308. Once the GDPR 
went into effect, with a new provision specifically describing a right to erasure as a “right to 
be forgotten,” the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) set about creating a new set of 
guidelines, adopted in July 2020. These Guidelines largely reference the previous 
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Regulators have not, however, set out a specific process that search 
engines must follow. In the absence of such rules, Google created its own 
process.405 The RTBF has prodded companies into creating a privatized 
system of contestation similar to, but in some ways crucially different from, 
the DMCA. That system was likely influenced by implementations of the 
E-Commerce Directive, an EU-wide instrument established in 2000.406 
Google set up what Edward Lee has described as an “administrative 
procedure for filing and deciding RTBF claims.”407 Google put a webform 
up on its website for individuals to request delisting.408 The requester also 
had to provide a document verifying their identity and (as with the DMCA) 
attest to the accuracy of the representations made.409 The current version 
of the webform is similar to what Lee describes but appears to contain 
some changes.410 
At least initially, Google hired fewer than a hundred employees to pro-
cess claims “on a case-by-case basis.”411 Sometimes the staff would reach 
                                                                                                                                
Guidelines under the Directive, delineating the substantive criteria that support a data sub-
ject’s right to delisting, and exceptions to the right, following Article 17 of the GDPR. See 
GDPR, supra note 13, art. 17; European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 5/2019 on the 
Criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the Search Engines Cases Under the GDPR (July 7, 
2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_201905_rtbf 
searchengines_afterpublicconsultation_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AH7-MKWQ] (“[T]he 
criteria of delisting developed by the Article 29 Working Party in guidelines on the imple-
mentation of the Court of Justice . . . C-131/12 can still be used by search engine providers 
and Supervisory Authorities to assess a delisting request based on the Right to object (Article 
17.1.c GDPR).”). 
 405. Lee, supra note 395, at 1037. 
 406. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 343. 
 407. Lee, supra note 395, at 1037. 
 408. Id. at 1038. Lee describes the webform at the time as containing the following 
fields: (1) which country’s law applies; (2) personal information, including the name used 
to search; (3) the specific URLs desired removed, and an explanation as to (a) how the web 
page is related to the requester and (b) “how the inclusion of this URL as a search result is 
irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise objectionable.” Id. 
 409. Id. at 1038–39. 
 410. It now requires: (1) the country of origin (similar to which country’s law applies); 
(2) the full legal name and contact email address of the requester, and a statement of 
whether the requester is acting on their own behalf or someone else’s; (3) specific URLs 
requested delisted (same as Lee describes). EU Privacy Removal: Personal Information 
Removal Request Form, Google, https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/legal-removal 
-request?complaint_type=rtbf&visit_id=637202230061146146-20083139&rd=1 [https://per 
ma.cc/2CLS-5YGJ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). However, the reason requested is changed to 
the arguably vaguer request for “(1) how the personal information identified . . . relates to 
the person on whose behalf th[e] request is made; and (2) why . . . the . . . information 
should be removed. For example: ‘(1) This page is about me because a, b, and c. (2) [It] 
should be removed because x, y, and z.’ ” Id. Under the current form, Google no longer 
indicates its criteria for delisting in its request for information from the individual. Id. The 
attestation requirement is still there, with an individual having to make a sworn statement 
as to accuracy. Id. 
 411. Lee, supra note 395, at 1039–40. 
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out to the requester for more information.412 For harder cases, Google 
would rely on a self-created “senior . . . panel consisting of ‘senior lawyers, 
engineers, and product managers,’ ” which would occasionally call in an 
outside expert.413 If a claim was rejected, Google sent a rejection indicating 
reasons and pointing to the complainant’s right to file a complaint with a 
national data protection authority.414 If Google found the claim valid, it 
notified the requester of removal of the URL.415 
As mentioned, the primary criticism of the RTBF is that it skews to-
ward delisting.416 Webmasters have limited options to ask for relisting;417 
members of the general public have no way to state an interest in keeping 
information searchable.418 Commentators have criticized the reliance on 
private companies to balance what in the EU are fundamental rights.419 
Unless companies voluntarily disclose information, there is no window 
into the decision-making process.420 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the RTBF did not, as some naysayers 
predicted, break the internet in Europe.421 Google established a process 
for handling complaints that appears to be manageable, at least for that 
company.422 Google’s transparency reports indicate that roughly fifty-eight 
                                                                                                                                
 412. Id. at 1040. 
 413. Id. (quoting Lisa Fleisher & Sam Schechner, How Google’s Top Minds Decide 
What to Forget, Wall St. J. (May 12, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-googles-top-
minds-decide-what-to-forget-1431462018 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)). 
 414. Id. at 1040–41. 
 415. Id. at 1041 (“If the claim for removal is accepted, Google sends the requester a 
notice indicating the removal of the URL.”). 
 416. See Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 397, at 394 –95 (noting that the Google Spain judg-
ment resembles intermediary liability under the E-Commerce Directive, which “creates an 
incentive for intermediaries to systematically take down content after complaints, which may 
interfere with the freedom of expression of those communicating on the internet”). 
 417. Id. at 396–97 (“If Google delists a search result, it informs the relevant website 
publisher. Google tells the website publisher which URL it delisted, but does not disclose 
who submitted the request or other details about the request . . . . [T]he publisher can ask 
Google to re-evaluate the delisting.”). 
 418. Id. at 397 (explaining that Google’s practice leaves the public with no way to over-
see how their right to access information is limited). 
 419. Id. at 394 (discussing the court’s reliance on private ordering and observing that 
“search engine operators may not be the most appropriate party to balance the fundamental 
rights involved”). 
 420. See id. at 395 (“A general problem of private ordering by online service providers 
through notice and takedown mechanisms is the lack of transparency of their decisions.”). 
 421. See Robert Krulwich, Opinion, Is the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ the ‘Biggest Threat 
to Free Speech on the Internet’?, NPR (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
krulwich/2012/02/23/147289169/is-the-right-to-be-forgotten-the-biggest-threat-to-free-
speech-on-the-internet?t=1627911057362/ [https://perma.cc/M9V9-7NZD] (suggesting that 
internet companies may delist content quickly to avoid fines or criminal prosecution, inhib-
iting the public’s right to know and freedom of the press). 
 422. See Lee, supra note 395, at 1038–41. 
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percent of targeted content stays up.423 Still, there are costs to leaving sub-
stantive discretion to private companies and costs to failing to articulate 
processes in detail.424 Certain interests, such as the public’s, are left out of 
the process.425 The process and substance of decisions can appear less le-
gitimate.426 And while Google has established procedures that seem to 
largely, though not entirely, map onto other familiar contestation mecha-
nisms, other, smaller companies might not have the desire or capacity to 
adopt the same. 
2. The Hungarian and Slovenian Implementations of the GDPR’s Right to 
Contestation. — Several EU Member States have established substantive 
backstops to the GDPR’s right to contestation.427 For example, Hungary 
requires that automated decision-making “not infringe the requirement 
of equal treatment.”428 Slovenia states that decisions “based on the pro-
cessing of particular categories of personal data . . . are . . . prohibited if 
they could lead to discrimination against the data subject or persons close 
to her/him.”429 Slovenia identifies the right to contest as a measure “for 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and the legitimate 
interests of the individual.”430 
Slovenia and Hungary thus each anchor their contestation schemes 
to a substantive standard rather than a rule. Creating a backstop based on 
fundamental rights of nondiscrimination and equal treatment arguably 
preserves dignitary interests. It also reduces the risk that the Slovenian and 
Hungarian schemes decay into empty processes untethered from sub-
stance, as has happened with, for example, some implementations of the 
DMCA.431 
At the same time, this approach creates interpretative space, which has 
both costs and benefits. What constitutes “discrimination” or “equal treat-
ment” is hotly contested.432 On the one hand, this creates flexibility for ap-
plying the right in new contexts. On the other, it potentially leaves leeway 
for less stringent implementations by self-interested actors. We advocate in 
                                                                                                                                
 423. Id. at 1043. 
 424. See, e.g., Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 397, at 393 (explaining that delisting infor-
mation conflicts with freedom of expression). 
 425. Id. 
 426. See id. at 395 (“A general problem of companies [delisting] . . . through notice 
and takedown mechanisms is the lack of transparency of their decisions. Without clarity on 
which results have been delisted, members of the public have limited ability to know the 
extent to which their freedom to receive information has been interfered with.”). 
 427. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, 
at 2. 
 428. Id. at 16. 
 429. Id. at 18. 
 430. Id. 
 431. See supra section III.C.1. 
 432. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, supra note 70, at 715. 
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Part IV below for ways to constrain self-interested interpretations of substan-
tive backstops, to preserve the utility of a substantive standard without sacri-
ficing some of the benefits that come with the constraints that typify rules. 
E. Archetype 4 Illustrated: The FCBA’s Chargeback Process and the Hungarian 
and French Rights to Contestation 
Our fourth and final contestation archetype is a contestation rule with 
a substantive focus. This example, the 1974 FCBA, is not intrinsically digital, 
but it still holds lessons for the right to contest AI.433 Components of the 
French and Hungarian implementations of the GDPR’s right to contesta-
tion also illustrate this archetype. 
1. The Fair Credit Billing Act. — The FCBA affords consumers a right 
to contest erroneous credit card charges.434 In many ways, the FCBA is 
structurally similar to section 512 of the DMCA. First, it provides the sub-
stantive basis of contestation. The law defines a contestable “billing error” 
to include: a charge that wasn’t made by the credit card holder; a charge 
that is in the wrong amount; a charge for which the credit card holder 
requests additional clarification; a charge for goods or services that 
weren’t accepted or delivered; accounting errors; and more, including er-
rors defined by regulation.435 Second, in addition to the substantive defi-
nition of “billing error,” the law contains various detailed procedural 
requirements.436 And, as with each of the archetype examples, there is no 
neutral arbiter in the FCBA process. Credit card companies themselves de-
cide whether or not to reverse charges.437 
Yet the FCBA does not founder in empty proceduralism as some im-
plementations of the DMCA do. Rather, it retains its substantive focus 
while providing detailed process requirements.438 This is likely for a few 
reasons. First, the substantive clarity of the statute constrains credit card 
companies’ discretion to reject reversal requests. The extensive, specific 
substantive definition of a “billing error” tethers credit card companies’ 
discretion in the contestation process.439 By contrast, the DMCA ties 
takedown to copyright infringement440—still substantive, still rule-based, 
but much more complicated to determine (and contestable) than whether 
an FCBA “billing error” has occurred. Second, while both models rely 
heavily on precisely defined processes, differences in the design of those 
                                                                                                                                
 433. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 851–52 (identifying the relevance of credit card dis-
pute adjudications to the conversation over platform process). 
 434. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2018). 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. § 1666(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(d) (2020). 
 437. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 852. 
 438. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(a)–(b). 
 439. However, federal courts have refused to second-guess companies. Section III.F be-
low discusses this wrinkle further. See Burnstein v. Saks Fifth Ave. & Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 
765, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 440. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2018). 
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processes create different incentives, risk structures, and, ultimately, out-
comes.441 These differences, and their effects, are discussed further in Part 
IV. 
In practice, the FCBA appears to be quite successful in resolving bill-
ing disputes and enjoys a more positive reputation than the DMCA.442 As 
Rory Van Loo notes, the FCBA establishes a working contestation process 
that is “free, accessible, and fast” and has not “necessarily come at the ex-
pense of merchants.”443 Credit card companies have benefited, too, from 
increased consumer trust fostered by the FCBA contestation process.444 
Scholars of alternative dispute resolution have criticized the FCBA process 
on a number of grounds, including the lack of damages, limited consumer 
awareness of the process, and the arms-length rather than relationship-
based method of adjudication.445 Consumer protection advocates, how-
ever, largely see the FCBA chargeback process as a success.446 Credit card 
companies rule in favor of consumers some eighty to ninety percent of the 
time.447 Perhaps because of this rate of success, consumers appear to view 
the process with satisfaction, and rarely bring suits to challenge it.448 
This is not to say that the FCBA is a perfect model or that it can nec-
essarily be replicated for every kind of dispute. For example, the FCBA 
may be successful in part because its substantive scope can be clearly de-
fined. It is far easier to define an erroneous credit card charge than to 
define copyright infringement or discrimination.449 And there can be costs 
to a constrained, ex ante definition of the substance of challenges, includ-
ing limiting the scope of contestation and missing newly developed prob-
lems as technology evolves. But as recent conversations about the use of 
personal data have turned to the centrality of consumer trust, policymak-
ers might do well to look to the FCBA as a contestation model.450 
                                                                                                                                
 441. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1666; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (presenting the procedural and 
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Pol’y 1, 16–19 (2018)). 
 446. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 853 (citing Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution 
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(2000)). 
 447. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 854. 
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 450. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age 61 
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2. The Hungarian and French Implementations of the GDPR’s Right to Con-
testation. — Both the Hungarian and French implementations of the 
GDPR’s right to contestation contain contestation rules with a substantive 
focus. Hungary requires that automated decision-making not be “made 
using sensitive data, unless otherwise provided for in the law.”451 France 
similarly prohibits automated decision-making based on sensitive data.452 
An individual contesting a particular decision could refer to these prohi-
bitions. If a company’s decision-making violates them, presumably the 
company would be required to reverse its decision. 
Again, however, these are not perfect instantiations of the archetype. 
The substance of France’s law is embedded within a deeply procedural ad-
ministrative law framework, as section III.D discusses above. Hungary also 
includes, in addition to its substantive rule, the broad substantive standard 
(“the requirement of equal treatment”) discussed above in section III.D. 
F. The Design of Privatized Process: Other Considerations 
In addition to the two key axes illustrated by the four archetypes, con-
testation schemes may vary in other important characteristics. These also 
can affect the schemes’ ability to provide meaningful process and should 
be taken into account when designing and operationalizing a contestation 
right. First, there is the question of who decides. A contestation scheme 
may house contestation with a neutral arbiter, have a mediating platform 
adjudicate, or have one of the parties themselves adjudicate. Second, how 
contestation schemes structure parties’ incentives matters. Third, 
transparency matters. Subjecting decisions to public transparency over 
time—a core element of judicial process—can illustrate whether a contes-
tation scheme is systemically fair. Finally, contestation schemes are heavily 
affected by the details of the regulatory context in which they reside. For 
example, contestation can be a stand-alone right, or it can be housed 
within a broader regulatory system that also provides systemic governance 
tools.453 For example, the GDPR’s right to contestation is just one element 
of the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability. The GDPR also de-
ploys a number of systemic regulatory tools, for example impact assess-
ments,454 which act as risk mitigation processes. Companies also have 
reporting and recording obligations455 and obligations to design technol-
ogy to protect individual rights.456 Each of these governance tools aims to 
                                                                                                                                
 451. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, 
at 16. 
 452. Id. at 13. 
 453. See Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1578 (“Individual rights can 
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 454. See Kaminski & Malgieri, Impact Assessments, supra note 287. 
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correct errors and protect from bias and discrimination on a systemic 
scale, complementing individual rights. 
Context also includes other elements of regulatory setting and regu-
latory design. Even where a contestation scheme is largely privatized, it 
often interacts with a background regulatory environment that can be cal-
ibrated to check privatized contestation. A contestation scheme may, like 
the DMCA, have a judicial backstop that enables sanctions of parties who 
misrepresent the substantive law.457 It may be set within a complex regula-
tory scheme with significant penalties, such as the GDPR, in which regula-
tors are armed with large fines and a human rights court may be willing to 
intervene.458 Or, as with the FCBA, federal courts may refuse to intervene 
in second-guessing parties’ decisions.459 Background rights may favor one 
party or the other, depending on the rights implicated (for example, cop-
yright, free speech, or privacy) and on the legal system of the country in 
which the contestation scheme has been structured. Background rights, 
too, can be legislative in nature or constitutional/fundamental, varying 
the kinds of interventions courts or regulators might make. 
IV. CRAFTING A MEANINGFUL RIGHT TO CONTEST AI 
No matter how strong the case for a right to contest AI, it will fail if 
not carefully designed and implemented. Contestation schemes can fail to 
fulfill due process values or actually undermine them, losing legitimacy. 
Or they can fail because they simply don’t work: They are too costly to 
invoke, they are too difficult to use, or they don’t resolve the dispute. This 
final Part considers how to design an effective right to contest AI—one 
that resolves disputes, meets due process goals, and is seen as legitimate. 
There is no one right way to design a right to contest AI. Legislators 
could take any one of the archetypes as a starting point and adjust it to 
avoid foreseeable pitfalls. Moreover, contestation is contextual and entan-
gled with other aspects of process such as notice and reason giving, the 
specifics of underlying substantive law, and incentive structures. Designing 
a successful contestation mechanism requires attention not just to contes-
tation itself, and not just to the algorithm, but to the entire decision-making 
system—human, machine, and organizational—together with the underlying 
legal framework. 
The complexities of contestation thus do not neatly lend themselves 
to a one-size-fits-all prescription. However, there are better and worse ways 
to design contestation, with significant lessons to be learned from both the 
theory and case studies explored above. This Part analyzes the observa-
tions, archetypes, and case studies from Part III, placing them against the 
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due process values set forth in Part II to draw practicable lessons about the 
design and implementation of this right. 
We begin with the archetypes from Part III. While a right to contest 
AI could track any of the archetypes, the case studies illustrate how best to 
avoid design pitfalls. This Part then turns to privatized process design, in-
cluding how to craft participation, the role of the decision-maker, risks and 
incentive structures, and the importance of regulatory context and of sys-
temic governance and transparency. It then explains that the right to con-
test AI should constitute a floor, not a ceiling, which might be augmented 
in certain policy settings. This Part concludes by discussing coverage 
thresholds and possible exceptions and challenges. 
A. Applying the Archetypes 
Part II details the theoretical goals of an individual right to contest: 
improving accuracy and reducing bias, supporting rule of law values such 
as consistency and rationality, and affording respect and agency to individ-
uals. Each contestation archetype Part III describes has strengths and 
weaknesses with respect to these due process goals and values. 
A right to contest AI that, like the GDPR’s Article 22, tracks the arche-
type of a contestation standard with a procedural focus raises several prob-
lems.460 Failing to clarify a substantive basis for contestation potentially 
allows self-interested decision-makers to defang the right, making it useless 
in practice. If there is no clear and consistent substantive basis for chal-
lenges, individual challenges are unlikely to serve the instrumental func-
tion of improving accuracy or preventing bias. Nor are individual 
challenges likely to serve rule of law values if there is no common substan-
tive standard under which decisions could be evaluated for consistency. 
With respect to dignity, affording individual challenges with no clear 
substantive basis or set of procedures could make it harder for individuals 
to exercise agency or feel respected by the system. The lack of procedural 
clarity in a contestation standard (versus a rule) risks disempowering indi-
viduals, rather than affording them a clear avenue for process. At best, a 
contestation standard with a procedural focus imposes on decision-makers 
the significant costs of determining when decisions should be overturned 
and of establishing sufficiently clear and meaningful process for affected 
individuals to feel respected by the system. 
A right to contest that, like the UK’s implementation, illustrates a con-
testation rule with a procedural focus faces similar problems. It too risks over-
proceduralizing at the expense of substance, undermining due process 
values such as accuracy and rule of law. By providing clear procedural rules 
and timelines, however, it potentially puts contestation within the reach of 
more individuals, giving more people a sense of agency by lowering the 
information costs of contesting decisions. The efficacy or legitimacy of 
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such a system depends on how well-meaning decision-makers are, what 
sorts of substantive challenges are considered, how consistent substance is 
across challengers, and more broadly, what incentives decision-makers 
have to decide for or against challengers. 
Affording a right to contest with a clear substantive focus, whether 
rule-based or standard-based, can address a number of these concerns. 
However, the right to challenge a decision on substantive grounds can still 
be meaningless if the afforded process is shallow or perfunctory. For ex-
ample, if a contestation process has no clear timelines, decision-makers 
can delay challenges, stymieing multiple due process goals: corrections of 
inaccuracies, revelations of unfair or inconsistent treatment, empower-
ment of individuals. Other missing particulars of process can similarly shift 
a right to contest from substantive to illusory. Without clear notice, a per-
son won’t know to challenge an unfair decision. Similarly, if there is no 
reason giving, individuals will find it difficult or impossible to challenge an 
AI decision on the basis of a substantive problem, as section IV.B discusses 
further below. 
As discussed above, contestation rights with a substantive focus can 
present additional issues depending on how legislators have defined the 
substantive bases of challenges. A right to contest that, like the Hungarian 
implementation, illustrates a contestation rule with a substantive focus risks 
on the one hand being overbroad, banning all automated decisions based 
on particularly sensitive data, whether or not such decisions are inaccurate 
or unbiased or unfair. On the other hand, a rule with a substantive focus 
risks being too narrow, missing challenges individuals should be able to 
bring. However, a right to contest that, like the Slovenian implementation, 
embodies a contestation standard with a substantive focus risks instead creat-
ing too much leeway for substantive interpretation, imposing costs on both 
challengers and decision-makers. There is no one definition of discrimi-
nation, and delegating the interpretation of discrimination to private com-
panies risks both confusion and self-serving interpretations. 
However, understanding the archetypes and the pitfalls they present 
can help legislators and regulators avoid many of these pitfalls, not just in 
enacting new laws but in applying those that now exist. For example, where 
the GDPR largely articulates a standard with a procedural focus, regulators 
and Member States should now focus on (1) creating more detailed time-
lines and processes to standardize the required procedure, and (2) articu-
lating more clearly the substantive harms on which such challenges might 
be based, even if this involves pointing to other substantive areas of EU or 
Member State law.461 Member States that have implemented the right 
through a different archetype could focus their efforts differently. Regula-
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tors in Slovenia, for example, might establish a workable contestation pro-
cess and timeline, while regulators in Ireland might establish or point to 
substantive bases for contestation. 
For countries that have not yet enacted a right to contest AI, a hybrid 
approach is advisable—that is, a law that contains elements of multiple ar-
chetypes and uses multiple regulatory tools. A right to contest that com-
bines clear procedural rules with both substantive rules and substantive 
standards is the better path forward as a starting point than reflexively 
mimicking either the GDPR or the DMCA/UK approach. 
The FCBA model—a contestation rule with a substantive focus, where the 
substantive underpinnings are clear and relatively straightforward to ap-
ply—potentially has significant benefits, as section III.E discusses above. 
However, determining what constitutes AI bias is far harder to determine 
than what constitutes an erroneous credit card charge. The right to con-
test AI could then be partially modeled after the FCBA archetype, with 
some clear substantive rules: that an AI decision cannot be made on the 
basis of racial data, or gender, or sexual orientation, for example, because 
such decisions are de facto biased.  
Coupling a set of specific substantive rules with a contestation stand-
ard has the benefit of being simultaneously clear and flexible. With the 
archetypes in mind, regulators could adopt a standard—for example, that 
establishes a right to contest AI decisions that evidence “bias” or “discrim-
ination”—while also avoiding the foreseeable pitfalls of standards. A vari-
ety of common drafting or regulatory tools can help. For example, 
legislators or regulators can clarify standards without forgoing malleability 
by providing an open list of examples. Regulators can issue soft law guid-
ance. Legislators or regulators could bring in external participation and 
accountability, requiring companies to consult affected stakeholders and 
legal experts when defining what “bias” and “discrimination” mean in a 
particular context.462 Legislators might establish certification processes or 
codes of conduct backed by regulatory oversight, as the GDPR does, to give 
substance to standards in sectoral context. Ex post, courts could articulate 
substantive backstops, for example by affording an avenue for legal chal-
lenges to AI decision-making after an individual exhausts a privatized con-
testation right.463  
In sum, while a contestation right is unlikely to succeed or fail solely 
because it is based on a particular archetype, due process goals are better 
served with certain common features. Clear process can make it easier for 
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individuals to contest AI decisions, giving them a sense of agency and bol-
stering the perceived legitimacy of a system. Clear substance can direct 
challenges appropriately, lower costs of participation, and better serve spe-
cific instrumental goals, such as accuracy or antidiscrimination. Both clear 
process and clear substance can serve rule of law values by uncovering ar-
bitrariness, unfairness, or irrational decision-making. However, there is 
also value in flexibility, particularly with regard to substance, as it can ac-
commodate previously unanticipated goals or values and support stake-
holder and expert participation.  
B. The Right to Contest as Privatized Process: Notice and a Hearing 
However well-crafted a right to contest AI, individual participation 
can be illusory if it is not supported by certain features. Participation rights 
should feature familiar elements of due process: notice, reason giving, and 
an opportunity to be heard before a legitimate, if not neutral, decision-
maker.464 They should also include design elements beyond due process, 
such as incentive structures that support legitimate decision-making and 
recognition of the broader regulatory context, including backing individ-
ual challenges with robust systemic governance. 
1. Meaningful Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard. — The paradig-
matic elements of due process as articulated by Judge Henry Friendly in-
clude: notice of a decision and the grounds of that decision, a right to 
know the evidence on which a decision is based, a hearing before an unbi-
ased decision-maker or tribunal, a right to present arguments against a 
decision; and a statement of reasons.465 Friendly’s elements are more of a 
menu than a checklist; what constitutes a fair hearing may vary with cir-
cumstances such as the level of harm and administrative costs.466 
It would be challenging to administer a number of Friendly’s ele-
ments in the context of a right to contest AI.467 However, a right to contest 
AI that does not include at least elements of notice, evidentiary disclosure, 
and reason giving will not provide a meaningful hearing. Individuals can-
not correct inaccurate decisions if they cannot see the incorrect data, rea-
soning, or inferences underlying decisions. Individuals cannot be assured 
that decision-making is being applied nonarbitrarily if they cannot under-
stand a decision-making system’s logic. And individuals are unlikely to feel 
respected by a contestation right that does not provide a sufficient window 
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into decision-making—through notice, evidence, and reason giving—to 
make meaningful challenges possible. 
The GDPR’s transparency requirements reflect longstanding due pro-
cess traditions and are intended to enable the contestation right.468 The 
GDPR requires that individuals be notified when a decision involves auto-
mated decision-making.469 The GDPR’s general rights to review and cor-
rect data can provide data subjects with information on which to base a 
challenge.470 
In the context of AI decision-making, however, notice and access 
rights are not enough. Due process theory explains that reason giving plays 
a central role.471 Friendly describes reason giving as necessary for a num-
ber of purposes: to prevent wrong decisions, to achieve more uniformity 
across decisions, and to make negative decisions more acceptable.472 
Frederick Schauer similarly describes reason giving as displaying commit-
ment to an outcome, allowing decision disciplining, and showing respect 
for the subjects of decisions.473 For a right to contest AI decisions to be 
effective, individuals must be afforded access to both the AI’s “record” and 
its reasoning. 
The GDPR consequently requires both that individuals affected by AI 
decision-making be provided “meaningful information about the logic in-
volved” in such decision-making,474 “the significance and envisaged conse-
quences” of the decision-making process,475 and a “right to explanation.”476 
The GDPR’s much-debated “right to explanation” requires that individuals 
be provided an explanation of automated decisions with significant ef-
fects.477 What this constitutes has been hotly debated.478 EU Member States 
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 478. Id. at 200. 
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have implemented the right to explanation in a variety of ways, ranging from 
France’s requirement that decisions be “legible,” to the UK’s more minimal-
ist interpretation.479  
The GDPR is not alone in requiring reason giving and records. The 
FCBA similarly requires that a credit card company explain why it has 
failed to refund a charge and provide documentary evidence to support 
this reasoning on request.480 By contrast, the RTBF does not mandate ex-
planation of search engine decisions, although Google has voluntarily 
taken it upon itself to provide an explanation when it rejects a claim.481 For 
a right to contest to be meaningful, there must be some individually com-
prehensible explanation of the reasoning behind a decision. 
Other elements of a fair hearing include participation, such as an op-
portunity to explain why a decision is wrong or a right to call witnesses.482 
The GDPR’s Article 22 includes at least two participation rights: a right to 
human intervention, and a right to “express his or her point of view.”483 
These rights are interdependent with the GDPR’s transparency rights and 
the particulars of how a contestation process is implemented. Whether a 
right to express one’s point of view is meaningful will depend on whether 
the right to explanation provides a sufficient measure of reason giving to 
support meaningful participation. It will depend on whether the contesta-
tion process and timeline are clear and low cost. And it will depend on 
whether the substantive aspects of the decision, such as underlying law, are 
easily understandable. Proprietary algorithms and datasets only add im-
penetrability.484 
It is unclear how robustly the GDPR’s participation requirements will 
be incorporated into actual contestation procedures. This, again, suggests 
an advantage to contestation rules rather than standards. The highly pro-
ceduralized UK rubric allows the data subject to provide “additional infor-
mation.” It is unclear, however, what “additional information” can be 
provided, or how it will be treated. Depending on how it is operationalized, 
this could create robust participation, or instead result in very limited 
“conversations” that are unlikely to serve as a true “sign of respect” for the 
data subject.485 
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The French approach to the use of AI in the public sector demon-
strates another way to structure a combination of reason giving and partic-
ipation rights. French law requires not just reason giving but 
comprehensibility. In France, the law, at least as it applies to the public 
sector, requires the users of algorithms (that is, public officials) to be able 
to exercise control over them and to explain how they work to an affected 
person.486 This is connected to robust participation rights: For public sec-
tor decisions, the “structured mechanism” for a right to contest AI is dic-
tated by French administrative law, including robust administrative 
procedures.487 
The French approach thus combines reason giving with human over-
sight, so as to create the possibility of meaningful intervention by the con-
testing parties and by the human using the algorithm.488 Whether 
contestation should require such a level of human intervention and over-
sight capacity remains an open question. Such comprehensibility require-
ments could protect data subjects but will likely preclude the use of certain 
kinds of complex algorithms. 
2. A Legitimate Decision-Maker. — A neutral arbiter is considered core 
to due process.489 A neutral arbiter affords dignity to participants, tethers 
parties’ discretion, and helps identify and eschew bias and error, ultimately 
providing confidence that decisions are accurate and fair. Schemes that 
lack a neutral arbiter may gain efficiency at the cost of legitimacy. 
For example, one of the criticisms of the DMCA’s notice-and-
takedown process is that online platforms—chosen for their handy inter-
mediary location between copyright holders and alleged infringers—are 
not neutral arbiters. Platforms’ interests—in avoiding liability, attracting 
and keeping a user base, and limiting administrative costs—may be at odds 
with the disputants’ interests. Neutrality concerns also pervade recent dis-
cussions of content moderation, with Facebook establishing the purport-
edly neutral Facebook Oversight Board to decide appeals.490 There may be 
merit in a hybrid system in which initial arbiters are not necessarily neutral 
                                                                                                                                
 486. French law requires that public authorities be able to exercise a mastery, or ensure 
control, over algorithmic decision-making to the extent of being able to explain, intelligibly 
and in detail, how the processing works to the impacted person (a loose translation of 
French law). Pour ces décisions, le responsable de traitement s’assure de la maîtrise du traitement 
algorithmique et de ses évolutions afin de pouvoir expliquer, en détail et sous une forme intelligible, à 
la personne concernée la manière dont le traitement a été mis en oeuvre à son égard. Malgieri trans-
lates this as “the data controller ensures the control of the algorithmic processing and its 
evolutions in order to be able to explain, in detail and in an intelligible form, to the person 
concerned how the processing has been implemented in his or her individual case.” 
Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, at 13 (em-
phasis omitted). 
 487. Id. 
 488. Malgieri refers to this and other French law regarding private processing as “one 
of the few cases in which a law guarantees a right to explanation.” Id. at 15. 
 489. Borraccetti, supra note 91, at 105. 
 490. Klonick, supra note 314. 
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but those who review their decisions are. Van Loo has suggested one such 
scheme by which privatized contestation overseen by companies can later 
be appealed to federal courts.491 
In an ideal world, an uninvolved party would adjudicate contestation 
of AI decisions. In some settings, this may be possible, particularly where 
the potential harms to an affected person are high enough to justify the 
attendant administrative costs. For example, when AI is used in the crimi-
nal justice system, affected defendants should be afforded the ability to 
meaningfully contest AI decisions before a judge.492 When AI decision-
making is used in a regulatory setting, constitutional due process may re-
quire adjudication by a neutral party.493 
A right to contest private sector AI decisions, however, is unlikely to 
include a neutral arbiter, at least at first bite. The privatized contestation 
schemes discussed in Part III illustrate this as a practical matter. Where 
speed and scale are concerns and the impact of decisions arguably less 
significant, the cost of a neutral arbiter can be prohibitive. Neither our 
archetype contestation schemes nor Article 22 feature a neutral arbiter. To 
the contrary, interested actors make the decisions. 
Under Article 22, a company that uses AI to make decisions about a 
person will likely also be the arbiter of challenges to those decisions. At 
first glance, this might appear to delegitimize the entire process. However, 
as the next section discusses, setting up the right incentives for a nonneu-
tral decision-maker can improve both outcomes and legitimacy. Jurisdic-
tions that have not yet formulated a right to contest AI might consider 
balancing neutrality with efficiency, for example, by requiring the arbiter 
to hold an independent position within a company or by contemplating 
hybrid private–public systems for “appeals.” 
In some cases, the question isn’t only whether there should be a neu-
tral human decision-maker but whether there should be a human deci-
sion-maker at all. A contestation scheme can be entirely automated.494 
Some parties may be tempted to address the decision-maker cost and effi-
ciency problem by replacing, or augmenting, human decision-makers with 
                                                                                                                                
 491. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 871–72. 
 492. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 79, at 2039–51 (discussing the right to confront and 
impeach machine “witnesses”); Wexler, supra note 6, at 1395–413 (arguing against using a 
criminal trade secret privilege to prevent criminal defendants from examining and chal-
lenging software programs). 
 493. See, e.g., Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, 
at 1905–06. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss what meaningful contestation 
might entail in these contexts. It would certainly entail more than attaching a warning to AI 
tools as, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has done. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 
749 (Wis. 2016). 
 494. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 29. 
Confronted with internet-scale infringement, some rights holders deploy algorithms to 
identify potentially infringing materials and generate notices. For the subset of OSPs that 
receive these notices—which can exceed a billion a year—the response is to automate the 
takedown process. One of us has called this system “DMCA Auto” and “DMCA Plus.” Id. 
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AI.495 Having an AI “judge” contestation “cases” would certainly make the 
system faster and less expensive. 
However, having an AI arbiter would compound the difficulty of un-
covering AI bias. Arbitrating AIs will have biases of their own—biases that 
may be difficult for humans to observe or understand. The GDPR places 
importance on recourse to a human, rather than AI, intervention in an AI 
decision. There is an active scholarly debate over the importance and ef-
fect more generally of having a “human in the loop.”496 
Where decision-makers aren’t neutral arbiters, a privatized contesta-
tion system must tether decision-maker self-interest. One way to do so is to 
establish a judicial or regulatory backstop. Contestation could be appeala-
ble to a judge or neutral external board;497 one could establish regulatory 
oversight over contestation systems;498 or one could make abuse or misrep-
resentations legally actionable.499 As the DMCA shows, however, none of 
these approaches is perfect; a legitimate contestation system might require 
multiple checks. Regulators might additionally require decisions to be 
made or overseen by an independent officer within a company, require 
reporting by a company to a regulator, or provide whistleblower protec-
tions for employees who wish to report on a contestation system. Section 
IV.B.4 further discusses such systemic regulations. 
3. Risk and Incentive Structures. — The effects of a contestation scheme 
are deeply influenced by the incentive structures created by law and re-
flected in practice. Another way to tether decision-maker discretion is to 
structure decision-maker incentives such that even nonneutral decision-
makers find it attractive to pursue accuracy and legitimacy, and to rule in 
favor of contesting individuals when appropriate. For example, the FCBA 
chargeback process encourages credit card companies to rule for challeng-
ers and refund charges, because the alternative—conducting an investiga-
tion—is expensive.500 The UK’s proceduralized implementation of the 
right to contest might similarly encourage companies to decide for indi-
viduals. By contrast, both the RTBF and section 512 processes operate in 
the shadow of liability risk for the online intermediaries making removal 
                                                                                                                                
 495. See generally Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra 
note 8; Van Loo, supra note 5. 
 496. See, e.g., Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 681; Meg Leta Jones, 
The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair Automation Practices 
Principles, 18 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 77, 134 (2015); Rebecca Crootof, Margot Kaminski & 
Nicholson Price, Humans in the Loop 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 497. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 314, at 2425; Lee, supra note 395, at 1036; Van Loo, 
supra note 5, at 870. 
 498. See, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 109. 
 499. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2018). 
 500. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 854. 
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decisions. Consequently, both the DMCA and RTBF are criticized for skew-
ing platforms’ incentives toward removal.501 
Incentives for contesting individuals also merit attention. For exam-
ple, uneven legal requirements, resulting in uneven risk allocation, afflict 
the DMCA’s complaint and contestation processes. Senders of takedown 
notices have to declare under penalty of perjury that they are authorized 
to act. However, none of senders’ other statements, including their sub-
stantive assertions of infringement, is subject to this stricture.502 But coun-
ternotice senders must accept perjury exposure for their statements that 
disputed material is not infringing,503 along with U.S. federal court juris-
diction and process.504 According to OSPs interviewed by one of us as part 
of a qualitative study, the perceived risk to targets of misstating their rights 
to post contested material chills counternotices.505 Indeed, it can chill 
OSPs from encouraging users to submit counternotices, even when they 
think counternotices are warranted.506 This is neither a practically usable 
contestation process, nor one that garners legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                                
 501. Because remedies for copyright liability can be punishing, the DMCA incentivizes 
online service providers to reduce risk by erring on the side of removing material. Statutory 
damages range from $200 to $150,000, per work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Because stat-
utory damages are calculated per work infringed, OSPs—which may host or link to very 
large numbers of user posted works—can face extremely high potential awards. For a de-
tailed discussion of the effect of statutory damages in the U.S. copyright system, see 
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 360. Some have argued that the RTBF also skews too 
heavily toward takedowns because companies have an incentive to avoid liability for posting 
personal information in violation of data protection law. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 397, at 
320–22. At the same time, companies also appear to have other incentives, both principled 
and economic, to push back against delisting. For example, Google has developed the prac-
tice of placing notices in search results from which links have been delisted and notifying 
webmasters of removal, despite criticism from regulators. Article 29 Working Party, 
Guidelines on Google Spain, supra note 308, at 9 subsec. 22, 10 subsec. 23. Indeed, in 2016, 
the Spanish Data Protection Authority fined Google €150,000 for communicating allegedly 
identifiable information about three data subjects to webmasters. See David Erdos, 
Communicating Responsibilities: The Spanish DPA Targets Google’s Notification Practices 




 502. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i-v), with id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). 
 503. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C). 
 504. Id. § 512(g)(3)(D). 
 505. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 44 – 45. 
 506. Id. at 45. At the same time, these requirements fail to deter bogus counternotices 
from some bad actors, determined pirates operating from the safety of jurisdictions outside 
the United States, who are undeterred by perjury penalties or section 512(f) damages. Id. 
at 46. For example, one rights holder interviewed as part of the Notice and Takedown in 
Everyday Practice research described  
receiv[ing] only seven [counter] notices in the last two years (we have sent 
nearly 9,000 notices to Google). Two were a result of administrative errors 
on our end. Five were [bogus counternotices] from Russian or Ukrainian 
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4. Regulatory Context and Systemic Regulation. — Both the substantive 
rights underlying a contestation scheme and the regulatory design around 
it can influence how the scheme operates in practice and whether it is per-
ceived as legitimate. For example, the DMCA’s section 512 exists against 
the backdrop of substantive copyright law, including cases on intermediary 
liability. The RTBF is backstopped both substantively and institutionally by 
judges (the CJEU) and regulators (data protection authorities enforcing 
the GDPR). Determining how the regulatory setting affects a right to con-
test may be particularly challenging for general-purpose algorithmic con-
testation schemes like Article 22, which are intended to work across legal 
and market sectors. 
Again, an individual right to contest AI is both necessary and by itself 
insufficient. As noted in section II.B.I, there have been extensive and valid 
critiques of a regulatory model that relies primarily on individual rights, 
given the United States’ history of emphasizing individual notice and 
choice.507 Relying only on individual contestation could in the best case 
still forgo the benefits of effective systemic regulation of AI, and in the 
worst case, afford a stamp of legitimacy to an illegitimate system.508 
Effective governance of AI requires expertise in both substantive law 
and in technology—expertise that is expensive to acquire, and that most 
individuals will not have, but that regulators may be more effective at ob-
taining and applying. Many of the problems with AI, too, are best ad-
dressed ex ante—by, for example, inspecting parameters and training sets 
or involving affected stakeholders—before a system is deployed. And many 
of the problems with AI will be best assessed systemically, rather than on a 
case-by-case basis—for example, an AI’s impact on particular marginalized 
groups or physical settings.509 
Thus it is crucial to situate contestation rights within regulatory over-
sight and other systemic risk mitigation measures.510 For example, 
Slovenia’s implementation of the right to contest contains a proactive pro-
cedural requirement that a “specially focused impact assessment” be 
carried out “[p]rior to the introduction of a system of automated decision-
                                                                                                                                
torrent sites that knew that there was no chance that we would sue them 
in their jurisdiction. 
 Id. 
 507. See supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text. 
 508. Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 67 (similarly discussing the individual Article 
22 “right to explanation” as potentially being a “transparency fallacy”). 
 509. See, e.g., Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1579 (“An accountable 
collaborative governance regime can also complement individual procedural rights. Estab-
lishing systemic accountability in a collaborative governance regime can bolster individual 
rights by providing oversight in the name of affected individuals.”). 
 510. See id. at 1549; Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating AI Risk Through the GDPR 13 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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making procedures.”511 This must “include an impact assessment on re-
lated human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular with regard 
to nondiscrimination.”512 Other measures, such as requiring that technol-
ogy be designed ex ante to protect human rights, requiring companies to 
involve an independent corporate officer in internal decisions and over-
sight, or requiring external audits of the system, all can make contestation 
rights more fair and effective. Legislators can backstop these systems with 
substantive regulations and significant penalties for failure. Individual 
rights and systemic governance are not in opposition; they can comple-
ment and augment each other.513 
Further, a privatized right to contest cannot be legitimate without some 
form of systemic transparency. Transparency into how a contestation system 
is operating and whether it meets due process goals is crucial for accounta-
bility and oversight. Subjecting decisions to public transparency over time—
a core element of judicial process—can illustrate whether a contestation 
scheme is systemically accurate or fair. Strikingly, the Council of Europe’s 
Recommendations recommend systemic transparency for contestation.514 
Yet transparency is often lacking in privatized contestation schemes. For 
example, the DMCA operates with a considerable lack of transparency and 
ensuing uncertainty about its reliability.515 Leaving aside the small number 
of section 512(f) lawsuits, the DMCA has no transparency requirements. Ra-
ther, its contestation scheme operates as a “black box” in which private com-
plainants, websites, and targets make decisions without insight into others’ 
actions.516 There is no requirement for websites or other parties to disclose 
their policies, provide their frameworks for decision-making, or explain 
their decisions.517 As a result, the U.S. Copyright Office has lamented that 
                                                                                                                                
 511. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, 
at 18. 
 512. Id. With this provision, Slovenia appears to be requiring a specialized version of 
the “Data Protection Impact Assessments” (DPIAs) required by Article 35 for all processing 
“likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.” GDPR, supra 
note 13, art. 35(1). Malgieri argues that DPIAs are generally required for algorithmic 
decision-making but sees the “human rights” aspect of Slovenia’s specialized impact assess-
ment as different from the general requirement. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in 
the EU Member States, supra note 115, at 18. 
 513. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1577–80; see also Kaminski & 
Malgieri, Impact Assessments, supra note 287, at 126–27. 
 514. Council of Eur., Recommendation on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic 
Systems, supra note 20, at 13 (“[Companies] should make public information about the 
number and type of complaints made by affected individuals or groups . . . .”). 
 515. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 282, at 113, 
119–20. 
 516. See, e.g., Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 373, at 343–44; Urban et al., Accounts 
of Everyday Practice, supra note 374, at 374. 
 517. Although some companies voluntarily provide statistical “transparency reports” 
and/or contribute notices they receive to the research repository Lumen, this is a minority, 
and there is no standard for what information is required. This lack of a standard has led to 
calls for greater voluntary transparency with standardized reporting. See, e.g., Manila 
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“the privatized, extra-judicial nature of takedown notices and counter-no-
tices under section 512 . . . result[s] in much of the information about how 
the system is being utilized in practice being inaccessible.”518 The Copyright 
Office named this as “a key obstacle” for “policy makers looking to create 
evidence-based policy with respect to the notice-and-takedown regime.”519 
Similarly, RTBF transparency, while encouraged in regulators’ 
Guidelines,520 is neither mandatory nor consistent. This, too, creates ques-
tions about the legitimacy of the system. Google, for example, has set up 
some transparency processes and described at least some of the substantive 
criteria it currently uses to render decisions, but the full criteria are 
unclear.521 
Systemic transparency could take a number of forms. Record-keeping 
about decisions and challenges could be made available to the public or 
to regulators.522 If this is too onerous, other options could partially fill the 
gap. For example, the European Commission Guidelines’ “good practice 
suggestions” for algorithmic decisions—auditing, certification, and ethical 
review boards—could also be applied to contestation mechanisms.523  
                                                                                                                                
Principles on Intermediary Liability, ManilaPrinciples.Org, https://www.manilaprinciples.org 
[https://perma.cc/E4DV-N9H8] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); The Santa Clara Principles on 
Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation, SantaClaraPrinciples.Org, https:/ 
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https://lumendatabase.org [https://perma.cc/2KEN-9TR2] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). 
 518. Strong, supra note 310, at 70. 
 519. Id. 
 520. Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Google Spain, supra note 308, at 3 
(“[T]he . . . Working Party . . . strongly encourages the search engines to . . . make more 
detailed statistics available.”). 
 521. Google voluntarily set up several different sources of transparency regarding the 
EU’s Right to Be Forgotten. For example, it has provided webmasters with notice of remov-
als, Lee, supra note 395, at 1041, and issued a summary report. Theo Bertram, Elie 
Bursztein, Stephanie Caro, Hubert Chao, Rutledge Chin Feman, Peter Fleischer, Albin 
Gustafsson, Jess Hemerly, Chris Hibbert, Luca Invernizzi, Lanah Kammourieh Donnelly, 
Jason Ketover, Jay Laefer, Paul Nicholas, Yuan Niu, Harjinder Obhi, David Price, Andrew 
Strait, Kurt Thomas & Al Verney, Google, Three Years of the Right to Be Forgotten 2 (2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H4MKNwf5MgeztG7OnJRnl3ym3gIT3HUK [https://per 
ma.cc/3LEC-QDDW]. Google also responded to regulators’ encouragement by running an 
actively updated transparency report that covers the RTBF. See Requests to Delist Content 
Under European Privacy Law, Google, https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/ 
overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/N94J-ZPD5] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). Google reports 
numbers of URLs delisted, categories of requesters, categories of material targeted by re-
moval requests, and statistics including the percentage delisted or retained. Id. 
 522. See, e.g., the recently proposed Washington Privacy Act, S.B. 5062, 67th Leg., 2021 Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2021) (requiring data protection impact assessments to be made available to the 
state Attorney General); see also Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong (2019). 
 523. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 32. 
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C. A Floor, Not a Ceiling 
AI creates problems wherever it goes. Thus, a right to contest AI 
decisions with significant effects should attach to the technology and apply 
across sectors, not just to specific applications. This recommendation runs 
counter, however, to the current U.S. sectoral approach to regulating in-
formation privacy. 
Therefore, a right to contest in the United States should operate as a 
floor, not a ceiling. This approach would allow decisions in particular subject 
matter areas to receive added protections. This Article has already mentioned 
criminal law. Perhaps housing, employment, and credit decisions should also 
receive augmented protections, grounded in existing regulatory regimes.524 A 
right to contest could be designed so that in addition to subject-matter-
specific laws, regulatory guidance could help fill in sector-specific 
applications, as could co-regulatory tools such as codes of conduct.525 
D. Thresholds for Coverage 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate which kinds of deci-
sions should be subject to a contestation right. However, a right to contest 
AI should apply at least to decisions with significant effects, even in the 
private sector. And a right to contest AI should apply not just to decisions 
made solely by AI, but to human decisions that significantly rely on AI 
tools. 
Due process rights, in general, wax and wane with the importance of 
the underlying interest. The GDPR’s contestation right applies to 
decisions with “legal” or “similarly significant[]” effects.526 We leave to 
policymakers and other research what kinds of decisions have sufficiently 
“significant effects” to necessitate contestation rights. The Council of 
                                                                                                                                
 524. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018); Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2018). 
 525. Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the 
Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 83, 122–35; Dennis D. Hirsch, 
The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 
Seattle U. L. Rev. 439, 465–66 (2011); Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1574; 
William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 959, 983–85 (2016). 
 526. GDPR, supra note 13, Recital 71; see also Guidelines on Automated Individual 
Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 21–22, which describes “legal effects” as applying to 
fundamental rights (such as freedom of association and voting), legal status (such as denial of 
citizenship), recourse to entitlements or benefits, and rights under a contract. “Similarly sig-
nificant” effects are effects that have an impact on a data subject similar to a change in legal 
rights in terms of its effects on the data subject’s “circumstances, behaviour or choices.” The 
Working Party notes that it “is difficult to be precise about what could be considered suffi-
ciently significant,” but suggests that access to credit, health services, employment or educa-
tion might qualify, and that vulnerable individuals might be significantly affected even when 
others are not. Id. 
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Europe’s Recommendation, for example, contemplates impacts on 
human rights and democratic systems.527 
As noted, there is an active policy debate over whether only “solely” 
algorithmic decisions should be regulated or whether regulations should 
apply more broadly to cover human decisions facilitated by machines.528 
While the GDPR covers only “solely” automated decisions (although guid-
ance has interpreted this to include at least rubber-stamping humans), the 
proposal of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada suggests 
dropping the qualifier to cover the use of AI more broadly.529 Proposed 
legislation in the United States similarly would have applied to AI that 
helps make impactful decisions.530 Because regulation could be easily 
evaded by using a human to rubber-stamp what is essentially an AI process, 
and because of concerns about human competence to question AI tools, 
this broader definition is preferable. 
E. Exceptions and Challenges 
While a right to contest AI should in general function as a cross-
sectoral floor, it may make sense to carve out exceptions for some applica-
tions or to tailor the threshold for coverage so that some applications 
aren’t included. In some cases, it may be that some other oversight mech-
anism—for example, expert oversight by a doctor with a fiduciary duty to 
a patient531—adequately substitutes for an individual right to contest. In 
others, it may be that the right’s threshold coverage could be tailored to 
leave out some kinds of arguably significant effects, such as telecommuni-
cations network outages.532 Future research may address this question. 
                                                                                                                                
 527. See Council of Eur., Recommendation on the Human Rights Impacts of 
Algorithmic Systems, supra note 20, at 6, 9, 11, 13. 
 528. See supra notes 115, 150, 307 and accompanying text. 
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Significant open questions and challenges remain. For example, un-
der what circumstances, if any, should policymakers allow for unexplaina-
ble AI? Relatedly, what level of explainability is necessary for effective 
contestation? The EU suggests that a right to explanation and right to con-
testation are intertwined, but that might not always be the case. Centraliz-
ing the right to contest—versus the right to meaningful explanation—
might address some of the purportedly irreconcilable challenges of black-
box AI, if an effective contestation scheme could be designed without nec-
essarily opening the black box. One way to do so might be to give individ-
uals performance metrics and allow contestation on the basis of disparate 
impact on a particular group.533 
Other questions, however, remain. What happens if there is a clear 
tradeoff between affording a right to contest and accuracy? Or between 
affording a right to contest and bias across a system? Again, these are prob-
lems for future researchers, but a look to the due process literature might 
be informative. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning now to the International Baccalaureate students whose 
story begins this Article, the importance of the right of contestation be-
comes clear. Writing in the Harvard Business Review, a parent of an IB stu-
dent and two colleagues argue that the IBO should have designed a more 
contestable process.534 “[Better design] is about making sure that people 
understand what information is used in assessing grades and what the steps 
are in the appeals process itself.”535 This argument invokes both dignity 
(participation) and rule of law (transparency) values. In other words, peo-
ple confronted with AI decision-making look for more transparency, more 
explanation, and more participation: a right to contest. 
There is a growing momentum around the world for establishing a 
right to contest AI decisions. This right has an important role to play in 
the United States, where it is not yet a meaningful part of policy conversa-
tions. A right to contest AI is both normatively desirable and practically 
feasible. A right to contest could ameliorate the foreseeable harms of AI. 
                                                                                                                                
 533. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 55–56 (explaining that performance met-
rics give information on a model’s unseen data, including breakdowns like success in certain 
subcategories of data). 
 534. Evgeniou et al., supra note 45 (arguing that IBO should have created an easier 
appeals process that offered human-led re-evaluation of grades). 
 535. Id. 
2048 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1957 
 
 
